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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose of the Thesis and Main Findings
In general, penal codes undertake the task of punishing crimes against a person
or a persons property. In this context, the punishment itself fullls two major
purposes. The rst is to sanction the criminal and therefore to provide individual
deterrence. The second and equally important purpose is to provide general deter-
rence with keeping potential o¤enders from committing similar crimes. It is not
the intention of criminal prosecution to compensate victims for the loss su¤ered
but to make clear that society opposes criminal behavior. In contrast to sanctions
like compensation in civil law, it is ex ante not clear to the decision maker whether
the expected punishment a criminal faces really has the intended e¤ects. Hence,
from an economic point of view, there is foremost one question of particular im-
portance in this context: To what extend does an existing sanctioning regime and
its specic components deter people from committing crimes?
It is the aim of the present thesis to answer this question for environmental
crimes in Germany. More specically, the thesis empirically analyzes the e¤ec-
tiveness of the German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) in deterring environmental
crimes. Although environmental crimes are perfectly accessible by economic theory
as they are mostly economically motivated, this focus is rather novel. Environ-
mental crimes have several special characteristics that have not been studied so
far. Existing studies examining the e¤ectiveness of criminal enforcement focused
on felonies like murder, rape, assault, etc.. Environmental crimes are distinct from
those in that they constitute crimes against a public good. Environmental crimes
in most cases do not harm a person or a persons property directly but only in-
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directly and in the long run through environmental degradation. Violations of
environmental laws are therefore in many cases seen as minor crimes that may be
prosecuted di¤erently. Previous studies of other types of crimes are therefore not
immediately applicable when it comes to environmental o¤ences. Another strand
of economic literature analyzes the e¤ectiveness of administrative law in punishing
violations against the environment. This literature again provides no evidence for
the e¤ectiveness of criminal law in enforcing environmental regulations. Since ad-
ministrative law and criminal law di¤er signicantly in incurred costs and available
sanctions, it is necessary for consistent policy-making to have reliable information
on the e¤ectiveness of both regimes. In addition to the gap in the existing liter-
ature, studying the e¤ectiveness of the enforcement of environmental law trough
the German Penal Code is an important research question for several reasons.
First, as there is no way to evaluate the e¤ectiveness ex ante, it is overdue
to examine this issue since criminal sanctioning for environmental crimes takes
place in Germany for almost 30 years. This applies especially as there is a cur-
rent discussion in German law literature that questions the usefulness of criminal
enforcement in the context of environmental law. Germany decided already in
1980 to include important environmental laws and the specic criminal sanctions
in the Penal Code. At this early stage only few other countries, including the
U.S., followed similar strategies to sanction violations of environmental laws and
regulations.
Second, there is an ongoing policy debate in many industrialized countries and
especially within the EU discussing whether to further strengthen criminal enforce-
ment in the context of environmental law - or not. However, neither proponents
nor opponents of sti¤er sanctions are able to base their arguments on sound em-
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pirical evidence. To provide evidence for Germany is of great importance in this
context as the German case is often considered as a reference point.
Third, it is evident that environmental crimes cause severe damages to society.
For example, in 2006 parties involved in hazardous waste pollution in the U.S. had
to pay a total of $391 Mill. to study and clean up contamination of 15 million
cubic yards soil and 1.3 billion cubic yards ground water (EPA 2006).
Finally, the analysis of Germany provides a new geographical focus as the major
part of the surrounding literature analyzes U.S. data with a small part focusing on
the UK. It is not clear whether results for the U.S. or UK carry over to other parts
of the world. The legal environments may be di¤erent enough in each country to
make direct comparisons impractical.
Against the background of the existing evidence gap, the thesis makes three
contributions: The rst (part II) is to examine whether the empirical data supports
the hypothesis that criminal sanctions are successful in deterring environmental
crime. The empirical evidence is contained in a unique dataset on recorded envi-
ronmental crime, prosecution, trials in criminal courts, and corresponding criminal
sanctions, including imprisonment. Covering the eleven-year period from 1995 -
2005 and 15 German states, a dynamic panel analysis is employed to exploit both
intertemporal and state-level variations. By doing so, the thesis provides a novel
focus on criminal sanctioning in the context of environmental regulations. In addi-
tion, the analysis determines the individual contributions of di¤erent components
of the sanctioning regime to the deterrent e¤ect. Typical components are the clear-
ance rate (i.e. rate of crimes for which an o¤ender has been identied), the rate
of o¤enders tried in court, the conviction probability, the probability of pecuniary
nes and the probability of prison sentences. Given the di¤erences of costs be-
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tween di¤erent components, the relative benets in terms of deterrence delivered
by di¤erent components is clearly of importance.
Another special focus of this part addresses explicitly the reporting bias in
environmental crime. Reporting bias is a common problem for empirical work on
criminal o¤ences since typically only a fraction of actual crimes are reported to and
recorded by o¢ cial authorities leading to potentially substantial dark gures. To
address the reporting bias, an analytical framework is developed that characterizes
the observed crime rate as an outcome that is co-determined by two sets of players:
Potential criminals considering the amount of crimes to commit; and the public
and enforcement agencies considering how much aggregate detection e¤ort to sup-
ply. On this analytical basis, the thesis introduces plausible proxy measures for
detection e¤ort in order to disentangle these two determinants of reported crime
rates. Controlling for the possibility of dark gures is rarely done in economics
literature but may be of importance for other types of legal violations.
The main ndings are threefold: First, criminal sanctions do provide the de-
terrent e¤ects intended by policy-makers. This nding lends support to the claim
that criminal sanctions are e¤ective in combating environmental o¤ences and is in
line with the emerging empirical consensus on criminal sanctions in general. In this
respect, environmental o¤ences are not fundamentally di¤erent from other types
of crime and amenable to the same enforcement instruments. The nding also
contradicts the view, that due to the small number of cases prosecuted, criminal
sanctions are largely invisible and hence unlikely to provide signicant deterrence.
Second, while I nd most of the typical components of the criminal sanctioning
regime operating in line with expectations, there are novel results on selected com-
ponents. One is that the probability of being tried - rather than being convicted -
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provides one of the most signicant deterrents. This strengthens previous ndings
on the role of reputational losses as components of the sanctioning regime and
raises important issues about the desirable degree of publicness of sanctioning.
Third, political economy factors are statistically signicant drivers of reported
environmental crime rates. Greater environmental preferences of citizens lead to
a more than proportional increase in reported crime. While the limitations of
the data do not allow to pinpoint the causal channels, I hypothesize on the basis
of experimental evidence and empirical studies that citizenspreferences result in
greater detection e¤ort by both the public and enforcement agencies. By contrast,
having a pro-industry party in government leads to a reduction in reported envi-
ronmental crime. One explanation for this result rests on the presumed decrease
in detection e¤ort by the government. These ndings are supported by previous
ndings on the political economy of environmental o¤ences and by German law
literature.
The second contribution (part III) of the thesis is to extent ndings of the
previous part (II) by analyzing the development of illegal waste disposals for the
counties of Baden-Württemberg and the years 1995 - 2005. Illegal disposals of
waste are the major type of environmental crime in Germany (see gure 1) and
are therefore of special interest when studying the e¤ectiveness of the enforcement
regime applied in this context. The reason for taking this more regional and
disaggregated perspective is that information reecting specic characteristics of
waste disposals are only accessible by a ner analysis. Although it is not possible
to include the full set of variables analyzed in part II, the disaggregated perspective
o¤ers a huge amount of further informations especially for local waste markets and
the structural composition of counties.
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Results are fourfold. First of all, with respect to the deterrence e¤ect of di¤erent
criminal sanctioning components, results obtained for this dataset support to a
huge extent both previous ndings for German states and results obtained in the
general crime literature at this disaggregated level. Especially the fact of being
identied as a suspect and being tried in court deters people from committing
environmental o¤ences. In contrast to the results on state level (part II), there is
no evidence that the probability of a prison sentence deters people from disposing
waste illegally. Moreover, there is no evidence for the German conservatives to
a¤ect reporting in Baden-Württemberg negatively. However, several structural
factors reecting industry composition seem to inuence local decision makers in
their decision how much e¤ort to put into the enforcement process.
As for the waste market data, it is not possible to reveal signicant e¤ects. As
it is unlikely the case that the legal market for waste disposal does not a¤ect the
illegal counterpart, the most obvious reason is that data quality is not su¢ cient
to convey the relevant information. This reasoning is supported by the existing
literature on monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. There is
evidence especially for prices to a¤ect the amount of illegal disposals.
Fourth, results suggest that structural variables like population density, GDP
per capita and the revenue generated in the manufacturing sector a¤ect the amount
of reported illegal disposal. This is line with general ndings as socioeconomic
variables seem to play an important role for all criminal behavior.
The third contribution (part IV) reverses the focus. It examines whether the
e¤ectiveness of institutions involved in the criminal enforcement of environmental
law is independent of surrounding institutions or external factors such as political
forces. The political economy of regulatory enforcement has attracted a good deal
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of scholarly attention, resulting in an impressive body of empirical evidence on
what determines regulatory action. The typical case considered in the literature
studies the behavior of one particular regulator enforcing one regulation. Across
the studies, there is evidence that the political economy factors are allocatively
relevant. The enforcement context in the present thesis also focuses on a single
regulation, i.e. the German Penal Code, but studies the behavior not of a single
regulator but several di¤erent institutions at once. This multitude of institutions
o¤ers the opportunity of comparing the determinants of enforcement decisions of
di¤erent institutions along a single enforcement chain with each other and against
widely held assumptions about how this system works.
Key results are threefold. The rst is that economic factors matter at all
stages of the enforcement process. This implies that - very much in line with the
economic theory of enforcement - institutions deliberately direct resources away
from the enforcement of environmental law as its opportunity cost increases. This
responsiveness with respect to costs is evident at all levels, including criminal
courts, which enjoy the greatest degree of independence.
The second result is that political economy factors inuence enforcement de-
cisions at a statistically signicant level at all stages of the process. This demon-
strates that even in the most independent parts of the criminal justice system,
there is evidence of political reach-through.
The third result is that the relative weight of political economy factors is not
fully in line with the declared degree of independence: Prosecutorsand judges
decisions seem to be as responsive to political economy variables as the police
force.
Taken together, the present thesis makes a rst step to close the evidence gap
7
between the law and economics literature and the literature on the monitoring
and enforcement of environmental regulations. In doing so, the thesis provides
important results that have far-reaching policy implications for both Germany
and the rest of the world. In contrast to some speculations, criminal law proves to
be a very powerful tool in the enforcement of environmental law. Increasing the
compliance with environmental laws through criminal enforcement may therefore
help to reduce the damage to society caused by environmental o¤ences to su¢ cient
extent. The thesis is also able to conrm results for deterrence in a di¤erent
geographical context. It seems like people from di¤erent countries and within
di¤erent legal environments to react similar to economic incentives provided trough
the enforcement of environmental law.
The next section provides some background information to illustrate the eco-
nomic importance of environmental crimes and the development of criminal sanc-
tions for environmental o¤ences. As the thesis relies on German data, section 1.3
explains the peculiarities of German environmental law. Finally, section 1.4 gives
a short summary of the development of environmental crimes in Germany.
1.2 Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws
Environmental crime consists of unauthorized acts that violate national and in-
ternational laws put in place in order to protect the environment and that are
subject to criminal prosecution and sanction. Standard examples are the illegal
disposal of hazardous waste in waterways or in the ground and the illegal capture
and sale of protected species. Typically, environmental crime has an economic mo-
tivation, with savings from bypassing costly environmental regulations being the
8
main motive. The economic value of environmental crime is signicant: Globally,
the annual turnover in the illegal trade of environmentally sensitive commodities
is estimated at around $21 33 billion. In the United States alone, estimated
earnings of $10-12 billion per year are generated by the illicit treatment of waste,
$6-8 billion per year by violations of the Convention on the International Trade
with Endangered Species (CITES). The illegal trade in substances banned under
the Montreal Protocol are imputed to earn o¤enders $25-60 million per year (IWG
2000).
The origins of criminalizing environmental o¤ences lie in the 1980s: EPAs
criminal enforcement program was established in 1982, with full law enforcement
authority granted in 1988 (Situ and Emmons 2000). On this basis, the EPA has
initiated between 300 to 650 criminal cases per year in the period from 1995 to
2006 (EPA 1999, 2002, 2006). Germany included environmental o¤ences in crim-
inal law for the rst time in 1980, expanding the range of o¤ences again in 1994
(Schall 2006). In the last ten years, German enforcement agencies recorded be-
tween 15000 and 33000 o¤ences annually as environmental crimes and prosecuted
an average of approximately 4300 o¤enders per year. Other OECD countries have
similar statutes in place, even though di¤erences in particular regulations between
countries can be substantial (Faure and Heine 2006).
Against the background of existing sanctions, environmental lawmakers and
regulators both in the United States and the European Union have recently been
actively reviewing how to strengthen the use of criminal sanctions. The U.S. Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, for example, held hearings on strengthening criminal
enforcement for environmental o¤ences in 2002 (U.S. Senate 2003). In the UK,
the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee held an inquiry on cor-
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porate environmental crime and the scope for greater criminal prosecutions (HoC
2005). Likewise, the European Commission has started to aggressively pursue the
introduction and strengthening of criminal sanctions for environmental o¤ences
committed within the European Union (EC 2007). At the same time, there is an
ongoing debate among environmental lawyers over the usefulness of instruments
of criminal sanctions for environmental o¤ences. For the case of Germany, the
low volume of criminal convictions provides an argument that the deterrent e¤ect
must - if anything - be negligible (Schall 2006). Ogus and Abbott (2002) criticize
the excessive escalation implicit in criminal sanctions in England and Wales.
A general shortcoming of the discussion on the merits of criminal sanctions is
that the empirical evidence on their e¤ectiveness has so far not been systematically
examined. This contrasts with the case of administrative sanctions for which a rich
literature is available (e.g. Heyes 1998, Eckert 2004, Earnhart 2004, Shimshack
and Ward 2005, etc.).
As this thesis focuses on German data in analyzing environmental criminal
law, I will rst give a brief introduction to the specic characteristics of the en-
vironmental part of the German Penal Code. Subsequently, there will be a short
paragraph illustrating the development of reported environmental crime and its
enforcement in Germany in recent years.
1.3 Environmental Criminal Law in Germany
German environmental law is a very widespread area of legal activity. Prescrip-
tions regarding the environment are found in the German constitution, the German
Penal Code, state laws and regulations and many more. Furthermore, there are
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also several institutions enforcing environmental law in Germany. Environmental
o¤ences may be recorded by the police, prosecutors, administrative authorities
and custom investigation. Another specic feature of German environmental law
is its administrative accessoriness (Verwaltungsakzessorietät). This means that
the decision whether a particular behavior is legal or not is not always dened
ex ante but is sometimes administrative discretion. Neither the law itself nor its
enforcement has a clear-cut structure. Therefore, Germany recently tries to adopt
a uniform environmental code in order to make things more tractable. Neverthe-
less, it should be interesting to get a better understanding of the activities of the
di¤erent enforcement agencies and their punishment schemes.
The German Penal Code was extended in 1980 to include environmental of-
fences. At this time, Germany was one of the rst countries that decided to use the
powerful but weighty instrument of a Penal Code to enforce environmental laws.
In contrast to enforcement of administrative law, criminal law o¤ers the possibil-
ity of more severe sanctions including imprisonment. However, at the same time
Penal Codes are a very expensive enforcement mechanism as criminal proceedings
involve police, prosecution and courts. The enforcement of administrative law is
usually carried out by a single administrative agency.
The intention behind the extension of the German Penal Code was (i) to raise
the level of general deterrence on account of harsher sanctions being available
through the criminal justice system, (ii) to harness the additional policing and
prosecutorial resources available in the criminal justice system, and (iii) to im-
prove general awareness of the need for greater environmental protection (Hoch
1994, Schall 2006). Sti¤er sanctions were introduced into the German Penal Code
in 1994, following the inclusion of environmental protection in the German Consti-
11
tution as a distinct constitutional objective. Articles treating environmental crime
are subsumed in part 29 of the German Penal Code. Table 1 shows the relevant
types of environmental crime included in the German Penal Code. Although there
are criminal sanctions for types of o¤ences one may also subsume under environ-
mental o¤ences (e.g. violation against the protection of species, see BMI 2006),
the thesis exclusively focuses on those displayed in table 1.
Table 1: Types of Environmental Crime in the German Penal Code
Article O¤ense
§ 324 water pollution
§ 324a ground pollution
§ 325 air pollution
§ 325a noise, tremor or radiation
§ 326 illegal waste disposal
§ 327 illegal operation of plants
§ 328 illegal handling of nuclear radiation
§ 329 endangerment of nature reserves
§ 330a endangerment by discharging toxic
While the German Penal Code is federal law, the implementation of the law,
i.e. detection, prosecution, and sanctioning, is delegated comprehensively to the
level of the 16 States (Länder) within the Federal Republic. Unlike in the U.S.,
there is no federal shadow system of federal prosecutors or EPA o¢ cers that mon-
itor, assist, remedy, and possibly preempt state-level enforcement. Although there
are several agencies in Germany both on federal and on state level which have
functions similar to those of the EPA, there is no single agency occupying such
far-reaching competencies. Like in the U.S., German criminal law only provides
the possibility to accuse natural persons. Contrasting with administrative law,
there is no possibility to accuse rms or other institutions for committing a crime.
Further di¤erences to U.S. enforcement of environmental criminal law relate to
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the type of major lawsuits. In the U.S., most environmental o¤ences are tried in
civil lawsuits with punitive damages being an important type of sanctioning. In
Germany, however, almost all environmental o¤ences are tried in criminal proceed-
ings with nes being the usual sentence. Another di¤erence relates to the rules
of procedure. In Germany, judges are not just refereeing but it is their duty to
actively pilot a lawsuit.
These complex legal and institutional structures require a careful empirical
analysis to understand how enforcement works in German environmental law, and
how e¤ective it is. It is therefore an interesting topic to analyze the function-
ing of German environmental policy in more detail since this has not been done
adequately until now.
1.4 Environmental Crime in Germany: 1973 - 2006
While environmental crime has been on the increase across most EU member coun-
tries, Germany has witnessed a severely non-monotonous development over the last
15 years. Figure 1 shows the development of reported cases of environmental crime
in general (Chapter 29, §§324 - 330a StGB ) and of illegal waste disposals (§ 326
StGB excluding section 2) for West-Germany1 and the years 1973 - 2006.2
Contemporaneously to this spike in 1998 there emerged a vital discussion in
German law literature on how this development can be explained (Schall 2006).
One possible explanation may be the changing legal environment with the amend-
ments of the environmental criminal code in 1994. It might be the case that the
further strengthening of the Penal Code had a lagged e¤ect on crime or the imple-
1Data for Eastern Germany is available from 1993 onwards.
2Data for illegal waste disposal is only available from 1987 onwards.
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mentation of the new law on recycling and waste management (KrW-/AbfG) in
1996 changed incentives for potential o¤enders. Especially the last argument will
be subject to further investigations in part III of the thesis. Another suggestion for
the rapid change in overall environmental crimes is proposed by the German law
literature (see e.g. Schall 2006). There exists the conjecture that diminishing envi-
ronmental awareness in German society resulted in decreasing reporting behavior
and decreasing incentives for police and prosecution to sanction environmental
crime. To test whether this is true I included variables indicating environmental
preferences in the regression analysis of part II. Findings for the indicator variable
for public environmental preferences support this hypothesis (see section 10.2).
However, decomposing illegal waste disposals into single states3 reveals that
this spike is driven by a small number of states including Hesse, Berlin and Saxony-
Anhalt. If one looks at the development of environmental crime excluding Hesse
and Berlin as displayed in gure 2, it is evident that the amplitude of the spike
is signicantly reduced. According to the State O¢ ce of Criminal Investigation
of Hesse I know that there has been one big lawsuit in 1998 including about 1900
cases of illegal waste disposal. Hence, this part of the spike can be explained. In
case of Berlin and Saxony-Anhalt4 informations point towards the hypothesis that
the spikes are mainly driven by relics due to waste sites of the former German
Democratic Republic. The waste sites were closed in the late 1990s such that
the possibilities for illegal waste disposals were eliminated in these areas. How-
ever, a general understanding of the mechanisms underpinning these dynamics is
desirable.
3See the gures provided in appendix to section 1.3.
4Saxony-Anhalt is not included in gures 1 and 2 as it is Eastern Germany. The reader nds
the relevant information in the appendix to section 1.3.
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Figure 1: Environmental Crime in West-Germany (1973 - 2006)
It is also evident when looking at gure 1 that illegal waste disposals have a
large and steadily increasing impact on overall environmental crime.
Figure 3 therefore contrasts the major types of environmental crimes committed
in Germany (East and West together). About 75 percent of all cases involve
o¤ences related to waste disposal. Until the late 1980s, however, water pollution
(§ 324 StGB) has been the dominating type of environmental crime in Germany.
Illegal waste disposal (§ 326n(2) StGB ) took over in 1991 (see BMJ 2001) with a
rapidly growing discrepancy from thereon. However, since reported cases of illegal
waste disposal decrease more rapidly than those of water pollution in the years
following 1998, there may again be an intersection in the future. The gure also
shows some other important types of environmental crime in Germany like the
illegal transport of waste (§ 326(2) StGB), air pollution (§ 325 StGB), noise and
tremor (§ 325a StGB ), and the illegal operation of plants (§ 327 StGB ).
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Figure 2: Environmental Crime in West-Germany: Excluding Hesse and Berlin
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Figure 4 shows the evolution of illegal waste disposal in the state of Baden-
Württemberg. This will be of special relevance for part III of the thesis where a
more regional perspective is taken including several additional structural, political
and waste specic variables in the analysis. Similarly to the case for Germany, the
development of illegal waste disposals in the 44 counties of Baden-Württemberg
in mainly driven by the counties and cities of Stuttgart, Ludwigsburg, Esslingen,
Biberach and Böblingen. With the exception of Biberach all mentioned counties
and cities belong to the metropolitan area of the state capital Stuttgart. Excluding
those ve counties leads to a far more stationary development.
Interesting is also the composition and origin of cases recorded in the o¢ cial
crime statistics. The main but decreasing (86% in 1998, 70% in 2003)5 share of
all lawsuits regarding violations of environmental law in Germany are initiated
5Statistisches Bundesamt (2003).
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Figure 3: The Development of Cases for Di¤erent Articles of the German Penal
Code (1993 - 2005)
by police. Theses cases may result from a hint given by some citizen or from a
discovery made during patrol. A smaller but steadily rising part is initiated by
prosecution (11% in 1998, 25% in 2003). A very small but also increasing fraction
is initiated by administrative authorities (1,8% in 1998, 3,2% in 2003). In case of
environmental o¤ences the main part of these should be due to the commercial
regulatory authority (Gewerbeaufsichtsamt) and should therefore reect the frac-
tion of violations committed by rms. Finally, a more or less negligible part is
initiated by custom investigation (0,3% in 1998, 0,6% in 2003).
As the development of crime usually depends on several factors including the
stringency of enforcement of the executive, it is of special interest to analyze the
success of police, prosecution, and courts in enforcing environmental criminal law
in detail. Figure 5 shows the development of clearance rates, the rate of tried
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Figure 4: Illegal Waste Disposal in Baden-Württemberg (1987 - 2005)
o¤enders, conviction rates, the rate of severe nes, and prison rates for environ-
mental crime. These are relevant for my analysis in part IV. As in later regressions,
the enforcement variables have been generated sequentially. That is, the clearance
rate represents the portion of cleared cases in comparison to all reported cases.
The portion of accused suspects divided by all identied suspects is called the rate
of tried o¤enders. The fraction of tried o¤enders who are convicted reects the
conviction rate and the fraction of convicted o¤enders sent to prison is called prison
rate. Finally, the rate of severe nes indicates the portion of criminals sentenced
to a ne above 90 daily rates (Tagessätze). Getting a ne above 90 daily rates
implies a lasting record in the Criminal Records Bureau Check and may a¤ect
future job opportunities.
It is fairly evident that, in contrast to the amount of environmental crimes, the
punishment rates remained rather constant over the last decade. The clearance
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Figure 5: Average Punishment Rates for German States (1987/1995 - 2005)
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Note: Data for clearance rates is available from 1987. Data for all other punishment variables is only
available at the state level beginning with 1995.
rate of reported environmental crime is on average 62 percent, i.e. in 6 out of 10
cases one or more o¤enders are positively linked to the crime. Approximately 26
percent of identied o¤enders are prosecuted in courts. The remainder of cases
are either dismissed for lack of evidence or insu¢ cient severity of the o¤ence or
the o¤ender punished using lighter administrative nes that establish no criminal
record. Out of those ending up in court, over three quarters (76%) are sentenced,
of which 6.4 percent are sentenced to a severe ne and 3.5 percent are sentenced
to a prison sentence which in most cases is placed on probation. The rest faces
a standard ne that is converted into a prison sentence only if there is refusal
to pay. Therefore, within the population of reported crimes only approximately
0.4 percent face a prison term, the severest form of sanction. While these low
shares of severe sanctions have led legal scholars to conclude that the deterrence
19
e¤ect of environmental criminal law must be negligible (Lutterer and Hoch 1997;
Schall 2006), the economist would point out that this could also be evidence of a
particularly e¤ective sanctioning regime.
To summarize, Germany has with its long experience in the criminal enforce-
ment of environmental laws and the interesting development of reported cases of
environmental crimes a very attractive setting for a profound analysis. In order
to be able to compare the ndings of the analysis obtained in parts II-IV with
the existing literature, part I will give a review of the ndings of the surrounding
literature.
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Part I
Review of the Relevant Literature
2 The Economics of Crime Literature
There are many theories around trying to explain why someone commits a crime
or violation. Some criminologists believed and still believe that criminals are e.g.
atavistic beings, reversions to primitive ages, mental disordered, hormonal imbal-
anced or even individuals with a low IQ.6 They believe that individuals commit
crimes because they are driven by some morbid mental dysfunctions. Some of
them also argue that one can identify criminals on the basis of di¤erent physical
characteristics, mental diseases or heritable components (see e.g. Raine 2002).
In contrast, Becker (1968) developed a model of crime that is based on decisions
made by rational agents facing economic incentives. An individual will commit
a crime if the gain trough this crime exceeds its (opportunity) costs. In this
view criminals are no weird subjects but rather usual individuals maximizing their
utility. This economic model of crime had far-reaching consequences since its
introduction. With this model at hand society is no longer relegated to inactiveness
as it was the case with previous approaches. Assuming that criminals occupy some
sort of mental or genetic dysfunction implicates that society has very few options
to inuence potential criminals in order to deter them from illegal activities. Some
kind of criminal addiction should be very resistant to changing circumstances like
socioeconomic factors or law enforcement. In addition, punishing or medicating
6Levitt and Miles (2006) give a brief introduction to related work.
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people just because they have some suspicious characteristics violates fundamental
human rights.
On the other hand, rational individuals undertaking some kind of cost-benet-
analysis are highly inuenceable. Aside from the arising social cost of deterrence,
in order to erase crime one just has to make sure that the expected costs of crime
exceed its gains. Taking costs of law enforcement into account, it will be in most
cases neither socially optimal nor a¤ordable to fully eliminate crime. Hence, one
is also able to calculate some kind of socially optimal equilibrium crime rate in
which neither actor (criminals, private individuals and government) has incentives
to change their behavior (see Ehrlich 1996).
With the economic model of crime society has various instruments to reduce
crime to an optimal level. Admittedly, it is not plausible to assume that every
decision to commit a crime is a fully rational one. There are still some types of
crime for which it is hard to belief that the o¤ender made a pure cost-benet
analysis. As a result, the response to enforcement activities will be di¤erent for
particular crimes. Nevertheless, there is a huge amount of crimes, e.g. property
crimes, fraud, white collar crimes and of course environmental crimes, for which
economic reasoning is very plausible.
In the last few decades following Beckers (1968) article there emerged a vast
empirical literature dealing with this economic model of crime. The empirical
literature had thereby two major purposes. First of all it was the aim of many
researchers, beginning with Ehrlich (1973), to test the economic model of crime
empirically. The question here was whether data supports Beckers (1968) model
and it turns out that it does for many cases (see sections 2.3 - 2.5). The other
purpose was to gure out how to e¤ectively and e¢ ciently adjust the di¤erent
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determinants of crime like potential gains and expected punishment.
Although the model of Becker is one of individual decision-making, most empir-
ical studies used aggregated data on county, state or country level simply because
of data constraints.7 The purpose of the present part is to give a survey of the
major ndings of the empirical work conducted so far.
It should be mentioned yet that there are quite a few problems concerning
data quality in the crime literature which a¤ect the amount of applicable empirical
methods. It is clear to everyone analyzing crime empirically that one will always
face the problem of dark gures. Not every violation is recorded and therefore will
not show up in o¢ cial statistics.8 This could yield great measurement error bias
in empirical studies and therefore reduce explanatory power dramatically.
Another problem arises with di¤erent forms of endogeneity like simultaneity,
unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables. In case of simultaneity it turned
out that variables like police force or severity of punishment etc. do not just have
an e¤ect on crime but also the other way round. Another topic in the empirical
literature concerns the unobserved heterogeneity bias emerging when simple cross-
section data is used. Furthermore, biases resulting from omitted variables show
up in the area of crime like in every empirical project.
Two last concerns are made covering the bias arising through the aggregation
of di¤erent crime rates and the possibility of time lags in the economic model of
crime. Some studies aggregate di¤erent crimes to one crime index blending the
individual e¤ects to one. One additional factor which is not addressed very often
7For a review of work using individual data, see Witte (1980), Myers (1983), Cornwell &
Trumbull (1994), Levitt (2002a) or Levitt and Miles (2006).
8Although there are great di¤erences in the extent between various crimes. The dark gure
of murder e.g. will be rather small in comparison to fraud.
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in literature is the possibility of delayed responses. Since the economic model of
crime is one of individual behavior, it may be that individuals need time to adjust
their beliefs when the enforcement changes. If this is not incorporated in the
model, results may not reect the true relationships between particular variables.
The remainder of part I is organized as follows. Section 2.1 will give a short
introduction into the theoretical basis of the economic model crime from which
empirical studies derive their estimation equation. Sections 2.2 - 2.5 then give an
overview of the results of empirical work conducted so far. Econometric methods
are explained as well as e¤ects of di¤erent deterrent variables, incapacitation or
changing socioeconomic factors. Section 2.6 addresses the data problems a re-
searcher faces when dealing with the economic model of crime empirically and
section 2.7 concludes.
2.1 The Basic Economic Model of Crime
The economic approach to crime introduced by Beckers (1968) is a model of
individual behavior. In its simplest form it argues that someone will commit
a crime or violate some legal rule if the gain through this exceeds its costs in
terms of expected punishment. A potential criminal is therefore seen as a rational
individual maximizing its utility.
More formally, following Polinsky and Shavell (2000, 2006), a risk neutral in-
dividual will commit a crime or violation, i¤:
B > p  F = p(f + d(t)); (1)
with
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B : net benet an individual obtains from illegal activity: gain obtained from
illegal activity minus gain from legal activity (opportunity costs)
p : probability of detection;9
F : severity of punishment
f : possible ne for specic violation , f  [0,f max];10
t : possible length of imprisonment term for specic violation, t  [0,tmax];11
d(t) : disutility per unit of imprisonment term t ; d(0)=0 ; d 0(t) > 0:12
In this very simple form, the model builds up a direct relationship between
potential benet B and expected punishment p  F . The main nding is that in-
creasing either p or F or both will result in greater expected costs of punishment for
a potential o¤ender and thus provide a higher level of deterrence. Assuming that
o¤enders are risk neutral it makes no di¤erence for the level of deterrence whether
to increase p or F. Form an economic perspective, however, increasing the proba-
bility of detection and sending an o¤ender to prison is more socially costly than to
impose nes. This is the case, because the detection of criminals depends on the
amount of police and increasing the amount of imprisonment implies higher ex-
penditures for prisons. Stigler (1970) concluded that economic reasoning suggests
that society should set nes to a maximum and the probability of detection to a
minimum in order to generate the e¢ cient amount of deterrence. As we will see in
sections 2.2 and 2.3, empirical analysis only partly supports this suggestions. For
9Including the possibility of a dark gure into this model, p can be broken down into: p =
C
N =
C
Q V ; with: C : amount of criminals being detected; N : amount of recorded violations; Q
: total amount of crime; V : dark gure.
10 f max may be at the individual wealth constraint of the o¤ender.
11tmax may di¤er from crime to crime with the absolute maximum being a lifelong prison
sentence.
12d() should rise proportional to s, i.e. d(s)=s, if the individual is risk neutral in imprisonment
term, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000/2006).
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the case of environmental crime in Germany, the empirical analysis in parts II and
III nds rather di¤erent results. Although it was not possible to include specic
information for the severity of punishment, my results suggest that especially the
very costly parts of enforcement like the probability of detection, the probability of
accusation and the probability of imprisonment do generate the biggest deterrence
e¤ects.
The basic model of crime experienced numerous extensions. Interesting exten-
sions for my purpose include variables for the probability of getting a ne pf and
being arrested pi; and functions for f and t that depend on the severity of the
crime s (marginal deterrence).13 Furthermore, the particular probabilities may
depend on the expenditures e for police, prosecution, courts or other public en-
forcement agencies and on the severity of the crime s. It is also likely the case
that the probability of detection will be a function of the expenditures for police
and other public institutions detecting legal violations. In the same manner the
probability of getting a ne may depend on the expenditures for prosecution and
for courts. Finally, the probability of imprisonment may depend amongst others
on the expenditures for prisons and all probabilities may depend on the severity
of the committed crime. Finally, one presumes that gain g, ne f and imprison-
ment term t rise with an increase in the severity of a violation.14 Furthermore,
the probabilities of detection, getting a ne and getting arrested rise with both
enforcement expenditures and the severity of the violation.15
13For a more complete list of extensions, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000/2006).
14More formally: gs > 0;
f
s > 0;
t
s > 0; and nally,
d
s =
d
t
t
s > 0.
15More formally: pDe > 0;
pD
s  0; pme > 0; pms > 0; pae > 0; pas > 0:
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Taken together, one can write the economic model of crime more elaborate as:
g(s) > pd(s; e)[pf (s; e)f(s) + pi(s; e)d(t(s))]: (2)
Although it should be obvious why the probabilities of getting a ne or being
arrested are assumed to rise with severity of the crime, it may not be obvious for
the probability of detection. However, the more severe the crime, the more e¤orts
will be made to detect the o¤ender (Polinsky and Shavell 2000). For example,
one has just to think of the mobilization of special forces to free hostages or to
arrest serial killers. As this may not hold for all types of crimes I assume that
the probability of being detected will at least not decrease with severity of the
crime. Although there is not enough information available to test this model
with all its characteristics together in one estimation approach, the remaining
parts of the present thesis analyzes this model step by step. Parts II and III test
the more basic model of deterrence on di¤erent levels of aggregation in order to
address the various characteristics of environmental crime in Germany. Part IV
nally provides a specic analysis for the determinants of the sanctioning regime
applied in Germany. More specically, it will give a rst insight whether German
data supports theoretical suggestions that the probabilities of being sanctioned in
either way do not only depend on the available resources and the criminals guilt.
In order to test the theoretical predictions with real life data, the next section
now translates the theoretical model of crime into an empirical estimation equation.
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2.2 The Empirical Version of the EconomicModel of Crime
Since there is not much variation neither in the type of model nor in the econo-
metric strategies used to estimate Beckers (1968) model, I labeled this chapter
The Empirical Version... indicating that there is only one version. As we will
see soon, most papers use a more or less similar version of the model presented by
Ehrlich (1973) which is based on the theoretical model of Becker (1968). Although
Beckers (1968) model is one of individual behavior most studies use aggregated
data (Ehrlich 1973, Cornwell and Trumbull 1994, Andreoni 1995, etc.). This is
mainly because of data availability. As this is also the case for the German data
used for my empirical analysis, I will concentrate on papers that are based on
aggregated data.
Using a log-linear or log-log form, most models look very similar to the following
named The Supply-of-O¤enses Equationby Ehrlich (1973):
ln

Q
N

= A+ P + S + Y + ; (3)
where Q reects the number of o¤ences, N the number of persons in the com-
munity, A is some constant and P is a vector containing variables a¤ecting the
probability of punishment. Furthermore, S is a vector consisting of variables in-
dicating the severity of punishment, Y is a vector for socioeconomic factors and
; ; ;  stand for the parameters to be estimated and the disturbance, respectively.
P again exhibits variables like the police force and/or detection rates, conviction
rates, arrest rates or imprisonment rates.
Especially in the presence of dark gures there might be a measurement error
bias when using di¤erent punishment rates since they all are somewhat endoge-
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nous(Pudney et al. 2000). For example, the probability of detection is nothing
else than the number of detections divided by the number of o¤ences Q. So all
these punishment rates should somehow be related to Q. The potential problems
arising through dark gures will be of special concern in my empirical analysis on
environmental crime as dark gures are considered to be relatively high for this
type of crime.
Moreover, S usually includes either the size of prison population or the length of
imprisonment with the latter seeming to be more obvious for most purposes. P and
S together are meant to reect the deterrence part of the economic model of crime.
Y may contain very di¤erent socioeconomic factors ranging from unemployment,
gender, minority fractions, education, wages, to population density or di¤erent
income (distribution) variables. As we will see later, there is an increasing part of
literature in present years dealing with all kinds of socioeconomic factors.
Most studies reviewed in this chapter use this or a slightly adjusted version
of the mentioned model depending on data structure, estimation methods and
research question. As stated previously, there are di¤erent problems one has to
deal with when estimating the economic model of crime. Dealing with unobserved
heterogeneity or endogeneity in general, many models use Random/Fixed-E¤ects
procedures or 2SLS, 3SLS and GMM and therefore include unobserved e¤ects or
instruments in their analysis. Papers using time series of crimes need to control
for special problems arising through autocorrelation, (co-)integration, time lags,
trends etc. It is therefore necessary to customize the model but in most cases the
core estimation equation remains the same.
The next section will give a detailed review of the results of the existing liter-
ature dealing with the economic model of crime. I will particularly focus on the
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deterrence literature but also stress socioeconomic factors. After analyzing indi-
vidual e¤ects, I will summarize to which extent the economic model of crime by
Becker (1968) is conrmed by the empirical literature.
2.3 Deterrence
In this chapter I discuss the ndings of the deterrence literature that represents the
major part of the crime literature (at least in the eld of economics). As already
mentioned, it is one of Beckers (1968) merits that we have a theoretical model
explaining the relationship between law enforcement and the amount of crime.
An individual being accessible to economic incentives or rational behavior should
at least to some extend respond to changing law enforcement conditions. More
precisely, a more severe enforcement in the sense that the probability of detection or
conviction, the severity of punishment, or both increase causes increasing expected
costs of crime. Increasing the costs of crime will have a deterrent e¤ect on rational
criminals. In the next section I will discuss whether this is conrmed by the
empirical literature.
2.3.1 Probability of Punishment
First, I want to address the deterrent e¤ect the probability of punishment has on
criminal behavior. There are several measures for this. Many studies just use
direct probabilities like the arrest, conviction or imprisonment rate. Very little
studies use the detection rate as a deterrence variable. The detection rate reects
the portion of o¤enders that are identied by legal authorities.16 This does not
16For many crimes, especially for felonies, the detection rate should coincide with the arrest
rate (as long as every criminal gets caught) since suspected criminals will be arrested for these
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coercively imply that this o¤ender will also be punished but it should not be in
the interest of the o¤ender to get known to enforcement authorities.
In contrast, the arrest rate directly implies that this portion of o¤enders already
received some kind of punishment but does not tell anything about how sure
their conviction is. The conviction rate reects the portion of o¤enders that are
convicted and thus face any kind of punishment. The imprisonment rate nally
reects the portion of imprisonments but not stating for how long on average.
Another variable, namely police force, is more a determinant of the probabil-
ity of punishment rather than a direct measure. However, police should have a
direct inuence on the detection and arrest rate, whereas the conviction and im-
prisonment rate should be more a¤ected by the amount of prosecutors and judges,
respectively.17
To foreclose the results, when dealing with the already mentioned problem of
simultaneity, the majority of recent studies is in favour of a deterrent e¤ect due to
the probability of punishment.
Punishment Rate
As my later empirical analysis rely to a great extent on the deterrence e¤ect
various punishment probabilities have for the German Environmental Penal Code,
I will give a more extensive literature review on this factors.
Ehrlich (1973) used a proxy for the imprisonment rate18 nding the resulting
negative parameter estimates and thus the deterrent e¤ect to be both economically
and statistically signicant for all types of crimes. Andreoni (1995) also nds a
types of crimes.
17Data on the number of prosecuters and judges is rarely used in practice.
18The author uses state-wide prison commitments per year.
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signicant deterrent e¤ect of the imprisonment rate noting that there might be
endogeneity between the severity of punishment and probability of punishment
due to avoidanceor reasonable doubte¤ects. Levitt (1998b) tries to separate
the deterrence from the incapacitation e¤ect estimating a huge and statistically
signicant deterrence e¤ect for burglary with one more arrest eliminating two
burglaries. One very often cited panel data study conducted by Cornwell and
Trumbull (1994) also estimated signicant deterrent e¤ects for the arrest, convic-
tion and prison rates. Cherry and List (2002) repeated their estimation trying
to prevent the bias due to the aggregation of di¤erent crimes into one index as
apparent in Cornwell and Trumbull (1994). The authors nd signicant deterrent
e¤ects for most types of crimes but also a great variability in the estimated e¤ects.
Baltagis (2006) reestimates also show signicant deterrent e¤ects with elasticities
of -0.35 for the probability of arrest, -0.28 for the probability of conviction, and
-0.17 for the probability of imprisonment. Cherry (1999) also used panel data
and conrms previous results for the probability of arrest with elasticities between
-0.07 (Larceny) and -0.3 (Robbery). He also claims that not controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity overstates the deterrent e¤ect in his sample by about 20%.
Mustard (2003) estimated the economic model of crime with a special focus on the
arrest and conviction rate. He also nds a deterrent e¤ect which is signicant for
most types of crimes and therefore also supports the deterrent hypothesis of the
probability of punishment. Viren (2001) estimated the economic model of crime
with Finnish and international data. The author conrms the deterrence hypothe-
sis of both apprehension and punishment in almost all di¤erent specications and
estimation routines used. Gould et al. (2002) get the same results for the deter-
rent e¤ect of the arrest rate on all types of crimes analyzed. To summarize, there
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is great support that the mentioned punishment probabilities have the intended
deterrent e¤ect on criminal behavior.
However, as most studies only include some of the mentioned enforcement
stages it is di¢ cult to assign the relative contribution of the di¤erent probabilities
to the deterrence e¤ect. In general, the elasticities range between almost 0 to up
to about -3 in some rare cases. The results of my own analysis t perfectly in
this frame as I will show in parts II and III. The elasticities range from ambiguous
and not statistically signicant to -1.5 (prison rates, part II) and highly signicant
e¤ects. Moreover, parts II and III of the thesis include variables for all stages of the
enforcement process and are therefore able to compare the relative contributions.
As this section suggests, there is no doubt that the probability of getting sen-
tenced deters people from committing crimes. However, some authors tried to
determine the deterrent e¤ect of the probability of getting caught indirectly via
the amount of police. Is is therefore the aim of the next section to discuss this in
more detail.
Police force
The amount of police should heavily inuence the probability of getting caught
although there are of course other factors like individual characteristics of crimi-
nals, victims or crimes which govern the probability of punishment. Nevertheless,
estimates for the e¤ect of police expenditures on the probability of punishment
have the expected positive sign, but they are not statistically signicant (Ehrlich
1973, Andreoni 1995) . This could have several reasons. Either expenditures are
not the right measure for the amount of police, the marginal e¤ect of additional
police has a rather weak deterrent e¤ect (there is one as we will see soon), or the
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focus of police investigation has changed (see Corman and Mocan 2000).
Estimation results for directly measuring the e¤ect of the size of police force
on crime are very heterogenous.19 Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) and Baltagi
(2006) nd positive and in most cases signicant e¤ects of police on crime. Baltagi
(2006) has two possible explanations for this. Either a greater police force directly
increases the number of recorded crimes or there is an endogeneity problem since
more crime attracts more police.
The estimates of Cherry and List (2002) show that using the aggregated crime
index as Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) did results in a positive e¤ect whereas
splitting into di¤erent crime categories yields to a negative and signicant e¤ect
of police on crime.20 The authors nd a positive and signicant e¤ect of 0.41 for
the index and negative and (for most categories) signicant e¤ects for individual
crimes ranging from -0.12 (assault) to -0.4 (Larceny).
However, Cherry (1999) also using panel data at the individual crime level re-
veals again positive and signicant e¤ects.21 Gould et al. (2002) included (log)
police expenditures per capita and (log) police employment per capita as indica-
tors for police force. They nd positive and (mostly) signicant e¤ects for police
expenditures and negative and insignicant e¤ects for police employment. Levitt
(1997) addressed this question nding the number of sworn police o¢ cers to be
negatively related to crime rates but only signicant as an index not for individual
categories of crime. Nevertheless, he concludes that a 10% increase in police force
leads to a 3% to 10% decrease in crime. Using another instrument for police force
19For a further survey see Cameron (1988) or Levitt and Miles (2006).
20Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), Baltagi (2006) and Cherry and List (2002) all use police per
capita as measure for police force.
21The author states that this ndings are robust even when controlling for simultaneity.
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and reestimating the model, Levitt (2002b) nds the elasticity between police per
capita and crime to be -0.43 for violent and -0.5 for property crimes which are
signicant for both cases. Evans and Owens (2006) use special grants for police
o¢ cers (Cops program) in the US to determine the e¤ect of police on crime. They
nd a negative e¤ect of police on crime for all crime categories but only signicant
e¤ects for four out of eight crime types.
So far, one only observes a weak evidence for the deterrence e¤ect of police on
crime. However, there are some authors who tried di¤erent empirical strategies
like time series analysis or some exogenous event to circumvent problems like
simultaneity, lagged e¤ects and unobserved heterogeneity.
Marvell and Moody (1996) applied time series analysis and the concept of
Granger-causality to break simultaneity. In their sample including state and city
data for over twenty years, they found that increasing police force leads to future
declines in the crime rates. Corman and Mocan (2000) used a monthly time series
for NYC and the concept of Granger-causality estimating the deterrent e¤ect of
police on crime to be between -0.41 and -0.53 (elasticities) but not signicant for
two out of four crime categories.
Another method to deal with potential simultaneity is the use of purely exoge-
nous events that inuence the amount or allocation of police forces. Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2004) and Klick and Tabarrok (2005) e.g. estimated the e¤ect of
police on crime after a terrorist attack and changing terror alert levels, respectively.
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) nd that neighborhoods in Buenos Aires with
a special police protection after a terrorist attack benet from an average decline
of car thefts of about 75% in comparison to other districts. Klick and Tabarrok
(2005) nd that crimes on high-alert days in Washington D.C. are reduced by
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about 6.6%. They argue that the source of reduced crimes on high-alert days is
due to greater police presence on streets at these days.
What can we conclude for the deterrent e¤ect of police on crime since there
is some variation in the results especially for the link between expenditures and
crime rates? One thing to conclude is that simultaneity seems to be a important
problem in this context. It is therefore very important for the reliability of results
to use the right estimation strategy.
In line with this, the estimates for the state-level analysis of part II do not
reveal a signicant e¤ect of police on crime (see table 25 provided in the appen-
dix). This may have several reasons. First, this may be due to endogeneity issues
discussed in the previous literature. The second reason may be that, as already
stated by Baltagi (2006), the deterrent e¤ect may be overlaid by an detection ef-
fect. Another reason pertains the special characteristics of the German case. As
environmental o¤ences do not have priority compared to felonies, increasing the
number of policemen may not reect more e¤ort to detect and clear environmental
o¤ences. Unfortunately, there is no data on the number of policemen responsible
for environmental o¤ences available.
2.3.2 Magnitude of Penalty
The second determinant of deterrence in the economic model of crime is the mag-
nitude or severity of punishment. In most cases punishment means either nes
or imprisonment, or both. As most studies use imprisonment variables like the
average length of prison sentences or the size of the prison population, I will con-
centrate on those and just briey discuss the e¤ect of nes. The economics of crime
literature merely focuses on the analysis of felonies. This implies that the usual
36
sentence for a convicted criminal will be imprisonment. This contrasts with the
literature on the enforcement of environmental regulations where nes are most
important. This is also true for environmental crimes in Germany, where also nes
are the major type of punishment.
Like it is the case for the probability of punishment, simultaneity is also an issue
in this case. With recognizing a higher crime rate, governments or judges could be
tended to increase the severity of punishment. However, there is one more concern
one has to take care of. It is not obvious whether a reduction of crime due to
imprisonment is the source of deterrence or incapacitation. The amount of crime
could just be reduced, because future crimes are prevented by locking up repeated
o¤enders. As we will see soon, this problem is only discussed by very few studies.
In the next section, I will focus on those studies that do not address this problem
and implicitly assume a pure general deterrence e¤ect. The subsequent section
will be dedicated to the part of the literature trying to separate the incapacitation
and the deterrence e¤ect from each other.
Imprisonment
Ehrlich (1973) used the average time spent in prison as an indicator for the
severity of punishment and nds elasticities between -0.02 (murder) and -0.91
(burglary). However, estimates have all the expected sign but are only signicant
in some cases. Andreoni (1995) using the same indicator but for an index of all
crimes nds the elasticity with respect to the crime rate to be -1.06 and signicant.
The author also regressed di¤erent crime rates on imprisonment length stating a
negative relationship for almost all crimes (except murder) that is signicant for
many categories. Andreoni (1995) interprets this as evidence for a strong deter-
37
rence e¤ect for the severity of punishment. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), Cherry
and List (2002), Mustard (2003) and Baltagi (2006) used panel data and also av-
erage prison length to examine the deterrent e¤ect of the severity of sanctioning.
Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) and Baltagi (2006) nd a negative but insignicant
relationship between prison length and crime for the index of all crimes. Cherry
and List (2002) disaggregated the Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) data and nd
both ambiguous signs and insignicant e¤ects. In line with this, Mustards (2003)
estimates reveal positive and insignicant e¤ects for all eight crime categories.
Cherry (1999) also uses panel data but prison population as an indicator for
the severity of punishment. Like most others, his estimates for di¤erent crime
types have di¤erent signs and are insignicant.
In general, there may be several reasons for this ambiguous ndings. First of all
the studies so far did not stress the possible existence of the incapacitation e¤ect.
However, this should overstate the deterrent e¤ect and can therefore not explain
the ndings so far. Another concern is simultaneity. As already mentioned, higher
crime rates could be associated with longer prison terms. Not controlling for this
the deterrence e¤ect of the severity of punishment is understated and this could
be an explanation for previous estimation results. In what follows, I will discuss
papers especially dealing with possible simultaneity.
Corman and Mocan (2000) used monthly time series data and they nd a sig-
nicant deterrent e¤ect of the lagged growth of arrests for all ve crime categories.
Marvell and Moody (1994) also using time series analysis and changes in prison
population nd that a 1% increase in prison population results in 0.16% fewer
overall crimes. The elasticities for individual crimes vary between -0.06 (Homi-
cide, insignicant) to -0.26 (robbery, signicant). In general, the estimates seem
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to be robust for property crimes like robbery, burglary, larceny and vehicle theft.
Levitt (1996) used an instrumental variable approach to estimate the e¤ect of
prison population on crime. In order to break simultaneity, he uses a variable
indicating special prison overcrowding litigations for di¤erent U.S. states. The es-
timates reveal a negative and signicant relationship between prison population22
and crime with elasticities of -0.37 for violent crimes and -0.26 for property crimes.
Similarly to the police variables, the deterrent e¤ect of the severity of punish-
ment is only denite when one controls for simultaneity. Dealing with simultaneity
results in a negative and signicant e¤ect of punishment on crime. However, in
all studies mentioned so far, there is no distinction between deterrence and inca-
pacitation. I will now briey discuss the deterrent e¤ect of nes before I switch to
studies that try to separate both e¤ects.
As we will see in parts II and III, the enforcement data for Germany does not
allow to construct reliable indicators for the average prison length. Publications by
the Federal Statistical O¢ ce do not exhibit the true amount of the prison sentence
but categorizes each prison term into di¤erent ranges.
Fines
Although nes seem to be an appropriate measure for the severity of punishment,
there are not many studies around using it. As already mentioned, this may be due
to the fact that the crime literature mainly analyzes felonies with imprisonment
as the typical sanction. However, as nes are the major type of punishment for
environmental crimes in Germany, it is important to have some benchmark.
Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) used nes in the context of red-light running.
22Levitt (1996) uses per capita incarceration rates as an indicator for prison population.
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The authors claim that their special dataset has several advantages. First, there is
no dark gure since every violation is proved by hidden cameras. Second, due to
the fact that there is usually no imprisonment after tra¢ c violations, there should
be no incapacitation e¤ect like it is the case for imprisonment. Other advantages
regard the quality of informations for single o¤enders and the occurrence of an
exogenous shift in the penalty. Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) use data for San
Francisco and Israel, where nes for red-light running increased signicantly. The
authors nd elasticities for the response of criminals to increasing nes to be
between -0.20 and -0.30.
Since there are many legal violations around which are sentenced by nes and
nes therefore are an important instrument for deterrence, it would be nice to have
more evidence for the deterrent e¤ect of nes.
2.4 Incapacitation versus Deterrence
As already mentioned in the last section, there is a problem with regressing crime
on the severity of punishment approximated by the size of prison population or the
average length of imprisonment. It is not clear whether the estimated coe¢ cients
show the deterrent e¤ect of imprisonment or the e¤ect due to hindering a criminal
from committing further crimes. Levitt (1998b) tried to distinguish both e¤ects
arguing that a increasing the severity of punishment for one particular crime should
redirect potential criminals to substitutable crimes. For example, if sentences for
robbery increase, criminals may tend to switch to larceny instead. However, if in
response to more severe sentencing for one particular crime the amount of crime
falls in general, then this may the result of incapacitation. Levitt (1998b) tries
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to separate the deterrence and incapacitation e¤ect of increasing arrest rates and
therefore incorporates the arrest rates for other crimes in the particular crime
equation. The author concludes that deterrence is relatively more important than
incapacitation. Levitt (1998b) nds negative coe¢ cients for all crimes and both
deterrence and incapacitation, although deterrence is not signicant for murder
and rape and incapacitation is only signicant for rape (-0.518) and robbery (-
0.688). The remaining deterrence e¤ects range from -0.365 for assault to -2.342
for burglary.
Levitt (1998c) compares crime rates of various states in the U.S., where the
transition from juvenile to adult justice system is treated di¤erently in terms of
the severity of punishment. The author runs regressions using a measure he calls
relative punitiveness which compares adult imprisonment rates and juvenile impris-
onment rates. Levitt (1998c) argues that an ad hoc decrease of crimes during the
transition from juvenile to adult crime in states with a relatively severe punishment
strategy for adults should be the source of deterrence. The e¤ect of incapacitation
should have a time delay since o¤enders rst have to commit a crime and then have
to be sentenced to prison. Levitt (1998c) concludes that in states with a relative
harsh adult justice system, crimes fell by almost 10% - 15% for property crimes
and 25% for violent crimes relative to states with lenient adult crime systems.
Kessler and Levitt (1999) tried to separate both e¤ects using the inuence of
a referendum called Proposition 8 on crime rates in California.23 The authors
argue that this proposition should have no e¤ect on prison population at least
in the short run, because the particular crimes were punished with imprisonment
anyway. Kessler and Levitt (1999) suggest that this sentence enhancement should,
23A referendum that provides sentence enhancements for repeat-o¤enders and di¤erent felonies.
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at least in the short run, only have a deterrent e¤ect on criminal behavior. The
authors nd an immediate decline in eligible crimes of 3.9% and after three years
the decline went up to 7.9%. Kessler and Levitt (1999) conclude that this e¤ect
can be attributed to deterrence and not to incapacitation.
Corman and Mocan (2000) estimate the incapacitation e¤ect as part of a very
broad analysis of the economic model of crime. They quantify the elasticities to
be between -0,006 (murder) and -0,032 (assault).
Not only the last study by Corman and Mocan shows that the incapacitation
e¤ect may be very small in most cases. Nevertheless, one can not conclude that
it is appropriate to neglect the e¤ect a priory. When using prison population or
prison length measures, the applied econometrician should take the possibility of
incapacitation into account and, when possible, control for it.
2.5 Socioeconomic Factors
Socioeconomic variables are included in most models because they are assumed to
reect the legal opportunities of the population under consideration and therefore
also the legal income opportunities of potential criminals. In an environment
with low wages, high unemployment, high poverty and high inequality, people
usually think that crime is more attractive than under opposite circumstances. It
is therefore the intention of this section to discuss the importance of socioeconomic
variables in explaining criminal behavior.
There is a rich empirical literature focusing on the e¤ects of socioeconomic
variables on crime. These papers do not explicitly refer to the economic model of
crime but nevertheless contribute to its discussion. There is also a great number of
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socioeconomic variables like population density, percentage of males, etc. included
in many papers and these variables sometimes have a signicant e¤ect on crime.
Nevertheless, this is not what I want to concentrate on in this section. Instead I
will briey discuss those socioeconomic e¤ects that may also have an inuence on
the amount of environmental crime in Germany.
Unemployment and Labor Force Participation
Unemployment and labor force participation are factors that seem to be of im-
portance for both crimes in general and environmental o¤ences (see section 3.3.3)
in particular.
Ehrlich (1973) included the unemployment rate of males with the age of 14-24
and 35-39 and a variable for labor force participation of 14-24 year old males.
The author does not nd a signicant e¤ect for unemployment, e¤ects for labor
force participation were only negative and signicant for murder and rape and not
for property crimes. More generally, Cherry (1999) used the portion of popula-
tion that is not employed and nds signicant positive e¤ects for the index and
in particular for assault, burglary, larceny, assault and burglary. Zhang (1997)
nds the relationship between unemployment and crime to be positive but in-
signicant. Surprisingly, Viren (2001) nds negative and sometimes even highly
signicant e¤ects of unemployment on crime for his analysis of Finnish municipal
data. Bourguignon et al. (2003) use Colombian panel data and nd a positive
and signicant e¤ect of unemployment on crime and a negative and not signi-
cant e¤ect for labor force participation. Levitt (1996) incorporated the growth of
unemployment in his analysis estimating the e¤ect to be positive for all crimes
but only signicant for property crimes. Almost identical results are obtained in
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another paper by Levitt (1997). However, Levitt (1998b) nds ambiguous results.
Whilst the estimates for property crimes have the expected positive sign and are
signicant for burglary and larceny, the e¤ects for crimes against persons are neg-
ative and even signicant for murder and rape. Levitt (1998c) runs regressions
on juvenile and adult crimes rates as well as for the transition from one to the
other. He nds a positive and signicant e¤ect of the state unemployment rate for
property crimes in all equations and sometimes negative and signicant e¤ects for
violent crimes. Gould et al. (2002) use the unemployment rates of U.S. states in
various regressions and conclude that unemployment has a positive and signicant
e¤ect for property crimes and ambiguous e¤ects for violent crimes. The authors
estimate that the 3% increase of unemployment in the period between 1979-1993
raised property and violent crimes by 7.1% and 3.8%, respectively.
In addition, there are quite a few time series analysis that stress the relation-
ship between unemployment and crime. Cantor and Land (1985) focusing on the
relationship between unemployment and crime distinguish between a criminal op-
portunity and a criminal motivation e¤ect and conclude that unemployment has a
overall positive e¤ect on poverty and violent crime. Marvell and Moody (1996) in
their time series analysis nd a negative but not signicant relationship between
employment and the seven index crimes. Greenberg (2001), as a response to Cantor
and Land (1985), also concentrates on the analysis of the e¤ect of unemployment
on violent and property crime. After controlling for lagged unemployment and
duration of unemployment, he is not able to get signicant estimates. At last,
there is another time series study dealing with the economic model of crime in
general and the e¤ect of unemployment on crime in particular. Saridakis (2004)
incorporated the percentage of employed female population as well as duration of
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unemployment (mean of weeks unemployed) in his analysis of violent crime. He
argues that the former displays the reduction of parental supervision and thus
could be positively related to crime. The author could not nd a signicant e¤ect,
neither for portion of employed female population nor for unemployment duration,
on crime.
To conclude, there seems to be reliable evidence for the positive e¤ect of un-
employment on property crimes, but not for violent crimes. Although the former
seems to be not valid for time series studies. This is in line with the suggestion
that unemployment leads to less income and therefore property crimes get more
attractive. Results for labor force participation allow no clear-cut conclusion.
For my own empirical analysis in parts II and III unemployment or labor force
participation did not have a signicant impact on environmental crime (see table
25 provided in the appendix).
Income and Poverty
Ehrlich (1973) also includes income and inequality measures in his very compre-
hensive analysis. The author uses median income of families as an indicator for
income. Estimates show up to be positive for all crime categories but only signi-
cant for property crimes. Andreoni (1995) also incorporates median family income
in his analysis comprising Ehrlichs (1973) results. Hsieh and Pugh (1993) conduct
a meta-analysis including 34 studies and nd the average estimate for poverty on
crime to be positive (0.44) and signicant. Marvell and Moody (1996) nd a pos-
itive relationship for income and poverty rate in their Granger analysis but both
e¤ects are not signicant. Zhang (1997) includes per capita disposable income,
aid for families with dependent children (AFDC), medical payments (Medicaid),
45
payments for school lunch program, public housing expenditures and di¤erent vari-
ables for welfare payments in his analysis. The author constitutes that especially
AFDC, Medicaid and public housing are the core of the transfer system for the
low-income population(Zhang, 1997). He nds positive but insignicant e¤ects
for income and negative and signicant e¤ects for the di¤erent welfare programs.
AFDC had a negative but not signicant and public housing a negative and sig-
nicant e¤ect, respectively. The e¤ects for school lunch and medical aid programs
also appear to be insignicant. Levitt (1997) includes public welfare spending
per capita nding a negative but in all cases insignicant relationship for prop-
erty crimes. In another paper (Levitt 1998b), the author nds very heterogenous
results varying in sign and signicance for property and violent crimes. Cherry
(1999) uses real income per capita as an explanatory variable in his crime equa-
tion and nds unambiguous e¤ects for his Random/Fixed-E¤ect estimation that
are only signicant (and positive in this cases) for assault and auto theft. Corman
and Mocan (2000) include AFDC as a measure for poverty and estimate a positive
e¤ect on crime that is only signicant for murder and assault and not for robbery,
burglary, and motor-vehicle theft. Viren (2001) includes an income variable in
both, his cross country and pooled analysis for Finnish municipal data. In both
cases he estimates a positive and in most cases highly signicant e¤ect. Fajnzylber
et al. (2002a/b) include GNP per capita and GDP growth rate in their panel data
analysis for di¤erent countries. The authors estimate a negative e¤ect for GDP
growth on both, homicide and robbery. GNP per capita, however, seems to have
no e¤ect on both crime categories.
Gould et al. (2002) use state income per capita in their panel data analysis
for the U.S.. The authors nd positive and signicant e¤ects for most regressions
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for both, absolute values and growth rates. Kelly (2000) includes poverty in his
analysis nding positive e¤ects in most cases, especially when police force is treated
as being endogenous.
Taken together, it is not quite clear how income a¤ects crime. Low income
measures could mean that there are many poor people and therefore many people
with high incentives for property crimes. On the other side, high income also is
associated with high earning opportunities through crimes. In the reviewed papers,
there seems to be more evidence for the positive e¤ect of income on crime.
Poverty variables tend to have a positive e¤ect on crime, as one might expect.
The results for welfare programs and GDP are more ambiguous. In most cases
ndings suggest a negative e¤ect on crime .
I also include variables for GDP per capita, income per capita and welfare
spending into my analysis of environmental crime. However, none of the mentioned
variables shows up to have a robust e¤ect on environmental crime in Germany (see
part II and table 25 provided in the appendix).
2.6 Empirical Shortcomings
As already mentioned, there are quite a few problems one has to deal with when
estimating the economic model of crime with real life data. The rst challenge one
faces when studying crime rates is the possibility of a dark gure. Nobody can
make sure that every o¤ence will be observed and then reported to and recorded
by o¢ cial authorities. Depending on which factors inuence the amount of dark
gures there might be a great measurement error bias when ignoring this. Sub-
section 2.6.1 will therefore address this issue and give an overview of the relevant
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literature. Furthermore, various types of endogeneity play a crucial role in extract-
ing the truecausal relationship within Beckers (1968) model. The majority of
previous work did therefore concentrate on this topic as described in subsection
2.6.2. The last part of this section focuses on the work by Cherry and List (2002)
who extrapolate the bias resulting through aggregating di¤erent crime rates to one
crime index.
2.6.1 Dark Figure
For many types of crime and especially for environmental o¤ences there is usually
a substantial amount of violations that is not included in o¢ cial statistics. This
shortcoming may play a crucial role when interpreting estimated e¤ects as being
causal. It may e.g. be the case that increasing police force just leads to a reduction
of dark gures, not a reduction in the amount of crime itself. Neglecting the
existence of dark gures then results in a spurious positive e¤ect of police on
crime. Therefore, o¢ cial statistics have to full at least one of two conditions in
order to get unbiased estimators when ignoring the possibility of a dark gure. As
Eide (2000) points out, the regional and temporal reporting or recording behavior
has to be constant in order to get unbiased estimates. Further on, there should also
be no problem if the dark gure is uctuating randomly such that it is not related
to any kind of variable explaining crime (McDonald 2002). If this is not the case it
will be questionable whether results are reliable. Blumstein et al. (1978) e.g. nd
di¤erences in dark gures to cause a spurious negative relationship between crime
and clearance rates. It is therefore an important task to study the properties of
dark gures in order to perform reliable analysis.
To proceed it is important to dene what a dark gure is. There are two
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denitions around which are often not explicitly di¤erentiated. In few cases dark
gure means the ratio between crimes included in o¢ cial statistics and the real
amount of crime. Another denition uses the di¤erence between the realamount
of crime and o¢ cial crime statistics. In this thesis, I will assign the term dark
gure to the second denition.
There are two main reasons why a criminal activity may not be included in o¢ -
cial statistics. First there is the possibility that a potential24 crime is not recorded
to the police. The reason for this may either be that the crime was not observed
by anyone or it has been observed but not recorded to any authority. Naturally,
one is not able to say anything about the amount of the former. According to the
annual conducted British Crime Survey (BCS), however, the latter amounts to
57% of all crimes in 2004 (Nicholas et al. 2005). Additionally, there is also a great
di¤erence in reporting behavior between di¤erent types of crime.25 Victims asked
why they did not report to the police respond in 71% of all cases with incident
was to trivial, there was no lossor police could not do much about it. Besides
this, in 20% of all cases the respondent stated that the incident was private matter
(in violent crimes even 41%).
The second reason for a crime being not listed in o¢ cial statistics is the possi-
bility that a crime is reported to o¢ cial authorities but not recorded by them. This
amounts of 11% in the BCS in 2004 and a substantial amount of under-recording
seems to be due to human failure.
Taking both aspects together, these numbers imply that only 32% of all o¤ences
24Not every presumed violation is also an illegal activity in the sense of law. However, this
holds also in the opposite direction.
25For vehicle thefts it was about 95%, whereas the rate for vandalism and theft from person
was only at 32% (Nicholas et al. 2005).
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are listed in o¢ cial statistics in 2004 for England and Wales. Albeit this rate
appears to be relatively constant over time (39% in 2000), its variation could have
highly distorting e¤ects in multivariate settings.26
The U.S. National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is also a periodic vic-
timization survey which included 42,000 households and 72,000 people in 2004
(USDOJ 2006). Similar to the BCS, the NCVS nds merely constant but little
reporting behavior in the American population. In 2004, 41.5% (40.5% in 2003)
of all victims reported the violation to the police with great variation between
various o¤ences. As reasons for not reporting personal crimes to the police, US
respondents stated in 20.3% (28.8% for property crimes) of all cases that the of-
fender was unsuccessful, 19.2% (6.6% for property crimes) stated that crime was
private or personal matter.
Data for the Netherlands also indicate huge di¤erences between police statistics
and victimization surveys. In 1980, police recorded 26,500 violent crimes whereas
data from the Justice and Security Survey (ERV) indicate 654,000 crimes (Witte-
brood and Junger 2002). In addition to the di¤erent levels of violence, Wittebrood
and Junger (2002) also nd no observable correlation in the development of both.
Unfortunately, there are still many countries, like Germany, France, etc., were
there are no periodic victim or crime surveys and therefore necessary data is not
available to lighten their dark gures (Obergfell-Fuchs et al. 2003). The latest
victim survey for Germany dates from 1997 and found an average reporting rate
of 60%. The previous survey of 1992 found smaller reporting rates, ranging from
40% to 58%, depending on victims age (BMJ 2001). Victim surveys for single
26In a study for Germany the variation over time was even higher (Landeskriminalamt NRW,
2006).
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German cities imply an even smaller reporting rate of on average 30% (Heinz and
Spieß1995).
However, as this thesis analyzes environmental crimes it is questionable if vic-
timization surveys for environmental o¤ences really would make sense. Not only
that it is in many cases di¢ cult for citizens to decide whether their rst obser-
vation is a crime or not, most types of environmental crimes harm many victims
independently from each other. Simple surveys would thus not necessarily reveal
the true amount of environmental o¤ences.
The striking question for my purposes is then, whether the existence or specic
properties of dark gures cause a bias in econometric analysis? There is some, but
not much work done so far to answer this question.
MacDonald (2001, 2002) addressed this question trying to nd the determi-
nants of non-reporting via data of the BCS. The author analyzes which of the
time varying variables do have a (statistically) signicant inuence on reporting
behavior. He uses microeconometric (probit) analysis and nds that variables like
unemployment and age have a signicant e¤ect on the decision whether to report
or not. He concludes that researchers should take these factor into account when
estimating the economic model of crime. As mentioned in previous sections unem-
ployment did not show up to be signicant in my empirical analysis. However, I
am aware that dark gures may be substantial for environmental crimes. I there-
fore included variables that are tailored for the case of environmental crime into
my empirical analysis. The results for those rather political variables are explained
in section 10.2.
Another study dealing with dark gures is the one by Pudney et al. (2000).
The authors use BCS data and data from the British General Household Survey
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(GHS), a error correction model (ECM) and Monte Carlo simulation methods
to identify the biases resulting through under-recording. They nd measurement
errors as statistically signicant, but in most cases negligible for all practical
purposes(Pudney et al. 2000). Measurement errors seem to be systematic and
multiplicative and only slightly problematic for the short- and long-run e¤ects of
conviction rates. However, the ndings for England and Wales are no evidence
that there are also no problems for other countries.
2.6.2 Endogeneity
The problems arising through potential endogeneity appear in almost every econo-
metric analysis. Nevertheless, there are some issues that are special to the eco-
nomic model of crime and should therefore be mentioned. Most studies estimating
the economic model of crime stress the question of simultaneity between crime
rates and di¤erent explanatory variables like the probability of apprehension, con-
viction, punishment or the severity of punishment. As this seems to be the source
of substantial bias, I will dedicate the main part of this section to this topic.
Another form of endogeneity results trough the use of cross section data and
therefore ignores the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity. Cornwell and Trum-
bull (1994) rst covered this shortcoming and revealed sizeable e¤ects. The last
subsection accounts for the biases resulting through omitted variables.
Simultaneity There exists a huge empirical literature dealing with the prob-
lem of simultaneity, in particular for deterrent variables, in the economic model
of crime.27 Within this literature, there is to some extend consensus regarding
27See Ehrlich (1973), Cornell and Trumbull (1994), Andreoni (1995), Viren (2001), Mustard
(2003), Levitt (2002b), Gould et al. (2002), DiTella and Schargrodsky (2004), Evans and Owens
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the deterrent e¤ect of di¤erent crime control policies like police force or severity
of punishment (see section 2.3). However, most researchers also agree upon the
inuence of crime on crime control policies (see part IV of the present thesis). In
most cases, a higher presence of police forces or more severe penalties should yield
less criminal activities. In contrast, with recognizing more crimes the o¢ cials will
be tempted either to increase the amount of police or the severity of punishment,
or both. Results of part IV of the thesis are able to conrm this for environmental
crimes in Germany (see section 25). Another possible e¤ect is the reduction of the
probability of apprehension via a rising crime rate which results from a capacity
overload of police forces. Whereas the rst and third e¤ect result in a negative
relationship between crime and deterrence, the second e¤ect leads to a positive
e¤ect. One will therefore get biased estimates, if this issue is not attended to in a
capable manner.28
In many earlier studies dealing with the connection between law enforcement
and crime, the authors did not address the possibility of simultaneity. As a result
(see section 2.3.1) they merely found a positive inuence of police on crime.
One solution for this problem is the use of a simultaneous equation model,
in which the possibility of simultaneity between crime and law enforcement is
explicitly modeled. Ehrlich (1973)29 was one of the rst using this method in
the context of crime and expanding the usual, as he calls it, supply of o¤ences
functionwith a production function of direct law enforcement activityand a
(public) demand function for such activity (Ehrlich 1973). The author uses a
(2006), Baltagi (2006) and many others; for an additional overview see Cameron (1988) and
Levitt and Miles (2006).
28There are a couple of studies that nd a positive relation between crime and enforcement,
see Cameron (1988) or Levitt & Miles (2006) for an overview.
29See also Ehrlich & Liu (1999).
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production function of the Cobb-Douglas type to model the relationship between
the probability of apprehension and variables like the crime rate, the expenditures
on police and courts and a vector of covariates (see part IV). The demand function
for enforcement or deterrence expenditures is described through the probability of
victimization (equals the crime rate) and the potential loss from crime.
Another possible solution for simultaneity is the use of instrumental variables.
Levitt (1997) uses local elections as instruments for variations in police force. He
argues that most of the major variations in American police force coincides with
local election dates and therefore uses election dates as instrument for police force.
Unfortunately, Levitts (1997) analysis su¤ered from some technical shortcomings
and a corrected regression found no inuence of police on crime (McCrary 2002).
Re-estimating his work, Levitt (2002b) uses the amount of reghters as an in-
strument for police force and nds again evidence for the deterrent hypothesis.
Evans and Owens (2006) use the Cops program (Community Oriented Police
Services) as instrument for the size of police. The Cops program is a grant for
local police agencies to nance various local crime prevention initiatives. Kelly
(2000) proposes per capita income, the share of non-police expenditures in total
local income and the percentage of voters against the democratic candidate in the
presidential election as three other instruments that he shows to be suitable. In
another article, Levitt (1996) uses court decisions in prison overcrowding lawsuits
as instrument for prison population.30 Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), Andreoni
(1995) and Baltagi (2006) use very similar model specications to address simul-
taneity.
30For further examples using the instrumental variables approach, see Virèn (2001) and Gould
et al. (2002).
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The third solution concept used by Marvell and Moody (1996) is based on
time series analysis and applies the concept of Granger-causalityintroduced by
Granger (1969). In this context variable a Granger causes variable b if changes in
a yield future changes in b. The authors are able to conrm the hypothesis that
not only police force inuences crime but also crime a¤ects the size of police force.
The same results also appear in the time series analysis of Corman and Mocan
(2000). In another study, Marvell and Moody (1994) address the simultaneity
problem in the context of the severity of punishment. There may be not just a
deterrence or incapacitation (see section 2.4) e¤ect, but also an e¤ect of crime rates
on severity of punishment. Facing higher crime rates, governments may tend to
increase prison population by either longer sentence terms or more imprisonments.
Time series analysis also stresses the problem of time in the economic model
of crime. However, most data is annual and since the time lag for the response
of o¢ cials to increased crime is found to be about 6 month (Corman and Mocan,
2000), one is not able to account for this in annual data sets. Corman and Mocan
(2000) solve this problem by using monthly data and nd support the deterrent
e¤ect of police.
Other studies trying to avoid the problem of simultaneity are the ones by Di
Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) and Klick and Tabarrok (2005). They use the ex-
ogenous events of a terrorist attack and changes of terror alert levels, respectively,
to examine the e¤ect of police size on crime. The authors of both papers nd a
signicant deterrent e¤ect of police on crime.
With respect to the empirical analysis in parts II and III, respectively, I do
not nd simultaneity to be a serious problem. Results do not change signicantly
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when using a instrumental variables approach (GMM) or lagged e¤ects31 and thus
controlling for potential endogeneity.
Unobserved Heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity between di¤erent ob-
servation units (individuals, counties, states, nations, etc.) is another source of
endogeneity. One can get biased estimates if this possibility is ignored. Cornwell
and Trumbull (1994) and Cherry (1999) address this question arguing that most
studies so far just used cross-sectional analysis and thus were not able to control
for unobserved heterogeneity. In their analysis, Cornwell and Trumbull (1994)
deal with both sources of endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity
using a simultaneous equations model and panel data. Re-estimated by Baltagi
(2006), all three studies nd unobserved heterogeneity to be a crucial problem
when estimating the economic model of crime. Cherry (1999) estimates a pooled
model and compares the results with appropriate random and xed e¤ects panel
data estimates. In line with Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), the author nds signif-
icantly di¤erent results for both models stating the upward bias resulting through
unobserved heterogeneity to be at about 20% for all crimes. In addition, Cherry
(1999) extends his analysis by estimating the model for di¤erent types of crime
separately. Doing this the authors nd biases ranging from 0% for robbery to 70%
for burglary. To solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, the later empirical
analysis in parts II-IV rely on panel data.
Omitted Variables Every econometric analysis is at risk of omitting a (more
or less) important variable. This is therefore not a special problem of the eco-
31However, the data in later empirical analysis in annual and it is therefore questionable if one
is able to circumvent the problem of endogeneity by using lagged e¤ects.
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nomic model of crime. However, Mustard (2003) argues that in many studies the
authors omit at least two important determinants of crime. One of them is the
conviction rate and the other is average sentence length. Many studies just use
arrest rates as indicator for the probability of punishment and thus omit conviction
rates. Furthermore there are some studies omitting any measure for the severity
of punishment or just using prison population as a indicator for that. Whether
the average sentence length, the prison population or both is the best measure for
the severity of punishment remains to be seen. Mustard (2003) also claims that
if there exists a negative or positive correlation between arrest rates and one of
the omitted variables then the deterrence e¤ect of arrest rates will be under- or
overstated, respectively.
Due to data constraints the empirical analysis in parts II and III excluded in-
formations on the severity of punishment. However, this should cause no problems
as both nes and prison sentences for environmental crimes in Germany mainly
are at the lower bound.
There are also some papers that focus either on the deterrent e¤ect of law
enforcement or the e¤ect of socioeconomic factors on crime but do not address
both. These studies may also su¤er from omitted variables bias since both scopes
seem to inuence criminal behavior.
To account for this, later regressions do not only include socioeconomic and
enforcement variables but also political factors that may a¤ect reported crime.
2.6.3 Aggregation Bias
The last but one concern I want to discuss briey is the aggregation bias. Cherry
and List (2002) indicate that many previous studies like the ones by Ehrlich (1973),
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Andreoni (1995), Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) and many more use a aggregated
crime index instead of analyzing every type of crime separately. The authors
run the aggregated analysis as well as a disaggregated one nding signicantly
di¤erent estimates and great variation between di¤erent crimes. Cherry and List
(2002) denote the possibility that overall aggregation of crimes could lead to biased
estimates since the pure e¤ects are blurred. This is not very surprising since there
should be di¤erences in the deterrent e¤ect or changing socioeconomic factors
between particular crimes . It seems very plausible that the deterrent e¤ects is
greater for property crimes than for violent crimes as shown by Cherry and List
(2002).32 Especially in part II of the present thesis, the empirical analysis focuses
on environmental crime in general and may be thus biased by this aggregation.
I therefore provide separate estimates for illegal waste disposals as they are the
major type of environmental crime in Germany. However, as the thesis focuses on
environmental crimes this is not as demanding as for the case of di¤erent types of
felonies.
2.6.4 Time Lags
A topic that has not been addressed very often so far is the possibility of a delayed
updating of potential criminals (Marvell and Moody 1994, 1996, Levitt 1998a,
Corman and Mocan 2000, Greenberg 2001, Saridakis 2004). A change in the law
enforcement variables or changing socioeconomic factors have to be anticipated by
the potential criminal in order to adjust behavior. It seems to be not very realistic
that individuals observe and respond to these changes right in the moment where
32The authors nd the deterrent e¤ect of the probability of arrest to be 45% higher for property
crimes than for violent crimes.
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they happen. However, this is assumed when there are no tests for time lags in
the empirical model. Exceptions are papers using time series analysis that mostly
stress this issue. Corman and Mocan (2000) include a time lag of one month for
arrests which is meant to reect delayed updating of potential criminals. They
also estimate a delayed response of police on increasing crime to be at least 6
months33 (Corman and Mocan 2000). However, for panel and time series analysis
using yearly data, time lags only exhibit some problems if the delay is longer than
a year. Having this in mind, there will be a section for delayed updating in parts II
and III of the thesis. However, as the data is annual, it is no surprise that results
do not suggest time lags to be a major source of di¢ culties.
2.7 Does Empirical Analysis support Beckers suggestions?
To foreclose the answer: In general, yes. Nevertheless, as frequently mentioned in
this section, there are many shortcomings, especially because of data constraints
and interdependencies among the di¤erent determinants of crime, which make it
hard to identify the causal e¤ects. Hence, it is not very surprising that there
seems to be no clear-cut evidence for some variables frequently used to estimate
the economic model of crime. However, most deterrence variables seem to have a
strong inuence on criminal behavior as parameter estimates show up to have the
expected negative sign and are signicant in many cases.
Direct measures of the probability of punishment, such as the arrest, conviction
and imprisonment rates nearly all have the expected negative and signicant e¤ect
on crime. It gets more challenging when one tries to examine the causal e¤ect of
33The reason is that a police o¢ cer in the U.S. has to absolve a 6-month program at Police
Academy.
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police force on crime. Nevertheless, after controlling for simultaneity police appears
to have a negative e¤ect on crime, too.
The same is true for the severity of punishment represented by the average
length of imprisonment or prison population. The varying e¤ects on crime mostly
disappear if the problem of simultaneity is included in the empirical analysis. To
conclude, there seems to be clear evidence for deterrence in the economic model
of crime.
As with deterrence, it looks like socioeconomic factors also having an important
impact on crime. However, this is not true for all mentioned variables. Unemploy-
ment seems to have only a signicant positive e¤ect on property crimes, the e¤ect
on violent crimes is sometimes even negative. Albeit the latter is not as easy to
explain, the former is in line with general suggestions. Labor force participation
is not very often included in previous studies and has no denite e¤ect overall.
However, there seems to be a very clear-cut negative e¤ect of income inequality
on crime.
Overall, most empirical implementations of the economic model of crime con-
rm Beckers (1968) suggestions. The probability of being sanctioned and the
expected severity of punishment do both deter from criminal activities. Hence,
there is evidence for the deterrence e¤ect of law enforcement. Socioeconomic vari-
ables indicating the possible benets from legal substitutes also show to have an
important impact on crime.
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3 The Economics of M&E of Environmental Reg-
ulation
The models describing the monitoring and enforcement (M&E) of environmen-
tal regulations and the resulting compliance or non-compliance of rms are based
on the economic model of crime introduced by Becker (1968).34 However, envi-
ronmental economists made several adjustments in order to account for the spe-
cial characteristics environmental regulations and related enforcement institutions
have. It is the aim of this section to give an introduction to the literature on the
M&E of environmental regulations. As the present thesis analyzes environmental
crime and is thus closer related to crime literature this section will be rather short.
Nevertheless, it is important to take the e¤ectiveness of administrative law into
account when comparing both types of enforcement. I will therefore give a short
overview of the theoretical model on the enforcement of environmental regulations
and then add a more detailed discussion on the empirical ndings obtained so far.
3.1 The Theoretical Model of Enforcement and Compli-
ance
As indicated above, most of the models used to describe rmsbehavior concerning
environmental regulations base on the economic model of crime. Firms facing
environmental regulations just minimize the sum of compliance cost and expected
34See Heyes (2000) for a survey of related papers.
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penalties. Speaking di¤erently, a risk neutral rm chooses not to comply if:
c > p  f; (4)
with c as the cost of compliance with a particular regulation. That is, a rm
will violate a regulation if the gain or the cost avoidance through this violation
exceeds the expected costs of punishment (p  f; see section 2.1). The basic idea
is therefore identical to the economic model of crime. As we will see in the next
section, however, there may arise some problems when comparing the individual
setup of the economic model of crime with the behavior of a rm.
One problem is that many decisions regarding compliance with environmental
regulations are not binary ones as described above but rather continuous ones.
Hence, f may depend on the actual amount of pollution s and some standard S.
This means that f(s,S)=0 8s  S and f(s,S)>0 8s > S; respectively.35 Addition-
ally, 8s > S one presumes that f(s;S)
s
> 0 and f(s;S)
S
< 0:
In the binary case c then reects the abatement costs a(s,S) to comply with S
when emitting s; assuming a(s,S)>0 8s > S: Therefore a rm will not comply, if:
a(s; S) > p  f(s; S) (5)
with a(s;S)
s
> 0 and a(s;S)
S
< 0: Furthermore, the amount of non-compliance will
depend on marginal deterrence and on marginal abatement costs. More formally,
if non-compliant a rm will choose a point where:
a(s; S)
s
= p
f(s; S)
s
(6)
35As long as there is no type II error, see Heyes (2000).
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for a xed pollution standard S.
As in the Becker model (see section 2.1), there is probably an upper bound for
f( ) which is either some practical or political limit or the wealth constraint of the
particular rm (Heyes 2000).
A further extension, again very similar to the economic model of crime, includes
the endogeneityof inspectabilityas Heyes (2000) calls it. Hence, p may depend
on pollution level s, standard S and public expenditures e, p(s,S,e), with p(s;S;e)
s
>
0 8s > S; p(s;S;e)
S
< 0 and p(s;S;e)
e
> 0: This could either mean that a very small
violation is rarely detected because it is di¢ cult to observe or that enforcement
e¤orts are increased and/or concentrated if there is a strong suspicion for a serious
violation.36 Moreover, increasing public enforcement expenditures are assumed to
have a positive inuence on the probability of detecting a non-compliant rm.
Including this into my basic inequality (5) leads to a more general setting,
where a rm decides how much to pollute:
a(s; S) > p(s; S; e)  f(s; S) (7)
and the non-compliant rm operating at:
a(s; S)
s
= p(s; S; e)
f(s; S)
s
+
p(s; S; e)
s
f(s; S): (8)
Heyes (2000) discusses a huge amount of further extensions of the model includ-
ing rmsinvestments to decrease inspectability, possible investments in e¤ective
lawyers, considering a multi-stage game, multiple polluters, self-reporting, multi-
36Heyes (2000) also points out that a rm in return may invest in uninspectability meaning
that a rm could be able to reduce p.
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period and multi-context interactions and many more. This section will concen-
trate on the basic model in order to keep the focus on the underlying motivation
which is to compare the empirical literature on the economic model of crime with
the empirical literature on compliance with environmental regulations.
3.2 The Empirical Model of Enforcement and Compliance
Simultaneous to the theoretical literature on compliance with environmental reg-
ulations there emerged the empirical counterpart estimating what is commonly
called compliance function(Heyes 2000). Very similar to the crime literature,
the questions in this context is whether greater enforcement e¤orts and a more
severe punishment really lead to greater compliance. In comparison to the general
economic model of crime, there are relatively few empirical papers published that
stress compliance with environmental regulations. Cohen (1999) points out that
this may be due to huge data constraints researcher face in this context. Although
the U.S. EPA is successively making relevant data available for researchers, data
is still very scarce in other countries.
The typical estimation equation for compliance with environmental regula-
tions37 very often has the following form:
Q = A+ P + Y + "; (9)
where Q stands for the level (or the duration)38 of the harmful activity (e.g. oil
37This literature often analyzes very di¤erent settings and industries. Examples include the
enforcement in case of oil spills, nuclear power plants, pollutions regulation for steal industry,
paper industry, etc. (see section 3.3).
38See Nadeau (1997).
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spills, pollution, etc.), P for a vector of di¤erent M&E activities and Y for a vector
of rm or region specic characteristics. A,  and  are the parameter vectors to
be estimated. This model is almost identical to the one used in the economics of
crime literature.
Many of the empirical shortcomings researchers found in the context of the
economic model of crime also are apparent in the literature dealing with environ-
mental regulations. The possibility that a violation is not observed by any legal
authority, meaning that there exists a dark gure, is obvious. In comparison to
the crime literature, however, it is even more di¢ cult to light the dark gure in
the context of environmental o¤ences since many violations are not observed by
anyone except the violator. At least to some extend and for some types of crime,
some countries try to measure the real amount of crime via comprehensive and
periodical victim surveys (see section 2.6.1). This is in many cases not possible
for environmental o¤ences since there is often no direct victim or no well dened
number of victims, or victims do not know that they have been harmed.
Researchers analyzing rmscompliance with environmental regulations also
are aware of potential simultaneities. Gray and Deily (1996) e.g. nd that greater
enforcement results in greater compliance and greater compliance leads to less
enforcement. Additionally, Helland (1998) tries to answer the question whether
rms being found in violation face a higher probability of inspection. Furthermore,
Magat and Viscusi (1990) stress the possibility of time lags that could exist in the
relationship between di¤erent enforcement, deterrence and compliance variables.
However, almost all problems associated with the empirical crime literature can
be carried over to the estimation of enforcement and compliance.
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3.3 Deterrence and Important Policy-Variables
This section focuses on important monitoring and enforcement variables that are
relevant for environmental regulations.
3.3.1 Monitoring
One of the most important policy-variables in this context is the frequency of
monitoring a rm faces. The more often or more accurate monitoring takes place,
the higher is the probability that a violation is observed. Monitoring is therefore
meant to reect the probability of detection and thus the probability of getting
punished in either way (nes, obligation, etc.). Epple and Visscher (1984) use
several monitoring variables nding that, ceteris paribus, increasing monitoring
leads to a lower volume of oil spills with elasticities ranging between -.08 to -.91.
However, the authors estimate di¤erent specications for di¤erent data and reveal
an opposite e¤ect for the number of oil spills. There, the enforcement e¤ort by
the cost guard measured as man hours per transfer have a positive and signicant
e¤ect on the number of oil spills with elasticities of .13 and .21. Epple and Visscher
(1984) conclude that in this case the detection e¤ect has to outweigh the deterrence
e¤ect. Cohen (1987) uses the same dataset and distinguishes di¤erent monitoring
activities. Findings suggest that monitoring oil transfer operations (-.14 to -.18)
and random port patrols (-.18 to -.21) seem to have the highest and signicant
deterrence e¤ect whereas the e¤ect of routine inspections seems to be negligible.
Viladrich-Grau and Groves (1997), using more detailed data, estimate the de-
terrence e¤ect of monitoring to be larger for oil spill frequency than for spill size.
The estimated elasticities range from -.005 to -.72 for the e¤ects monitoring of
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transfers have on oil spill size and frequency. Magat and Viscusi (1990), analyzing
compliance for the U.S. pulp and paper industry with water pollution regulations,
conrm previous results. They are additionally able to designate a one quarter
time lag for the positive e¤ect of EPA enforcement actions on compliance. Results
also suggest that being not inspected on average doubles the probability of being
noncompliant.
Cohen (1997) refers to an unpublished study by Liu (1995) who uses additional
data and nds no clear-cut evidence for the deterrence e¤ect of EPAs monitoring
e¤orts. Liu (1995) divides monitoring into two types, discretionary and routine.
Similar to Epple and Visscher (1984), routine inspections seem to increase the
number of known violations and only discretionary monitoring has the expected
negative e¤ect.
Laplante and Rilstone (1996) use an approach very similar to that of Magat and
Viscusi (1990) and conrm their results for Canadian data. The authors estimate
a positive e¤ect of inspections on compliance with lagged inspections reducing
absolute discharge of Biological oxygen demand emission (BOD) by around 7%.
Gray and Deily (1996), using data for the U.S. steel industry and EPAs enforce-
ment e¤orts, again estimate a positive lagged e¤ect of monitoring on compliance
with an elasticity of 1.13.
Nadeau (1997) uses duration analysis and tries to extrapolate the e¤ect of mon-
itoring and enforcement on the length of non-compliance. The author estimates
that a 10% increase in monitoring leads to a 0.6% to 4.2% reduction in violation
time. Weil (1996) analyzes compliance decision of rms with the Occupational
Health and Safety Act (OSHA). The data reveal that inspecting a plant more than
once (2-6 times) increases the probability of compliance by 1.078 to 1.586. Win-
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ter and May (2001) analyze Danish farmers compliance with agro-environmental
regulations. The authors predict a increase (from the lowest quartile to highest
quartile) in the likelihood of detection and magnitude of ne to change compliance
by 2.1 (signicant) and -.2 percent (not signicant), respectively. Sta¤ord (2002)
analyzes the e¤ect of M&E on rm compliance with hazardous waste regulations
and is not able to extract a negative e¤ect of inspections on violations. Eckert
(2004) provides evidence for Canadian data that the inspection probability deters
violation with marginal e¤ects between -.75 and -.81. Earnhart (2004) analyzes
M&E of publicly-owned treatment plants. Findings partially support deterrence in
case of EPA inspections with one more inspection reducing BOD relative average
emission by 1.483 percent. Shimshack and Ward (2005) nd in their analysis that
inspections up to one year ago lowers the probability of a plant being noncompliant
by -.18.
To conclude, nearly all of the reviewed empirical work supports the hypothe-
sis that more and tighter monitoring and therefore a higher probability of being
detected leads to greater compliance. Similar to the case of crime, the estimates
range from almost no e¤ect to about 1.5.
3.3.2 Enforcement
This section reviews the existing empirical evidence on how e¤ective enforcement
actions are in deterring non-compliance with environmental regulations. Viladrich-
Grau and Groves (1997) included several variables in their regression trying to nd
a robust e¤ect of nes on oil spill size and frequency. However, none of the variables
had a signicant inuence on oil spills.
Nadeau (1997) analyzes the e¤ect of enforcement on the length of noncom-
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pliance. The author nds that a 10% increase in enforcement activities like ad-
ministrative orders, penalties, civil actions and criminal actions leads to a 4 to
4.7% reduction in violation time. Weil (1996) studies the e¤ect penalties have on
compliance of plants with OSHA. The author nds that a 1% increase of penalties
raises compliance in a range of .374 to .620 percent at least for the signicant
estimates.
Sigman (1998) analyzes the e¤ects of legal sanctions on the number of oil
dumping incidents. In this analysis, increasing enforcement activities like admin-
istrative actions, civil referrals, and criminal referrals by 1% reduces the number
of oil dumps by .18 percent. Sta¤ord (2002) studies the e¤ect of a regime change
in penalties. The legal amendments in the enforcement of illegal waste disposal
reduced the probability of a violation for a rm by 15%. Earnhart (2004) uses
data on the number of EPA and KDHE enforcement actions and nds a signi-
cant e¤ect on BOD emissions for both with estimates of -.071 and -.009 (log-linear
specication), respectively. Similar to the case of inspections, Shimshack andWard
(2005) also nd evidence for the e¤ectiveness of nes imposed. A dummy variable
indicating whether there has been a ne to anyone in the last 12 months lowers
the probability of a rm being noncompliant by -.509.
In summary, although the e¤ects are not as clear-cut as it is the case for moni-
toring activities there is strong evidence that enforcement plays an important role
in ensuring compliance with environmental regulations. Moreover, the estimates
are in line with those for nes and imprisonment in the crime literature. Finally,
before there will be a summary on the results to this part on M&E, I will briey
discuss other factors potentially inuencing compliance behavior of rms.
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3.3.3 Structural Factors
Epple and Visscher (1984) include the price for oil in their empirical investigation
and nd negative e¤ects on oil spill size and volume.39 In addition, Sigman (1998)
examines the e¤ect prices have on illegal waste disposals. The author concludes
that increasing prices for waste disposals seem to increase the amount of illegal
disposals. May and Winter (2001) included an indicator for the cost of compli-
ance with agro-environmental regulations resulting in a negative and signicant
estimator. Higher cost of compliance are associated with a higher probability of
non-compliance. Gray and Deily (1996) include the total cost to bring a rm into
compliance and nd a signicant negative e¤ect on compliance. Sta¤ord (2002)
nds a positive and signicant relationship between state environmental member-
ship and rms being noncompliant. However, including regional characteristics
changes this somewhat counterintuitive e¤ect and leads to a negative estimate.
Weil (1996) and Earnhart (1997) include plant size in their analysis and at least
Earnhart (1997) nds some evidence that the size of a plant or a rm has a positive
impact on non-compliance. Eckert (2004) is able to estimate a negative e¤ect of
population density on violations. Shimshack and Ward (2005, 2008) include local
unemployment rates in their analysis nding negative e¤ects of unemployment on
compliance. However, the rest of their community characteristics do not show up
to have any impact on compliance of rms.
The ndings conrm the results of the crime literature and also my own results
in parts II and III that political and structural variables do have an inuence on
reported violations. As we will see later (part II), detection or reporting e¤orts
39The authors implemented several specications and nd signicant results for most cases.
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play a crucial role as already pointed out by Epple and Visscher (1984).
3.4 Is there Evidence for the E¤ectiveness of M&E?
The previous sections reviewed the literature on compliance or non- compliance
with environmental regulations. Similar to the literature on the economics of crime
there is strong evidence that environmental o¤enders follow economic incentives.
In most cases monitoring, enforcement, structural and political variables have the
expected e¤ect on environmental o¤ences. The existing literature provides great
support for the deterrence hypothesis which states that increasing the expected
costs of punishment in terms of the probability and the severity of sentencing
reduces violations of environmental laws. As the e¤ectiveness of sanctioning seems
to be high in both settings compliance with environmental regulations and general
crimes, the next paragraph discusses some di¤erences between criminal law and
administrative law.
4 Di¤erences between M&E and Criminal En-
forcement
A very obvious di¤erence between the two strands of the literature is that Beckers
(1968) model of crime is based on individual decision making whereas the litera-
ture on environmental regulation focuses on the behavior of rms. The relationship
between the rm and the employee in the model of compliance can be seen as a
principal-agent setting with the rm being the principal. Applying this setting
causes no bias if principal and agent are able to reallocate nes and are not able
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to decrease total burden (Polinsky and Shavell 2000, 2006). In case where the
employees response to public enforcement would be di¤erent from the optimal be-
havior suggested by the rm, rm and employee should be able to adjust contracts
in a way that optimal decisions coincide. Moreover, if there is any possibility for
principal and agent to avoid (at least parts of) the sanctions, then deterrence might
be undermined. Polinsky and Shavell (2000) state that if the wealth constraints of
the employee make it impossible to pay the ne, then principal and agent do not
take the originally imposed amount of the ne into account. Policy-makers then
have either to resort to prison sentences or to impose the (remaining part of the)
ne on the principal. This aspect is of special interest in the case of environmental
o¤ences as most of the more severe violations are assumed to be committed in a
commercial environment. Unfortunately, in the following empirical analysis, there
is no data available indicating whether the violation has a private or commercial
background.
Another possible and important di¤erence between enforcement in both set-
tings is due to the di¤erences in available mechanisms. Despite the simultaneity
between di¤erent enforcement variables, the literature on crime is usually a rather
static setting. The criminal commits a harmful act whereupon public enforcement
institutions react with some sort of punishment (ne, burden and/or imprison-
ment). However, in the setting of environmental regulations there is much more
interaction taking place. Usually, if the enforcement agency (EPA in the U.S.,
Gewerbeaufsichtsamt in Germany) is suspicious whether a rm may violate some
legal standard, in most cases it will rst of all warn that rm rst. In this early
stage, the rm has not been punished yet. The rm is now able to react to this
detection. After the rms reaction, the agency can again react and either close
72
proceedings if the rm complies or impose a ne or burden if the rm still violates.
After all, if a rms violation lasts for a long time or the violation is very severe
the agency may forward the case to prosecutors. This may imply a ne and/or a
prison sentence for the violating rm. To conclude, enforcement of environmental
regulations is a rather dynamic setting with a lot of interaction taking place. It is
important to take this into account when comparing the e¤ectiveness of sentencing
for both types of enforcement.
5 Conclusion to Part I
In general, there seems to be convincing evidence that both criminals and non-
compliers with environmental regulations follow the incentives economist consider
to be relevant for these cases. There is clear support that the calculus of de-
terrenceas postulated by Becker (1968) is operational in the context of crimes
and environmental o¤ences. In the following three parts, the thesis will there-
fore adopt previous ndings when analyzing the e¤ectiveness of the German Penal
Code empirically. The ndings of part I will serve as a benchmark and a starting
point in order to conduct an appropriate analysis. Furthermore, it seems to be
very important to choose the right estimation method and the right data structure
to get reasonable results when estimating the economic model of crime. Conse-
quently, the remaining parts of the thesis use panel data to circumvent many of
the mentioned problems.
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Part II
Environmental Crime and
Punishment
6 Introduction to Part II
More than 20 years after their introduction in most industrialized countries, the
use of criminal sanctions against environmental o¤enders is again being debated.
Criminal sanctions di¤er in at least two important aspects from the more tradi-
tional administrative enforcement process. One important di¤erence concerns the
institutions involved in enforcement: While administrative law relies on regulators,
criminal sanctioning regimes rely on police, public prosecutors, and the courts in
order to generate enforcement. The second di¤erence is in terms of the types of
sanctions imposed: While administrative sanctions center around pecuniary nes,
criminal sanctions include more severe penalties such as incarceration and heavy
court-imposed nes that become part of an o¤enders criminal record for prolonged
time periods.
A general shortcoming of the policy discussions on the merits of criminal sanc-
tions is that the empirical evidence on their deterrent e¤ect has so far not been
systematically examined, neither in the USA nor elsewhere. The rich empiri-
cal literature on environmental enforcement has a clear focus on the enforcement
activities of regulators such as the EPA and others using administrative law. Illus-
trative examples among many excellent studies are Magat and Viscusi (1990) on
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the EPAs enforcement strategy for industrial e­ uents, Gray and Deily (1996) on
the enforcement of air pollution standards, Decker (2003) on regulatory delay as an
enforcement strategy, Eckert (2004) on enforcement and compliance in petroleum
storage, Shimshack and Ward (2005) on the role of the regulators reputation for
compliance, and Innes and Sam (2008) on the interplay between voluntary pollu-
tion reductions and regulatorsenforcement policy. In these papers, the possibility
of criminal sanctions is frequently alluded to, but rarely explored. Cohen (2001)
and Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar (2004), on the other hand, o¤er theoretical -
rather than empirical - perspectives on criminal sanctions vis-à-vis environmental
o¤ences. This part of the thesis employs available data on the use of criminal sanc-
tions to provide an empirical perspective on this active area of policy developments
based on an economic model of environmental crime.
Building on Beckers seminal paper on the economics of crime (Becker 1968)
and its modern implementations (e.g. Rickman andWitt 2007, Machin and Meghir
2004), this part of the thesis makes three contributions to closing the evidence gap
on the e¤ects of criminal sanctions on environmental crime: The rst is to ex-
amine whether empirical data supports the unconrmed hypothesis that criminal
sanctions are successful in deterring environmental crime. The empirical evidence
is contained in a unique dataset from Germany on recorded environmental crime,
prosecution, trials in criminal courts, and corresponding criminal sanctions, in-
cluding imprisonment. Covering the eleven-year period from 1995 - 2005 and 15
German states, this dataset provides an opportunity to employ modern econo-
metric tools of panel data analysis to exploit both intertemporal and state-level
variations. By doing so, the paper provides a novel regulatory focus on criminal
sanctioning in the context of environmental regulations and a novel geographic
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focus on enforcement outside North America.
The second contribution of the thesis is to determine the individual contribu-
tions of di¤erent components of the sanctioning regime to the deterrence e¤ect.
Typical components are the clearance rate (i.e. share of crimes for which an of-
fender has been identied), the share of identied violators brought to court, the
probability of pecuniary nes and the probability of prison sentences. Given that
the di¤erent sanctioning components di¤er in expected costs both to o¤enders and
the public, the relative benets in terms of deterrence delivered by di¤erent compo-
nents is clearly of importance. This requires controlling for important endogeneity
of reported crime rates. One key area are various forms of reporting bias, i.e. the
fact that only a fraction of actual crimes are reported to or detected by o¢ cial
authorities (McDonald 2002, Levitt 1998a). Environmental crime su¤ers to a par-
ticular extent from this problem, as the criminological literature on environmental
crime universally acknowledges (Faure 2004, Lohr 1996). The reporting bias in
environmental crime implies that particular caution is warranted when interpret-
ing changes in the amount of crime reported as both changes in actual crime and
changes in detection and reporting e¤orts are relevant drivers.
The third contribution of the paper is to exploit some of the specicity of
environmental crime in order to learn more about the role of political economy
variables in enforcement. In contrast to crime as a generic phenomenon, envi-
ronmental crime typically a¤ects one very specic public good. This specicity
with respect to the environment allows to exploit data on citizensenvironmental
preferences and data on the political identity of state-level governments. Since
di¤erent political parties opt for di¤erent trade-o¤s between environmental qual-
ity and industry interests, these ideological di¤erences may conceivably show up
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in the data. This empirical analysis complements previous work on how political
factors determine enforcement policies chosen by regulators (Helland 1998, 2001;
Decker 2003).
My main ndings are threefold: First, criminal sanctions do provide the de-
terrent e¤ects intended by policy-makers. The economic model of crime correctly
predicts the observed variations in the rate of environmental crime. While no
proof of e¢ ciency, this nding lends support to the claim that criminal sanctions
are e¤ective in combating environmental o¤ences and is in line with the emerging
empirical consensus on criminal sanctions in general (Levitt and Miles 2006, Bal-
tagi 2006). Environmental o¤ences are therefore not fundamentally di¤erent from
other types of crime and amenable to the same enforcement instruments. The nd-
ing also contradicts the view, popular for example among regulators (Hoch 1994,
US Senate 2003) and legal scholars (Schall 2006), that due to the small number
of cases prosecuted, criminal sanctions are largely invisible and hence unlikely to
provide signicant deterrence.
Second, while I nd most of the typical components of the criminal sanctioning
regime operating in line with expectations, there are novel results on selected com-
ponents. One is that the probability of being tried - rather than being convicted -
provides one of the most signicant deterrents. Independent of the outcome of tri-
als, an increase in the share of o¤enders brought to court by one percent decreases
the crime rate by roughly one percent. This strengthens previous ndings on the
role of reputational losses as components of the sanctioning regime (Karpo¤ et al.
2005) and raises important issues about the desirable degree of publicness of sanc-
tioning (Kahan and Posner 1999, Funk 2004). The probability of conviction and
of severe pecuniary nes, on the other hand, are statistically less signicant and
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have considerably lower deterrent impact. This contrasts with results obtained by
Baltagi (2006) and Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) in general studies of crime in
which similar components return signicant estimation coe¢ cients.
Third, political economy factors are statistically signicant drivers of reported
environmental crime rates. Greater environmental preferences of citizens lead to
a more than proportional increase in reported crime. While the limitations of
the data do not allow us to pinpoint the causal channels, I hypothesize on the
basis of experimental evidence and empirical studies (Helland 1998) that citizens
preferences result in greater detection e¤ort by both the public and enforcement
agencies. By contrast, having a pro-industry party in government leads to a reduc-
tion in reported environmental crime. One explanation for this result rests on the
presumed decrease in detection e¤ort by government. Given the well-known feed-
back e¤ects between greater enforcement and deterrence, these empirical results
on the impact of changes in environmental preferences on environmental crime are
arguably lower bounds on their total impact.
The remainder of part II is organized as follows. Section 7 sets out ve hypoth-
esis for understanding reported environmental crime. The aim is to state testable
hypothesis about the relationship between components of the criminal sanctioning
regime and the amount of reported environmental crime. Section 8 discusses the
available data sources and section 9 develops an extended and tailored version
of Beckers model of crime and employs it in a dynamic panel data estimation.
Since the data constitute a small unbalanced panel with the plausible presence
of simultaneity and nonstationarity in variables, my report of the main empirical
results in section 10 includes a technical discussion on the suitable econometric
techniques applied in order to generate reliable estimators (Alvarez and Arellano
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2003). Finally, section 11 discusses a suite of robustness checks. Section 12 pro-
vides a discussion of the results in the light of the theoretical considerations of
section 7 and the existing literature of part I. Section 13 concludes.
7 The Determinants of Reported Environmental
Crime
Activities in the uno¢ cial sector share the characteristic that their true volume is
typically unknown. The starting point for most empirical analysis is therefore the
reported volume of illegal activities. While a di¢ cult proxy for the underlying true
value, careful analysis nevertheless allows a number of ceteris paribus statements
(Levitt and Miles 2006, McDonald 2001).
7.1 Deterrence
In line with the empirical literature examining other types of criminal activity
in the white collar sector (e.g. Rickman and Witt 2007, Machin and Meghir
2004), potential environmental criminals are assumed to consider the net expected
benets of criminal activity as the primary decision criterion. An illustrative
example is a decision regarding illegal waste disposal (Sigman 1998). Here, gross
benets consist of the avoided cost of proper disposal minus the cost of illegal
disposal. The components of expected costs are the probability of being detected,
identied, prosecuted, and penalized for illegal waste disposal on the one hand
and the economic cost of the penalty on the other. Costs comprise both monetary
categories such as nes and non-monetary categories such as reputation losses and
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the opportunity cost of spending time in prison. Variations in this expected cost
give rise to the rst two hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Reported crime responds to more severe criminal sanctions
in that higher probabilities of their use lead - ceteris paribus - to a reduction in
reported crime.
As environmental crime is primarily motivated by economic considerations, this
hypothesis postulates that changes in sanctioning probabilities deter environmen-
tal criminal activity as predicted and observed in other contexts of enforcement
and deterrence (Becker 1968, Cornwell and Trumbull 1994). Higher sanctioning
probabilities raise the expected cost of criminal activity and should hence decrease
net benets of environmental crime, leading to less criminal activity being under-
taken.
Hypothesis 1 is implemented using available data on the conditional probabil-
ities of a case being subject to a court trial, a severe ne, and a prison sentence.
The empirical strategy in this case is to exploit the inter-state and intertemporal
variations in the sanctioning probabilities in order to extract their marginal impact
on reported environmental crime. As in many studies, simultaneity between ob-
served variables is a possible contaminating factor. While the rst-order impact of
tougher sanctioning is to reduce crime, less or more crime might in turn inuence
sanctioning practices. Estimated coe¢ cients may therefore over- or understate the
true magnitude of e¤ects. My empirical strategy of controlling for simultaneity is
explained in detail in section 4.
Hypothesis 2: A higher clearance rate implies a higher probability of being
identied as an o¤ender, thus raising the expected cost of crime and leading to a
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reduction in reported crime.
Greater e¤ort by police to identify the o¤enders responsible for a reported
crime is the rst key step for the prosecutorial process to commence. Clearance
rates (or arrest rates) are therefore invariably included in empirical studies of
enforcement (see Levitt and Miles 2006 for a survey). Since for a given amount
of crime, a higher clearance rate implies greater probability of being subject to
criminal investigation, there is a strong a priory intuition that reported crime
should fall for higher clearance rates. Empirically, this conclusion is borne out
by studies typically returning negative coe¢ cient estimates on account of their
deterrent e¤ect on potential o¤enders (e.g. Baltagi 2006, Cherry and List 2002,
Cornwell and Trumbull 1994). As in the previous hypothesis, increasing e¤orts to
clear environmental crimes may plausibly interact with the composition of crime,
leading to an endogeneity. I expand on the appropriate tests for endogeneity in
section 4.
The prediction of negative coe¢ cients attached to sanctioning variables is silent
on the relative contribution of di¤erent components of the sanctioning regime
to overall deterrence. The question of relative contributions is the subject of
hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: An increase in the probability of more severe sanctioning com-
ponents will result in a greater deterrence e¤ect relative to less severe sanctioning
components. The order of deterrence e¤ects should be the probability of (i) a
prison sentence, (ii) a severe ne, (iii) a conviction, (iv) of having to stand trial,
and (v) being identied as an o¤ender.
Di¤erent sanctioning components imply di¤erent costs. Theory would dictate
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that the marginal impact of a change in the di¤erent sanctioning probabilities
should therefore correspond to these cost di¤erences (Polinsky and Shavell 1984).
Among the sanction considered in the German Penal Code, prison sentences are
arguably the most severe form of punishment as they include time lost and the
social stigma attached to prison sentences, followed by severe nes, standard nes,
and nally the purely reputational losses of having to appear in court (Kahan and
Posner 1999, Karpo¤ and Lott 1993).
While theoretically clear, the available empirical evidence is more equivocal on
the issue: In a survey paper, Eide (2000) captures the prevailing view of the litera-
ture that a shift to harsher sanctions has a lower marginal impact than an increase
in the probability of sanctions overall. In order to separate out the e¤ects of overall
deterrence and the contribution of individual components, the empirical analysis
relies on conditional probabilities applied to the relevant subset of o¤enders (e.g.
the probability of facing a severe ne given that one was convicted), which allows
separating out the incremental contributions of each sanctioning component.
7.2 Political Factors
Hypotheses 4 and 5 examine political economy factors that conceivably inuence
environmental crime in specic ways. I examine two areas, namely the degree to
which the public at large is concerned about environmental quality and the role of
the ideological orientation of state-level administrations vis-à-vis the appropriate
trade-o¤ between environmental and business concerns.
Hypothesis 4: An increase in pro-environmental preferences among the public
leads ceteris paribus to less reported crime.
82
Hypothesis 4 contains a prediction regarding the net e¤ect of two di¤erent
mechanisms, one direct, one indirect. The direct e¤ect of a greater concern for
environmental matters will increase the propensity by citizens to incur e¤ort costs
in order to detect and report crimes to the authorities. This leads - on average
- to a greater proportion of violations being uncovered (Naysnerski and Tieten-
berg 1992, Langpap 2007). The indirect e¤ect of greater environmental concern
among the public is an increase in governmental e¤orts to detect and prosecute
environmental violations. For the indirect e¤ect to be operational requires a po-
litical system in which such environmental concerns have su¢ cient salience. In
Germany, this salience is arguably provided through the country-wide presence
of a well-organized Green Party such that state-level governments will nd it in
their interest to respond at the margin to changes in environmental preferences
(Rose-Ackerman 1995).
The direct and indirect e¤ect together provide a causal link from preferences to
the aggregate detection and reporting e¤ort. Linking these preferences to reported
crime encounters a familiar feedback e¤ect between changes in reporting e¤ort and
changes in reported crime (Levitt and Miles 2006). While a greater share of crimes
may be reported, more crimes may be deterred to begin with, leading to a lower
absolute number of reported violation. The number of reported cases will increase
only if violations are inelastic with respect to being arrested. The elasticity of
the supply of crime is a matter of great empirical uncertainty, however (Levitt
and Miles 2006). Evidence from empirical research in college basketball refereeing
seems to support that violations are highly elastic with respect to reporting e¤ort
(McCormick et al. 1984). In line with this evidence, hypothesis 4 assumes that the
supply of environmental crimes is elastic with respect to detection and reporting
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e¤ort driven by environmental preferences. The extent to which this assumption is
justied in the context of environmental crimes is subject to empirical examination.
Given that the absolute risk of detection is comparatively low at 10 to 40 percent
(Hoch 1994), environmental o¤enders are plausibly operating at a very di¤erent
point on the supply curve from college basketball players. At a more general
level, there is also a plausible link between a greater presence of environmental
crimes and a greater share of citizens reporting strong environmental preferences.
To check for the possible endogeneity between environmental consciousness and
reported environmental crime, section 4 provides a suite of appropriate tests in
order to rule out simultaneity.
The nal hypothesis considers the inputs of governmental institutions on re-
ported crime.
Hypothesis 5: Pro-industry governments lead ceteris paribus to a higher rate
of reported environmental crime.
Hypothesis 5 considers the determinants of agency behavior in the context of
environmental crime. Government has several channels of inuence that determine
detection and reporting e¤ort since ministries of justice, the police force, and reg-
ulators are subject to political inuence when deterring whether to devote e¤ort
to environmental crime at the margin. There is a small, but informative litera-
ture that has identied key political determinants of enforcement e¤orts. Helland
(1998) demonstrates that local political preferences have identiable impacts on
the stringency and enforcement of state-level environmental regulations of federal
statutes, with pro-industry preferences leading to less stringent implementation.
Helland (2001) nds in a study of prosecutorial discretion at the EPA that regu-
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latorsbehavior is inuenced by the nature of presidential administrations, with a
shift from a pro-industry Republican to a less pro-industry Democratic administra-
tion being accompanied by a much more proactive approach by the EPA towards
enforcement. A study by Hamilton (1996) examines EPA data on administrative
nes levied in the context of hazardous waste violations.
As in the case of hypothesis 4, there are complicating feedback e¤ects in op-
eration between government orientation and reported environmental crime. Laxer
enforcement by pro-industry governments will arguably lead to more environmen-
tal crime, but also less detection e¤ort, leaving the net e¤ect on reported crime
ambiguous. Hypothesis 5 assumes that the supply of environmental o¤ences is elas-
tic with respect to detection e¤ort. Again, this assumption is subject to empirical
examination as well as further tests for endogeneity in section 4.
While the empirical exercise considers - in line with the established literature -
additional explanatory variables such the level of economic activity and unemploy-
ment, the ve hypotheses established in this section form the theoretical backbone
of the following empirical investigation. They also reect the econometric chal-
lenges that are inherent in the frequently ambiguous net e¤ects of components of
the enforcement environment on reported crime. In combination with additional
endogeneity tests, however, this ambiguity has a silver lining in the form of allow-
ing to anticipate a bias in the empirical estimation. Positive estimates of variable
coe¢ cients will tend to understate the size of the positive impact of variations in
the variable since the results mask a simultaneous countervailing e¤ect and vice
versa.
The following section will implement the model with a view to returning em-
pirical estimates for the di¤erential e¤ects of preference, enforcement variables,
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and past reported crime rates.
8 Data
Data on environmental crime in Germany is collected at the level of 16 individual
states to which enforcement is devolved and at various stages in the state-level en-
forcement process. Since one state has not released the relevant data, my sample
comprises 15 of the 16 states and the years 1995 (1994 in case of reported cases)
to 2005 with a small subset of states having incomplete reporting,40 leading to an
unbalanced panel. Data on reported environmental crime and the clearance rate
are taken from the o¢ cial police crime statistics (PKS) published by the German
Federal Criminal Police O¢ ce (BKA). Data concerning juvenile o¤enders is ex-
cluded from the dataset due to the distinct sanctioning regime applicable to this
subgroup. The necessary data for the explanatory variables of the sanctioning
regime applied to environmental crime, such as the number of trials, convictions
and length of imprisonment, is available from the o¢ cial prosecution statistics
(StVSt) of the Research Data Centre (FDZ) provided by the Federal Statistical
O¢ ce and its state level counterparts. Data on structural variables that character-
ize individual states, such as population, size, political, and several socioeconomic
variables, are taken from publications of the Federal Statistical O¢ ce.
Environmental preferences at the state level are not immediately observable.
However, there is empirical conrmation of the intuitive argument that political
preferences can proxy for environmental preferences. Witzke and Urfei (2001)
40No data is available for the state of Saxony-Anhalt. Saarlands date cover 1996-2005, Bran-
denburg 1995-2005 with the exception of 2002, Hamburgs data 1997-2005. Thuringias data
cover 1998-2005 and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2001-2005.
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show that there is a signicant positive and robust statistical relationship between
higher political support for the Green Party and willingness to pay for environ-
mental protection. Rather than using voting shares in elections, a better measure
is therefore annual state-level survey data on peoples stated sympathies for the
German Green Party at the state level, available from the Central Archive for Em-
pirical Social Research (ZA). Specically, this variable tracks the share of people
surveyed who describe themselves as strongly supporting positions of the Green
Party41.
As an indicator of having a pro-industry government in power, I use the pres-
ence of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) as a proxy. The CDU (CSU in Bavaria)
is the German party that is consistently most closely aligned with business and
industry interests and least aligned with environmental policy preferences among
the parties in German state parliaments (Budge et al. 2007).
Additional factors that are commonly included in these types of models in-
clude socioeconomic variables such as GDP per capita, unemployment rates, social
transfers as well as enforcement resources such as the number of prosecutors and
enforcement expenditures. Since most environmental crimes in Germany are illegal
waste disposals, one fruitful approach would seem to include waste market vari-
ables in my empirical analysis. Data constraints preclude much of these extensions
and limit the number of variables for which meaningful data at the appropriate
level of specicity is available over the time period under consideration. I include
variable covariates that report on those in appendix (table 25).
Tables 2 and 3 provide variable denitions and summary statistics for all vari-
41Although there exist data indicating environmental awareness for Germany as a whole, these
are not available consistently on an annual and state-level basis.
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ables included in the core econometric estimation.
Table 2: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition
Environmental Crime Rate (CR) Number of reported cases divided by population
Clearance Rate (cleared) share of cases for which suspects are identied
Rate of tried suspects (tried) share of identied suspects that are accused
Conviction Rate (convicted) share of accused suspects that are convicted
Prison Rate (prison) share of convicted o¤enders that are sent to prison
Rate of Severe Fines (ne) share of convicted o¤enders that are ned heavily
Strong Green Support (green.supp) share of survey respondents that see themselves
as strong supporters of the German Green Party
Dummy Conservatives (cons) takes on the value 1 if the conservative German party
(CDU/CSU) is member of the state government
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
CR .0004379 .0003139 .0000818 .0014 163
cleared .590 .126 .158 .806 152
tried .263 .106 .060 .733 152
convicted .762 .115 .333 1.00 152
prison .035 .033 0.00 .200 152
ne .064 .066 0.00 .600 152
green.supp .047 .025 0.00 .113 152
cons .572 .496 0 1 152
Given the limited sample size, this paper employs a two-step estimation ap-
proach. As a rst step, the core of the model as set out in the analytical section
is implemented and estimated. Subsequently, I carry out tests for additional vari-
ables that have been identied in the larger literature on crime to play a plausible
role and check for robustness.
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9 The Econometric Model of Environmental Crime
In this section, I implement the core of a simple model of reported environmental
crime in line with the modern literature (Rickman and Witt 2007; Machin and
Meghir 2004), augmented by variables capturing environmental preferences and
governmental ideology. This model posits a relationship between annual reported
crime in each state and state-level enforcement variables plus political economy
variables. This leads to an estimation equation of the form:
lnCRit = A+  lnCRit 1 + Pit + consit + green: sup pit + Fi + Tt + it (10)
where lnCRit is the natural log of the reported environmental crime rate in state i
in year t and A is an constant term. Fi (not included in pooled OLS) and Ti cap-
ture individual state and year e¤ects, respectively. Pit is a vector containing the
state- and year-specic probabilities of di¤erent levels of punishment for o¤enders
located in di¤erent states. In my case this are clearance rates and clearance rate
squared42, the rate of tried o¤enders, conviction rates, prison rates and the rate
of people sentenced to a severe pecuniary ne43. The indicator of environmental
awareness employed in the estimation is captured in variable green: sup pit. consit
denotes a dummy variable that is set to unity for the conservative party in power
in state i in year t and zero otherwise. Finally, ; ; ;  and  stand for the para-
meter (vectors) to be estimated and the disturbance term, respectively. As there
is great support in general crime literature that di¤erent socioeconomic variables
42Further investigations pointed towards a nonlinear relationship between clearance rates and
environmental crime.
43Usually, there is also a vector containing variables indicating the severity of punishment.
However, since information about nes and prison sentences are not available in their true mag-
nitude but only in intervals, it is not possible to construct plausible variables.
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play an important role in explaining the amount of crime I additionally tested the
following list of variables: Population Density, Housing Subsidies, Employees in
Prosecution and Courts, Real Income per Capita, Real Gross Company Surplus,
Portion of People Expecting Negative Future Economic Situation, Portion of Peo-
ple Being Afraid of Crime, Portion of People being Afraid of Loosing Job, Real
Revenue of Manufacturing Sector, Real Revenue of Farming Sector, Number of
Manufacturing Companies, Real Revenue of Recycling Sector, Degree of Moder-
nity of Assets in Manufacturing Sector, Investments in Environmental Protection
in Manufacturing Sector, Number of Manufacturing Companies Investing in Envi-
ronmental Protection. However, none of these seem to have a signicant inuence
on environmental crime in Germany. I will return to this in section 11.2 on omitted
variables.
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of the core model for di¤erent es-
timation procedures with di¤erent characteristics. Column (1) represents pooled
OLS (POLS) with robust standard errors as it is the cases for the Fixed-E¤ects
(FE) estimates in column (2). Columns (3) and (4) present parameter estimates
for the Arellano and Bond (1991) di¤erence GMM (AB) and the Blundell and
Bond (1998) system GMM (BB)44 estimators with robust standard errors and
small sample corrections. Column (5) and (6) report the estimates obtained by
following the Bias-Correction (BC) procedure as proposed by Bruno (2005a/b) for
unbalanced panels, applying AB and BB in rst stage45.
44Implemented in Stata through the user written command xtabond2 by David Roodman, see
Roodman et al. (2006).
45The BC is implemented in Stata using the the user written command xtlsdvc by Bruno
(2005a). The variance-covariance matrix is a bootstrap-estimate based on 50 iterations.
90
Table 4: Estimation Results 1
Variable POLS FE AB BB BC(AB) BC(BB)
Regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6
lnCR, lag 1 .9983 .6757 .4917 .9945 .7601 .8426
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0123) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
cleared -1.9682 -3.5374 -2.3520 -2.4065 -3.4988 -3.4661
(0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0052)
cleared sq. 2.2718 3.4038 2.4589 2.7197 3.3739 3.3317
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0019)
tried -.89062 -1.0474 -1.0524 -.91246 -1.0437 -1.0419
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
convicted -.1571 -.27678 -.2341 -.1442 -.2793 -.3030
(0.2502) (0.0856) (0.3626) (0.4017) (0.1435) (0.1391)
prison -1.4634 -1.4393 -.5694 -1.263 -1.524 -1.541
(0.0035) (0.0025) (0.3548) (0.0247) (0.0014) (0.0026)
ne -.1101 .0913 -.1599 -.1147 .1018 .0624
(0.5632) (0.5834) (0.2608) (0.5286) (0.5801) (0.7607)
green.supp 2.6980 1.7576 1.0610 2.6936 1.9258 2.2938
(0.0000) (0.0570) (0.3204) (0.0050) (0.0560) (0.0334)
cons -.0235 -.0976 -.0500 -.0540 -.0988 -.0968
(0.4993) (0.0327) (0.4371) (0.3088) (0.0181) (0.0344)
N 152 152 136 152 152 152
instruments 73 84
Sargan 69.9013 84.9307
(0.0715) (0.0411)
ar1 -2.7420 -2.7086
(0.0061) (0.0067)
ar2 1.2901 1.4829
(0.1970) (0.1380)
Note: Time dummies and a constant term have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis. AB,
BB and BC have been estimates via the user written command xtabond2 and xtlsdvc, respectively. Standard
errors are robust and in case of BC obtained by bootstrapping with 50 repetitions. Small sample corrections
were used in both GMM specications.
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There are various technical issues that are of relevance in comparing the results
between the di¤erent estimation procedures and suggest the bias-corrected (BC)
model as the most appropriate. It is well-known in literature (see e.g. Bond
2002) that OLS estimates for the lagged dependent variable will be upward and
FE estimates will be downward biased. As columns (5) and (6) show, I conrm
the prediction of the consistent BC estimate lying between the OLS and the FE
estimates. Due to the large number of instruments relative to the small sample
size, there is also a potential reliability problem associated with the estimators of
both AB and BB. This is supported by the Sargan test which rejects the Null of
validity of the instruments for the lagged dependent variable for AB and BB at the
10 and 5 percent level, respectively.46 Another potential source of problems arises
if the series are close to unit root (Bond 2002), in particular in the case of the
estimators derived using AB di¤erence-GMM. BB system-GMM is less vulnerable
in case of unit roots (Bond 2002, Binder et al. 2005) but can su¤er - like AB from
a substantial bias in the case of small samples. Monte Carlo experiments (Kiviet
1995, Bun and Carree 2005) provide evidence that BC overcomes the results of
di¤erence and system GMM with respect to their bias even in small samples. The
potential problems notwithstanding, parameter estimates are in fact robust across
estimation procedures and, in most cases, highly signicant.
10 Estimation Results
The estimation results comprise both results that are consistent with the existing
literature and unexpected ndings.
46For a more detailed discussion of the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions in GMM, see
Baum et. al. (2003) or Roodman (2006).
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To begin, my results replicate in German data on environmental crime the
common observation that there is strong intertemporal persistence in the depen-
dent variable (e.g. Rickman and Witt 2007, Fajnzylber et al. 2002). Coe¢ cient
estimates for the lagged reported crime rate are at .84 for BC(BB). There are a
number of explanation observations on this. One concerns the interplay between
budget constraints and crime levels on available resources. Benson et al. (1995)
and Cloninger and Sartorius (1979) identify past crime levels as a key driver of
inputs available for crime detection and reporting. Cloninger and Sartorius (1979)
demonstrate in a 16-year study of urban crime in Houston, Texas, that past crime
levels are statistically signicant in explaining future detection and reporting in-
puts. Benson et al. (1995) point to two factors that explain this observation,
namely lagging budgetary allocations that are contingent on past crime rates and
internal allocation processes that shift resources internally in response to changes
in reported crime. Another explanation derives from the individual behavior of
o¤enders who are likely to engage in repeat behavior (Fajnzylber et al. 2002a).
10.1 Deterrence
Table 4, upper middle section, reports the e¤ects of the classic deterrence vari-
ables on reported environmental crime. With the exception of the rate of severe
nes, these e¤ects are consistently signicant and have the predicted negative sign,
leading to result 1.
Result 1: Coe¢ cient estimates lend strong support to the general deterrence
conjecture contained in hypothesis 1. Particular support derives from the estimated
elasticities of reported crime with respect to the rate of tried o¤enders and the
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incarceration rate.
The conviction rate has the predicted negative sign but is not signicant for
most relevant estimation procedures except FE. Of particular interest are the ro-
bust and substantial coe¢ cients associated with the rate of tried o¤enders and the
prison rate: Their estimates are statistically signicant even at the 1% level across
estimation procedures and their elasticities have magnitudes at around 1 for the
rate of tried o¤enders and 1:5 for prison rates. This means that an increase in the
rate of tried o¤enders of 1 percentage point will decrease environmental crime at
about 0:9 to 1 percent. In case of the prison rate, the deterrence e¤ect is even
larger: An increase of the prison rate of one percentage point results in a decrease
in reported environmental crime rate of 1:3 to 1:6 percent.
Clearance rates also show a clear deterrent e¤ect on reported environmental
crime, giving rise to result 2.
Result 2: Parameter estimates for the clearance rate give support to the de-
terrence hypothesis 2. A higher clearance rate has an signicant negative e¤ect on
reported crime with an elasticity of on average -.8.
At the mean of clearance rates, the elasticity is at approximately 0:88, varying
with one standard deviation of clearance rates between  0:77 and  0:89: Being
subject to criminal investigation alone therefore deters potential o¤enders from
committing an environmental crime.
While the deterrent e¤ect of prison sentences provides a conrmation of the
economic model of environmental crime, result 3 regarding clearance rates and the
rate of tried o¤enders is less obvious.
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Result 3: Comparing coe¢ cient estimates for di¤erent components of the
sanctioning regime leads to a partial rejection of the hypothesis that deterrence
e¤ects of sanctioning devices are ordered by severity. While ndings endorse the
e¤ect for prison rates, the rate of tried o¤enders and clearance rates, there is no
evidence that severe nes and conviction rates t into this frame.
The least obvious nding are the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cient for
being identied as a suspect and for standing trial. These events in themselves do
impose losses such as time and travel costs. These alone, however, would not seem
su¢ cient to explain the scale of their deterrence e¤ect. What is likely, therefore,
is that unobserved reputational losses of being identied or standing trial are
substantial. The public nature of criminal sanctioning is a plausible cause of such
losses. Given the low level of pecuniary nes and the rarity of prison sentences,
reputational e¤ects remain as one of the main driving forces behind the deterrent
e¤ect of criminalizing environmental o¤ences.
10.2 Political Factors
As Helland (1998, 2001), I nd evidence for political factors being signicant de-
terminants of enforcement. The lower section of table 3 reports on the variables
capturing the e¤ect of detection and reporting e¤ort on reported environmental
crime. The e¤ect of strong support for the Greens on reported environmental
crime is compelling: The indicator for environmental preferences is statistically
highly signicant and positive, leading to result 4.
Results 4: The positive and signicant impact of environmental preferences
on reported crime contradicts the conjecture that public environmental preferences
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decrease the supply of environmental crime. Hypothesis 4 is therefore rejected.
On the basis of the empirical evidence, the conclusion is justied that the
elasticity of committing an environmental crime with respect to reporting behavior
of society and agencies is low. The share of strong supporters of green issues in
a state and year positively a¤ect environmental crime by reducing the reporting
bias.
Everything being equal, being governed by a pro-industry party reduces a
states reported environmental crime. Since enforcement variables are controlled
for, this leaves a causal channel from administrative policies to detection and re-
porting e¤ort as the most plausible explanation of the observed evidence.
Results 5: There is no supporting evidence for the conjecture that pro-industry
governments lead to an increase in environmental (hypothesis 5).
The empirical results detect a small but negative and in most cases signicant
relationship between the CDU/CSU being in government and environmental crime
rates. This pinpoints to a reduction of reporting e¤orts undertaken by agencies in
response to a pro-industry government. I come back to this in the discussion on
omitted variables.
11 Robustness of the Estimates
There are several technical issues involved in the econometric implementation of
the economic model of environmental crime. First and foremost are issues of
endogeneity whose presence may weaken the hypothesized causal relationship pos-
tulated in the simple model. As BC is only valid for strictly exogenous explanatory
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Table 5: Di¤erence-in-Sargan Test for AB and BB
explanatory variables di¤erence-in-Sargan (AB) di¤erence-in-Sargan (BB)
P-values P-values
cleared (level and squared) 0.137 0.885
tried 0.739 0.118
convicted 0.588 0.256
prison 0.056 0.008
ne 0.560 0.218
green.supp 0.725 0.396
cons 0.063 0.343
Note: Small sample corrections have been applied for AB and BB.
variables (except the lag of the dependent variable), I have to return to GMM to
test for potential endogeneity issues.
11.1 Simultaneity
The empirical literature on the economics of crime is rich in exploring the problem
of simultaneity, in particular for deterrent variables.47 As suggested by Roodman
(2006) and Baum et al. (2003), the di¤erence-in-Sargan48 test was used to examine
possible endogeneity. The di¤erence in Sargan tests are in most cases not able to
reject the Null of exogeneity of the deterrence and political variables for AB and
BB (table 5). Only the test for the CDU dummy in case of AB and prison rates
for both AB and BB are signicant.
However, as the Sargan test for the validity of the instruments for the lagged
dependent variable causes some problems and there may be doubts about the
47See Ehrlich (1973), Cornell & Trumbull (1994), Corman and Mocan (2000) and many others;
for an additional overview see Cameron (1988) or Levitt & Miles (2006).
48The test is automatically computed and diplayed in the output of xtabond2.
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consistency of the test applying it to my data I reestimated my model with BB
sequentially treating suspected variables as being endogenous. The reader nds
the results in table 6. While it is possible to argue that under some circumstances
regarding the data generating process the Sargan test statistic is invalid (see e.g.
Roodman 2006 or Baum et al. 2003), parameter estimates and standard errors
did not change substantially in comparison to the BB estimation in table 4 nei-
ther in signicance nor in magnitude. There is therefore little reason to conclude
that simultaneity plays an important role in my dataset. As this is not in line
with previous ndings the reader may be suspicious about theses results. How-
ever, in a workshop organized by the authors, members of police and prosecution
mentioned that - in practice - environmental crime does not have priority inside
enforcement institutions. Only environmental crimes with persistent media atten-
tion have anecdotally had signicant inuence on enforcement e¤orts at least in
the short run.
11.2 Omitted Variables
In the interest of economical use of available data, the empirical strategy involves
estimating the core of the economic model as a rst step. However, this strategy
runs the risk of omitting potentially important variables (see section 2.6.2). In
order to check for robustness against omitted variables, other potentially relevant
variables are subsequently introduced. The author is aware that this approach is
not in line with usual General to Simple Strategy(Greene 2003). However, having
in mind that the data set is small, including too many variables at the same time
reduces degrees of freedom dramatically and results would be questionable. To test
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Table 6: Estimation Results 2
Variable BB(cl) BB(tr) BB(conv) BB(pr) BB(sgs)
Regressors 1 2 3 4 5
lnCR, lag 1 .9983 .9950 .9967 .9977 .9983
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
cleared -1.9682 -2.0206 -2.0267 -1.9511 -1.9682
(0.0103) (0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0088) (0.0103)
cleared sq. 2.2718 2.3197 2.322 2.2551 2.2718
(0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.002)6 (0.0032)
tried -.8906 -.8757 -.8859 -.8943 -.8906
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
convicted -.1571 -.1468 -.1462 -.1667 -.1571
(0.3002) (0.3422) (0.3518) (0.2669) (0.3002)
prison -1.4634 -1.4447 -1.5742 -1.5012 -1.4634
(0.0099 (0.0095) (0.0072) (0.0058) (0.0099)
ne -.1101 -.0995 -.0748 -.1120 -.1101
(0.5115) (0.5441) (0.6637) (0.4995) (0.5115)
green.supp 2.6980 2.6466 2.6023 2.7008 2.6980
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0025)
cons -.0235 -.0288 -.0285 -.0246 -.0235
(0.6043) (0.5219) (0.5491) (0.6018) (0.6043)
N 152 152 152 152 152
instruments 152 144 144 144 152
Sargan 168.8952 161.2093 154.1789 165.3315 168.8952
(.0166) (.0138) (.0342) (.0077) (.01665)
ar1 -2.7550 -2.7584 -2.7528 -2.7549 -2.7550
(.0058) (.0058) (.0059) (.0058) (.0058)
ar2 1.6454 1.6221 1.6033 1.6443 1.6454
(.0998) (.1047) (.1088) (.1000) (.0998)
Note: Time dummies and a constant term have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis.
Restricting lag length to 6 as I did implied a reduction of instruments to almost 1/2. BB(cl) indicates that both
variables for clearance rate have been treated as endogenous. The same is true for the rate of tried o¤ender,
BB(tr), conviction rates, BB(conv), prison rates, BB(pr), and the support for the Greens, BB(sgs). Again, small
sample corrections were used in all specications.
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whether my approach generates di¤erent outcomes I went through both procedures
and ended up with the same core equation.
Typical examples for further explanatory variables are the competition for en-
forcement resources as indicated by the general crime rate, the level of enforcement
inputs such as the number of employees in the prosecution service, expenditures
for police, prosecution and courts. Structural variables are also potential candi-
dates for omitted variables, such as GDP per capita, the revenue or value added
for di¤erent sectors including recycling and farming, unemployment rates, and
social transfers indicating a higher opportunity cost of compliance. Finally, socio-
political variables that determine the governing party in individual states and a
dummy for the eastern states would qualify ex ante. Table 25 (Appendix to part
II) reports on the results for a roster of commonly used variables among those
tested using the BC estimation procedure. None of the non-core variables had a
robust e¤ect on reported environmental crime across the di¤erent estimation pro-
cedures and remaining parameter estimates were unchanged. Di¤erences in inputs
into police forces or the prosecution system do not contribute to explaining the
observed variation in reported environmental crime, nor do staple variables from
the standard criminological literature such as unemployment. As environmental
crime is a complement rather than a substitute to production activities, this is
expected. Also, there is no evidence that other forms of reported crime crowd
out reported environmental crime, for example through competition for scarce
enforcement budgets.
As I used panel data and thus control for unobserved heterogeneity I can con-
clude that endogeneity issues as suggested in section 2.6.2 do not seem to be
relevant for this dataset. However, few issues remain and will be subject to the
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next section.
11.3 Additional Checks
The last concerns concern possible time lag structures, nonstationarity and ag-
gregation bias in the data (see section 2.6.3 and 2.6.4). With respect to of I(1),
it is evident that the dataset possesses a relatively large time dimension in com-
parison to the cross section. Although traditional approaches are consistent for
0 < T=N < 2 (Alvarez and Arellano 2003) and thus appropriate in this case, the
possibility of nonstationarity in the panel data with relatively large T is real (Pe-
saran et al. 1995, 1999). I apply the customary panel unit root test for unbalanced
panel developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) to my environmental crime and de-
terrence variables. As it is evident in table 7, this test rejects the H0 of integration
and therefore points towards I(0) in my crime and deterrence variables.49 Only
the indicator for environmental preferences points towards I(1) in two of the three
specications. This provides an additional robustness check to the validity of the
results.
In case of possible delayed updating of potential o¤enders resulting in time lags
in the causal relationship between enforcement and crime (see section 2.6.4) it is
recommended to estimate the crime equation with lags in all deterrence variables.
However, as the sample is rather small and depends to a great extend on its time
dimension, it makes only sense to include the variables with one lag. The reader
nds the results in table 8. Although the amount of estimates being signicant
is reduced dramatically, the estimates especially for the preferred BC estimators
49Di¤erent specications including trends and lags were applied, with the majority of tests
rejecting unit roots.
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Table 7: Maddala-Wu Test of I(0)
Variables lag + trend trend lag
P-values P-values P-values
CR 0.0098 0.0011 1.0000
cleared 0.0838 0.0041 0.0000
tried 0.0303 0.0000 0.1348
convicted 0.9724 0.0067 0.3419
prison 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ne 0.0000 0.0123 0.0010
green.supp 0.2784 0.3769 0.0173
Note: H0 is I(1). The user written command xtsher by Scott Merryman was used to implement this test in
Stata.
have all the expected signs. The parameter estimates for the deterrence variables
and the CDU dummy return to be negative and the estimate for the indicator
for environmental preferences shows up to be positive. Moreover, the lagged de-
pendent variable, conviction rates, prison rates, rate of severe nes and the CDU
dummy also have the right order of magnitude. Only the estimates for clearances
rates, rate of tried o¤ender and environmental preferences decrease in comparison
to the original results.
Although most of the variables become insignicant the signs and magnitudes of
the parameter estimates stay almost the same especially for BC estimates. Usually
the applied econometrician would apply several tests to nd out the right lagging
structure. This is not possible in my case as the sample size is too small.
Finally, table 9 shows results estimating the equation including only illegal
waste disposal to circumvent the problem of an aggregation bias. I concentrated on
illegal waste disposals as this is the major type of environmental crime in Germany
(see section 1.3). Although the GMM estimators seem to deviate sometimes,
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Table 8: Estimation Results for Lagged Deterrence Variables
Variable POLS FE AB BB BC(AH) BC(BB)
Regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6
lnCR, lag 1 .9656 .6856 .3879 .9459 .8856 .9094
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0546) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
cleared, lag 1 .8134 -.9663 .2508 .8898 -.7585 -.6591
(0.2735) (0.3865) (0.8694) (0.4118) (0.5889) (0.5864)
cleared sq, lag 1 -.7787 .0642 -.8419 -.9256 -.2613 -.25128
(0.2743) (0.9496) (0.5338) (0.3901) (0.8373) (0.8212)
tried, lag 1 .0695 -.2358 -.0973 .1512 -.1277 -.1625
(0.7533) (0.2783) (0.7430) (0.6467) (0.7131) (0.5908)
convicted, lag 1 .0976 -.2056 -.4272 .0779 -.2906 -.2303
(0.4856) (0.3551) (0.0402) (0.5194) (0.2660) (0.2958)
prison, lag 1 -.3694 -.9517 -.7716 -.5232 -1.08968 -1.0445
(0.5023) (0.0645) (0.0959) (0.2752) (0.1291) (0.1216)
ne, lag 1 -.3644 -.2910 -.4206 -.3488 -.1923 -.2635
(0.1271) (0.2513) (0.0439) (0.0514) (0.5643) (0.3798)
green.supp .9186 1.1283 .9394 .6942 1.1330 1.0991
(0.2349) (0.3323) (0.4753) (0.5363) (0.4295) (0.3974)
cons .0258 -.0096 -.0253 .0090 -.0358 -.0062
(0.5623) (0.8568) (0.7834) (0.8970) (0.5960) (0.9116)
N 137 137 121 137 137 137
instruments 71 82
Sargan 71.9726 87.3785
(.04245) (.0227)
ar1 -2.5466 -2.7042
(.01087) (.0068)
ar2 1.5667 1.9145
(.1171) (.0555)
Note: Time dummies and a constant term have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis. AB,
BB and BC have been estimated via the user written command xtabond2 and xtlsdvc, respectively. Standard
errors are robust and in case of BC obtained by bootstrapping with 50 repetitions. Small sample corrections
were used in both GMM specications.
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results for both BC and for OLS and FE are in line with previous ndings. The
only key di¤erence is that or indicator for environmental preferences slightly fails
signicance at the 10% level for BC. The remaining results are almost the same
as those for environmental crime in general both in magnitude and in statistical
signicance. To conclude, there seems to be no aggregation bias in my results
derived so far.
To conclude the results for this section, there is great support that my original
estimates are very robust with respect to all shortcomings mentioned in previous
literature (see section 2.6). Neither endogeneity, aggregation bias, time lags nor
nonstationarity give cause to doubt my initial ndings. Additionally, a rst try
to capture variations in the dark gure showed up to be of great importance but
have no e¤ect on my deterrence variables.
12 Discussion
12.1 Interpreting the Results
The empirical results derived on the basis of the dynamic panel analysis add in
signicant ways to the existing literature. The rst new insight is that while a
substantial part of the legal literature characterizes criminal enforcement in case
of environmental o¤ences as ine¤ective and therefore redundant, the results of the
paper indicate otherwise. While rarely used, enforcement instruments restricted
to criminal sanctioning such as trial in a public court and prison rates have a
substantial statistical e¤ect on reported environmental crime rates. Most of the
standard variables measuring the quality of enforcement come out as strongly
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Table 9: Estimation Results for Illegal Waste Disposal
Variable POLS FE AB BB BC(AH) BC(BB)
Regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6
lnCR, lag 1 1.005 .6613 .6218 1.0246 .7425 .8230
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cleared -.7200 -3.3651 -1.7848 -.8789 -3.1783 -2.8139
(0.3189) (0.0000) (0.2054) (0.3943) (0.0121) (0.058)
cleared sq. 1.2176 3.3406 1.9444 1.4660 3.1733 2.8010
(0.0682) (0.0000) (0.1339) (0.1108) (0.0042) (0.0310)
tried -.5895 -.8875 -.9542 -.6457 -.8663 -.8285
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0014)
convicted .0946 .06346 -.0547 -.0136 .0545 .0359
(0.6038) (0.7734) (0.8556) (0.9516) (0.8226) (0.8963)
prison -1.2365 -1.4149 -.2466 -.7717 -1.4304 -1.3764
(0.1442) (0.0533) (0.6591) (0.3361) (0.0338) (0.0795)
ne .1034 .5580 .1320 -.0077 .5487 .5376
(0.6664) (0.0147) (0.6379) (0.9617) (0.2464) (0.3304)
green.supp 3.1917 2.0391 1.1277 3.0557 2.2580 2.5685
(0.0001) (0.0898) (0.3150) (0.0034) (0.1044) (0.1046)
cons -.0129 -.0941 -.0667 -.0214 -.0876 -.0828
(0.7765) (0.0589) (0.3556) (0.6918) (0.0623) (0.1325)
N 151 151 134 151 151 151
instruments 73 84
Sargan 54.8619 86.8262
(.4417) (.0303)
ar1 -2.6002 -2.4554
(.0093) (.01407)
ar2 1.4238 1.3791
(.1545) (.1678)
Note: Time dummies and a constant term have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis. AB,
BB and BC have been estimated via the user written command xtabond2 and xtlsdvc, respectively. Standard
errors are robust and in case of BC obtained by bootstrapping with 50 repetitions. Small sample corrections
were used in both GMM specications.
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signicant and with a deterrent e¤ect. With a view to validating the economic
theory of crime, there is clear evidence that the "calculus of deterrence" is indeed
operational in the domain of environmental crime. On the policy side, it should
be pointed out that the results are not conclusive evidence that criminal sanctions
are in any way superior to standard regulatory sanctioning mechanisms. At the
same time, the results demonstrate that criminal sanctions can play an important
role in deterring environmental crime.
The second new insight contained in the results is that the public nature of
sanctioning by trial appears to be quantitatively much more important than the
conviction rate and the magnitude of sanctions. The fact that the criminal process
generates informational externalities that do not arise in the essentially bilateral re-
lationship between regulators and o¤enders is an important feature of that regime.
Its high deterrence e¤ect suggests that policy-makers may nd it worthwhile to
consider adding a public component to regulatory processes in order to reap the
benets of this e¤ect while avoiding incurring the high costs that beset prosecu-
tions and trials under criminal law.
The third insight that my paper delivers is the importance of political factors
to understand the variation in reported environmental crime. The positive contri-
bution of citizensenvironmental preferences to the explanation of reported crime
has in my view not been empirically established so far. While the causal channels
through which these preferences translate into greater reporting cannot be traced
given the available data, intuitive explanations would center around the direct ef-
fects of more direct reports by citizens to enforcement authorities and the indirect
e¤ects of voter preferences leading to political pressure to increase detection and
reporting e¤orts by the police and regulators. Empirical evidence on the e¤ects of
106
which party governs individual states tends to lend support to this link that medi-
ates voter preferences through the political process. The paper does not explicitly
consider the longerterm e¤ects of political preferences on the sanctioning regime
(Helland 2001, Hamilton 1996). These will be the subject of a separate paper.
Focusing on the econometric aspects of the paper, particular attention has been
paid to tackle the issue of possible simultaneity in connection with crime variables
and the fact that the panel data set covers a long time period relative to the cross
section, thus giving rise to the real possibility of unit roots in the data. Regarding
simultaneity, the main problem arises in the joint determination of reported crime
and enforcement variables. Here, the paper employs di¤erent validation strategies
that universally fail to substantiate the presence of simultaneity in the data set.
One explanation is that this is due to the small relative importance environmental
crime has in comparison to serious and more frequent o¤ences such as felonies.
Overall, the estimation results are surprisingly robust and give grounds for cautious
condence in the results.
12.2 Confronting Results with the Existing Literature and
Part III
It is the aim of this section to embed the new insights into the existing literature
presented in part I and into the ndings of part III. It will then become evident
whether my results are supported by previous ndings in the general law and the
environmental regulation literature or not.
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12.2.1 Deterrence
In the empirical analysis of part II I nd strong evidence for the deterrence e¤ect
of clearance rates with the elasticity of around -.8 for the average clearance rate.
Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) replicate studies using cross-sectional data with
estimated elasticities for di¤erent types of crime being between -0.342 to -2.95
and almost all being statistically signicant. Their own results regarding arrest
rates are at around -.5 for their aggregate crime rate. Cherry and List (2001)
reestimate the dataset analyzing di¤erent types of crime separately. Their elas-
ticities range from -.167 (robbery) to -.557 (burglary). Baltagi (2006) gets similar
results for his reestimation of the dataset. Cherry (1999), also using panel data,
found results in similar magnitude. In his panel data analysis, Mustard (2003)
found substantially lower deterrence e¤ects of arrest rates with elasticities ranging
from -0.0016 to -0.012 for di¤erent types of crime. Viren (2001) also included ar-
rest/apprehension rates in his analysis nding very heterogenous results depending
on the type of data. The elasticities range from -.003 (pooled cross country data)
to -70.168 (pooled Finnish municipalities data). Gould et al. (2002) also found
rather low elasticities of around -.001. In addition, Levitt (1998b) tries to separate
measurement error, incapacitation and deterrence e¤ects. The author nds strong
support for the deterrence e¤ect dominating the other with substantial e¤ects es-
pecially for property crimes. In this analysis one additional burglar arrested deters
two burglaries. Although previous literature found rather heterogenous results for
clearance or arrest rates my ndings are in a comparable order of magnitude. My
results for clearance rates in part III conrm results in both part II and the general
crime literature. At the level of counties of Baden-Württemberg, the estimated
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elasticity is at around -.2 and therefore in line with previous ndings.
Results are also in line with the ndings of the literature on the compliance or
noncompliance with environmental regulations. There the frequency of monitoring
activities may reect the probability of detection and thus the rate of violations
being cleared. Almost all studies nd signicant positive e¤ects of monitoring on
compliance with di¤erent types of regulations (see section 3.3.1). The estimates
are in a similar order of magnitude with -1.5 being the highest estimate.
As the rate of tried o¤ender reecting the probability of getting accused when
identied is new in the law and economics literature it is not possible to compare
my results to previous ndings. However, the rate of tried o¤enders seems to be
the most e¤ective deterrence variable for Germany as results in part III broadly
conrm the present ndings. Although the estimated elasticity is smaller in part
III (ca. -.5), it is again highly signicant. Taken together, the fact of being tried
seems with elasticities of around -1 (part II) and -.5 (part III) to be very e¤ective
in deterring people from committing environmental crimes.
The empirical analysis implemented in this part of the thesis returns an elastic-
ity for the conviction rate of roughly -.3 but without signicance at any common
level. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) also replicate two examples of cross sectional
studies estimating the e¤ects for conviction rate with elasticities of -.26 and -1.8,
respectively. Depending on the model specication, their own analysis reveals
e¤ects ranging from -.282 to -.530 which are signicant in most cases. Cherry
and List (2001) estimate e¤ects in similar size for di¤erent crime categories. The
same is true for the reestimation by Baltagi (2006). Mustard (2003) also included
conviction rate as a deterrence variable but got signicant lower results with all
elasticities being below -.001. Estimates in part III show even more ambiguous
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results with varying signs and no signicant e¤ects.
Most comparable to conviction rates in the crime literature are the enforcement
e¤orts in the environmental regulation literature. There, estimates are in a very
similar range and do thus suggest a comparable level of deterrence (see section
3.3.2).
Prison Rates have in my analysis the biggest deterrence e¤ect on criminal
behavior with an elasticity of about -1.5. In literature, most results are of the
same order of magnitude or smaller. Ehrlich (1973) analyses di¤erent dataset with
di¤erent estimation approaches and gets estimates for the rate of apprehended and
imprisoned ranging between -.275 to -1.3. The range of the results for Andreonis
(1995) reestimation is almost identical. The two papers replicated by Cornwell
and Trumbull (1994) nd e¤ects of -.526 and -.991. Their own results do not show
up to be signicant and are relatively small (-.2). The reestimation by Cherry
and List (2001) results in statistically signicant e¤ects for many types of crimes
but with elasticities of again roughly -.2. This holds also for the reestimation of
Baltagi (2006). My ndings of part III are not able to conrm results of part II as
the estimates are only signicantly negative for the lagged e¤ect (with elasticities
of around -.9).
As there is little evidence for the impact of nes on deterrence in crime litera-
ture, I compare my results to the work by Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004). In their
study, the authors nd elasticities of around -.2 and -.3, respectively. However, in
case of German environmental crimes the rate of severe nes has ambiguous e¤ects
on crime and there is no specication for which it is signicant. The reason for
this may be that severe nes are seldom used and in contrast to prison sentences
they may be of less interest to media coverage. However, estimates of part III
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are negative throughout with elasticities of around -.5 and only slightly fail to be
signicant at the 10% level (see section 18.1).
In contrast, Sta¤ord (2002) analyses the e¤ect of a sudden increase of monetary
sanctions for hazardous wastes caused by changing legal environments. Although
this is not the same as a rate of severe nes it to some extent comparable to my
analysis. Sta¤ord (2002) nds that with this increased penalty the probability of
a rm being in violations decreased by 3 percent.
12.2.2 Political Factors
The fact that political variables may a¤ect the amount of crime or, to be more
precise, the reported amount of crime is rather new in crime and environmental
regulation literature. The only exception is, at least to my knowledge, Sta¤ord
(2002). The author included state environmental membership in her analysis nd-
ing a negative e¤ect on non-compliance. However, as the targeted variables are
di¤erent (see section 3.3.3), the results are not comparable. Although the empiri-
cal analysis of illegal waste disposals in Baden-Württemberg is not able to conrm
the present results, there is evidence for variables being at the intersection between
political and structural factors to inuence illegal behavior (see section 18.3).
13 Conclusion to Part II
Environmental crime, despite sharing important features with the types of crime
generally studied in economics of crime, has so far largely escaped the attention
of scholars. This is in contrast with environmental policy-makers who have em-
braced and continue to embrace the sanctioning potential of criminal law, albeit
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without clear empirical evidence regarding the ability of criminal sanctions to pro-
vide a deterrent e¤ect. Instead, the absence of rigorous economic analysis has led
to a proliferation of narratives with frequently irreconcilable characterizations of
regulatory reality.
This paper attempts to close the evidence gap in the use of criminal sanctions
in environmental policy making by specifying a theoretical model of reported crime
and implementing it in the shape of a dynamic panel data analysis. In doing so,
the paper not only conrms the operability of the "calculus of deterrence" in the
context of environmental crime. It also challenges the notion now widespread in
legal circles that German environmental criminal law is ine¤ective and - hence -
redundant. This is important since although environmental agencies are able to
impose nes, the essentially bilateral and condential nature of standard regulatory
practice denies regulators access to the reputational sanctions implicit in public
trials.
To verify the result obtained so far, the next part of the thesis follows a similar
strategy as this part does to analyzes illegal waste disposals on the more disaggre-
gated level of Baden-Württemberg.
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Part III
Illegal Waste Disposals and
Punishment
14 Introduction to Part III
Part III of the thesis is dedicated to a specic analysis of the major type of en-
vironmental crime in Germany - illegal waste disposal - from a more regional
perspective of the 44 counties (Stadt- und Landkreise) of the German state of
Baden-Württemberg. This section therefore extends the analysis of part II in or-
der to verify the results obtained on a more disaggregated level and to focus on
further determining factors of environmental crime that may only be detectable at
a ner level of analysis. Di¤erent aggregation levels imply di¤erent sets of avail-
able informations and it is therefore of huge importance to analyze environmental
crime at the level of the German states and the counties of Baden-Württemberg.
Congruence in the deterrence e¤ects on both levels when including di¤erent sets
of covariates would provide a strong argument for the reliability of the ndings.
Due to data constraints the empirical analysis in part II only included infor-
mations for expected costs in terms of expected punishment and political economy
factors. The economic approach to crime introduced by Becker (1968) claims,
however, that potential criminals balance benets and costs of crime. It is there-
fore also important to uncover the e¤ects incorporated in the benet side of illegal
disposal. This will be the focus of this part of the thesis.
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Focusing on illegal waste disposal has several advantages. First, it is the most
common type of environmental crime in Germany and it has a similar weight in the
U.S. (EPA 2006) and the rest of the European Union (EC 2007). Second, previous
theoretical and empirical literature (Sullivan 1987, Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995,
Sigman 1998 and Sta¤ord 2002) suggest that illegal waste disposals should to a
great extent be driven by economic incentives and thus constitute a good example
to study Beckers (1968) model. Third, it is, in comparison to other types of
environmental crime, rather easy to include data on the benet side of the market
as information for the amount of waste and for specic fees is contained in o¢ cial
statistics for Baden-Württemberg.
In line with my comments on the literature on environmental regulation in
general, there is a small but informative literature on administrative sanction-
ing of illegal or hazardous waste for the case of the U.S. (Sigman 1998, Sta¤ord
2002). However, at least to my knowledge, we do not know anything about crim-
inal enforcement of illegal waste disposals so far. Sigman (1998) e.g. studies the
e¤ectiveness of administrative, civil and criminal enforcement under the Resource
and Recovery Act (RCRA) together in one approach and thus is not able to reveal
distinct e¤ects for criminal enforcement. This lack of evidence is concerning, as
there is an ongoing debate arguing in favor of a further strengthening of criminal
enforcement in the context of environmental law for both the U.S. and EU (see
section 1.2). For policy-making to be e¤ective and consistent it is necessary to
have information about all relevant ties in this context. It is therefore the aim
of this part of the thesis to (i) validate the results for deterrence and political
economy factors obtained through the state level analysis, to (ii) include specic
information for the regional composition of each county and to (iii) incorporate
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data for the markets of legal waste disposal. To be precise, it will be interesting to
know whether results for deterrence for German states carry over to the counties
of Baden-Württemberg. If this is the case it would provide a strong argument
that criminal law is really e¤ective in deterring environmental o¤ences at least for
the German case. The same is true for the results regarding the political economy
drivers of reported environmental crime. Evidence for the composition of munici-
pal councils (Stadtrat and Kreistag) having an impact on the amount of reported
illegal waste disposals would denitely support ndings of part II. However, one
obvious drawback of more disaggregate data is that political variety is reduced
signicantly at this level. As the composition of municipal councils is rather sta-
ble over time and mostly in hand of the German conservatives (CDU)50 in case
of Baden-Württemberg, it will be hard to reveal important e¤ects. Furthermore,
there is no data available reecting environmental preferences of county popula-
tion. Additional waste market factors especially include a variety of informations
for the sources of household and industrial waste and the quantities and prices
relevant for legal disposal.
Although the data availability is much better for Baden-Württemberg than for
most of the other German states, there are still some important drawbacks I will
explain in section 16.
Results are fourfold. First and foremost, there is again strong support for a
deterrence e¤ect of criminal enforcement in the context of environmental crime.
Especially the fact of being tried is again a key driver in the general deterrence
framework. This nding is remarkable as the combination of part II and III give
50Other very important parties are local votersassociations only being active for a specic
county.
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rise to the result being consistent and reliable. The thesis is therefore in the
position to add important informations to ongoing debates in Germany and to
similar discussions elsewhere.
Secondly, and as it has been expected, the political economy factors reecting
the composition of municipal councils do not show up to be signicant. This is
not surprising as there is not much political heterogeneity in Baden-Württemberg.
Both the state parliament and the municipal councils are dominated by the Ger-
man conservatives for more than 50 years.
Third, as for the waste market data, it is not possible to reveal the causal
channels. The quality of the informations available for the waste market give
cause to concern. However, we will come to this issue in later sections.
Fourth, results suggest that structural variables indicating industrial activity
in each county a¤ect the amount of reported illegal disposals. Especially factors
indicating the dependency a county faces with respect to the manufacturing in-
dustry in terms of employment or tax income seems to inuence the amount of
reported illegal waste disposals.
The remainder of part III is organized as follows. In section 15 I will present
the theoretical hypothesis tested in later regression analysis. These include deter-
rence, political and structural e¤ects potentially inuencing the amount of illegal
disposals. Section 16 introduces the data collected that builds the basis for the
later econometric investigations. After that I will present the empirical model to
be estimated and the corresponding results in section 17 and 18. Finally, there
will be some robustness checks, a discussion and concluding remarks in sections
19 - 21, respectively.
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15 The Determinants of Reported Illegal Waste
Disposal
The theoretical hypothesis are based on three aspects. The rst set of considera-
tions stress the deterrence e¤ects of criminal enforcement in the context of illegal
waste disposals and is therefore in line with the analysis in part II. Deterrence
should play a similar role at the county level and at the level of German states. I
therefore briey replicate the hypothesis on this issue stated in section 7.1. Sec-
ondly, and as it is well-known in environmental economics literature, the economic
incentives inherent to the waste market will inuence the amount of illegal waste
disposal (Sullivan 1987, Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995, Sigman 1998 and Sta¤ord
2002). Lastly, political and structural factors may inuence illegal behavior.
15.1 Deterrence
In case of illegal waste disposals, gross benets consist of the avoided cost of proper
disposal minus the cost of illegal disposal. The components of expected costs are
the probability of being detected, identied, prosecuted, and penalized for illegal
waste disposal on the one hand and the economic cost of the penalty on the
other. Costs comprise both monetary categories such as nes and non-monetary
categories such as reputation losses and the opportunity cost of spending time in
prison. Variations in this expected cost give rise to the rst two hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Reported crime responds to more severe criminal sanctions
in that higher probabilities of their use lead - ceteris paribus - to a reduction in
reported crime.
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As illegal waste disposals are primarily motivated by economic considerations,
this hypothesis postulates that changes in sanctioning probabilities deter environ-
mental criminal activity as predicted and observed in other contexts of enforcement
and deterrence (Becker 1968, Cornwell and Trumbull 1994, Sullivan 1987, Fuller-
ton and Kinnaman 1995, Sigman 1998 and Sta¤ord 2002). Higher sanctioning
probabilities raise the expected cost of criminal activity and should hence decrease
net benets of illegal disposals, leading to less criminal activity being undertaken.
Hypothesis 2: A higher clearance rate implies a higher probability of being
identied as an o¤ender, thus raising the expected cost of crime and leading to a
reduction in reported crime.
Greater e¤ort by police to identify the o¤enders responsible for a reported ille-
gal disposal is the rst key step for the prosecutorial process to commence. Since
for a given amount of illegal disposals, a higher clearance rate implies greater
probability of being subject to criminal investigation, there is a strong a priori in-
tuition that reported cases of illegal disposals should fall for higher clearance rates.
Empirically, this conclusion is borne out by studies typically returning negative
coe¢ cient estimates on account of their deterrent e¤ect on potential o¤enders (e.g.
Baltagi 2006, Cherry and List 2002, Cornwell and Trumbull 1994).
As stated in section 7.1, the prediction of negative coe¢ cients attached to sanc-
tioning variables is silent on the relative contribution of di¤erent components of
the sanctioning regime to overall deterrence. The question of relative contributions
is the subject of hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: An increase in the probability of more severe sanctioning com-
ponents will result in a greater deterrence e¤ect relative to less severe sanctioning
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components. The order of deterrence e¤ects should be the probability of (i) a
prison sentence, (ii) a severe ne, (iii) a conviction, (iv) of having to stand trial,
and (v) being identied as a suspect.
Di¤erent sanctioning components imply di¤erent costs. Theory would dictate
that the marginal impact of a change in the di¤erent sanctioning probabilities
should therefore correspond to these cost di¤erences (Polinsky and Shavell 1984).
Among the sanction considered in the German Penal Code, prison sentences are
arguably the most severe form of punishment as they include time lost and the
social stigma attached to prison sentences, followed by severe nes, standard nes,
and nally the purely reputational losses of having to appear in court (Kahan and
Posner 1999, Karpo¤ and Lott 1993).
15.2 Waste Market Determinants
Although there is data available for the quantities of legal waste disposals and for
local waste disposal fees for Baden-Württemberg, it is not quite clear in which way
they a¤ect the amount of illegal waste disposals. There are several reasons that
give rise for ambiguous e¤ects. The law on recycling and waste (KrW-/AbfG)
implemented in October 1996 totally changed the situation for waste disposals.
According to o¢ cials from local waste departments the new law had the same
e¤ect as a subsidy for all commercial operators producing waste. Prior to the law,
the disposal of industrial waste had to be carried out by local authorized private
rms or local waste disposal departments. With the law being in force, rms and
plants are allowed to commission private companies without a local commitment
and thus fewer regulatory control. Moreover, another e¤ects is that companies
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entered the market o¤ering the professional disposal of industrial waste for a very
low price and then dispose that waste illegally e.g. as household garbage. Although
it would be very interesting to study the transition from one legal situation to the
other in more detail, it is not possible to derive a clear-cut hypothesis whether the
law leaded to more or less environmental crime.
Taken together, the law on recycling and waste decreased prices for industry
waste disposal and increased at the same time the prices for household waste dis-
posal. This is because local rms commission internationally operating companies
to dispose their waste. In doing so, they cause a huge gap in the ll rate of local
incinerating plants. The e¤ect of this gap is that the price per kg of waste disposal
rise which foremost a¤ects the costs for private households as they are committed
to the local supplier. On the other hand, rising fees also signal that less industrial
waste is disposed locally. Although internationally operating rms may have in-
centives to dispose illegally, it is unlikely that this illegal disposal will happen at
the place of origin. Furthermore, even on this disaggregate level, prices are very
heterogenous and depend on the amount of services connected to the disposal. To
summarize, one is not able to derive consistent and testable hypothesis for waste
disposal fees.
Similar problems arise for the amount of waste appearing in o¢ cial statistics.
As data for the amount of waste is only collected recently and there have been
several adjustments in o¢ cial statistics, informations exhibit some inconsistencies
over time.51 It is therefore questionable if one nds denite e¤ects when including
data for the amount of di¤erent sorts of waste into an econometric specication.
51According to the ministry of environment of Baden-Württemberg, there have been several
adjustments in recent years.
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This suspicion is supported by later results (see section 19.2). None of the included
waste market variables show up to be signicant in any specication.
In contrast to waste market data, informations on the political and structural
composition of each county are more reliable. It is therefore possible to derive
consistent and testable hypothesis for these factors.
15.3 Structural and Political Factors
The key points regarding the impact of the structural and political composition
of counties on illegal disposals are concentrated in 4 hypothesis. The rst one
considers the relationship between the amount of civil servants in a county and
population. I assume that the higher the share of civil servants in comparison
to county population, the higher the probability of a crime being detected and
reported. However, as criminals may anticipate this, there may also be a deterrence
e¤ect of a higher share of civil servants. I assume the reporting e¤ect to dominate
the deterrence e¤ect, leading to hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4: A higher share of civil servants in population will - ceteris
paribus - lead to more reporting and thus increase the rate of reported illegal
disposals.
On the other hand, illegal waste disposals may be more likely committed in a
county with a lower population density (Eckert 2004). In a less dense populated
county it should be fairly easy to dump waste without being caught red-handed.
This leads to hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 5: A more dense populated county is assumed to experience less
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illegal waste disposals and thus a lower rate of illegal disposals.
In contrast to the analysis for German states, there is no data available re-
ecting environmental preferences of county population. In addition, although I
have data on the political composition of municipal councils, there is not much
variation as the conservatives are the dominating party in Baden-Württemberg
(LPB 2008). Moreover, there are complicating feedback e¤ects in operation be-
tween political orientation and reported illegal waste disposal. Laxer or a more
stringent enforcement induced by politicians will arguably lead to more or less ille-
gal disposals (Hamilton 1996, Helland 1998), but also less or more detection e¤ort,
leaving the net e¤ect on reported cases ambiguous. However, I included several
variables indicating how powerful the conservatives and the German green party
are in local municipal councils. In contrast to part II, hypothesis 6 assumes that
the supply of illegal disposals is inelastic with respect to detection e¤ort. Again,
this assumption is subject to empirical examination.
Hypothesis 6: Pro-industry councils lead ceteris paribus to a lower rate of
reported illegal waste disposal. In contrast, a higher share of green politicians in
municipal councils will ceteris paribus increase the rate of reported illegal waste
disposal.
Typical structural factors like GDP per capita or indicators for industry activity
like the total revenue of the manufacturing sector may also a¤ect the amount of
illegal disposals. I assume that both indicators for economic activity increase the
amount of reported illegal disposals (Eckert 2004, Sigman 1998, Sta¤ord 2002).
According to Sigman (1998), counties with a higher income may care more about
the environment and thus have higher reporting than counties with lower incomes.
122
Hypothesis 7: Increasing GDP per capita or total manufacturing revenue
leads- ceteris paribus - to a increasing rate of reported illegal waste disposal.
Another potentially important determinant of reporting that is at the inter-
section between political and structural factors is the degree a county depends on
the income generated by the manufacturing industry. Both the income of counties
generated by corporate taxes and earnings of employees may a¤ect the amount
of reporting. I assume that in counties with a higher portion of people work-
ing in manufacturing industries there will be less reporting. In line with this, a
higher relationship between county corporate tax income and total county income
is assumed to reduce reported illegal disposals.
Hypothesis 8: Increasing the share of people working in the manufacturing
industry or the weight corporate taxes have in comparison to county income leads
ceteris paribus to a decreasing rate of reported illegal waste disposal.
The next section introduces the dataset used in the later econometric analysis
in sections 17 - 19.
16 Data
Data on illegal waste disposals in Germany is collected at the level of 44 individ-
ual counties (Stadt- und Landkreise). As I employ panel data analysis, my sample
comprises the years 1995 (1994 in case of reported cases and cleared cases) to
2005 with a small subset of states having incomplete reporting,52 leading to an
52In 2001, there is no information on reported cases and clearance rates for Raststatt and
Neckar-Odenwald-Kreis. In case of enforcement variables, data is missing for 17 observations.
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incomplete panel. Data on reported illegal waste disposals and the clearance rate
are taken from the o¢ cial police crime statistics (PKS) published by the State
Criminal Police O¢ ce (LKA) of Baden-Württemberg. Data concerning juvenile
o¤enders is excluded from the dataset due to the distinct sanctioning regime ap-
plicable to this subgroup. The necessary data for the explanatory variables of the
sanctioning regime applied to crime, such as the number of trials, convictions and
imprisonments, is available from the o¢ cial prosecution statistics (StVSt) of the
Research Data Centre (FDZ) provided by the Federal Statistical O¢ ce and its
state level counterparts. Data on structural variables that characterize individual
counties, such as population, size, economic, administrative, political, and several
socioeconomic variables, are taken from publications of the State Statistical O¢ ce
of Baden-Württemberg. Examples include GDP per capita, industry production,
the composition of municipal councils, data reecting the waste market, county
income and enforcement resources such as the number of civil servants, prosecutors
and judges.
There are some important issues regarding data quality that have to be dis-
cussed in detail. First, an important characteristic of the enforcement process is
that although there is data for cases and cleared cases of illegal waste disposals
for every county and year, there does not exist data for the enforcement process
on this disaggregated level. The reason for this is that local courts are in most
cases responsible for several counties. In order to match every county with its
corresponding court I mapped the enforcement variables of the 17 regional court
districts (Landgerichtsbezirke) to their particular counties. That is, several coun-
ties will have the same rate of tried o¤ender, conviction rates, etc..
As there may be some time lag between identifying a suspect and the criminal
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proceeding and, in addition, the number of illegal waste disposal for each county
sometimes is very low and varies signicantly over time, there are 50 observations
where the number of tried exceeds the number of identied suspects. This implies
a rate of tried o¤enders which is greater than 1. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
map the whole process of enforcement for each case separately as information stem
from di¤erent sources. It is therefore not possible to identify the right time lag for
every case separately. Applying some kind of average time lag or moving averages
may worsen things as there is a signicant amount of cases that are enforced in the
year of detection. However, for the public and for potential o¤enders it is important
to know the present amount of crime and the present amount of enforcement
in order to generate the relevant probabilities of punishment that inuence their
decisions. In my point of view it is therefore most practical to use the original rates
of tried o¤enders. In order to be able to interpret the estimates as elasticities and
to ensure a similar range as the remaining enforcement variables I transformed the
rate of tried o¤enders by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm. This ensures
that the variable is positive and in a similar range as the clearance rate, conviction
rate, etc..
Tables 10 and 11 provide variable denitions and summary statistics for all
variables included in the core econometric specication.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CR 505 .0000913 .0000839 0 .0006523
clear 526 .6736597 .2497356 0 1
tried 468 .3942176 .2131316 .0645385 1.540.445
convicted 470 .7392265 .1913142 0 1
prison 467 .0297241 .065799 0 .5
ne 467 .0508961 .1138831 0 1
outliertrend 528 2.272.159 6.351.823 0 2.005
pop.den 528 5.273.197 6.552.667 1.029.385 7.641.714
greens 528 .083408 .0446269 0 .2708333
cons 528 .4107641 .0741905 .2413793 .5652174
dummy.cons 528 .1609848 .3678655 0 1
dummy.cons.lib 528 .3522727 .4781314 0 1
civil.servants 440 .014436 .0058389 .005697 .0393293
gdp 440 72318.8 51729.69 19582.43 343650.1
rev.manu 484 54458.35 49372.29 7079.894 346632.7
emp.manu 440 .0906159 .1335163 .0079495 .6939474
corp.tax 350 .0004373 .0001312 .0001151 .0009186
Given that many of my political, structural and waste market variables are not
available for the whole period under consideration this part of the thesis employs
again a two-step estimation approach. As a rst step, the core of the model as
set out in the next section is implemented and estimated in order to use as many
observations as possible. Subsequently, I carry out tests for additional variables
that have been identied in the larger literature on crime and illegal waste disposals
to play a plausible role and check for robustness.
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17 The Econometric Model of Illegal Waste Dis-
posal
In this section I develop a simple empirical model on illegal waste disposals that is
at the intersection between the crime (Ehrlich 1973, Cornwell and Trumbull 1994,
etc.) and the environmental regulation literature (Sigman 1998, Sta¤ord 2002).
This estimation equation maps a relationship between illegal waste disposals on the
one hand and county-level enforcement, political economy, structural and waste
market variables on the other hand. This leads to an estimation equation of the
form:
lnCRit = A+  lnCRit 1 + Pit + Xit +Oit + Fi + Tt + it (11)
where lnCRit is the natural log of the reported rate of illegal waste disposals in
county i in year t and A is a constant term. Fi and Ti capture individual county
and year e¤ects, respectively. The variable O is an interaction term indicating
whether the 5 counties that show an outlying behavior follow some distinct time
trend. Pit is a vector containing the state- and year-specic probabilities of dif-
ferent levels of punishment for o¤enders located in di¤erent counties and court
districts, respectively. In the present case this are clearance rates53, the rate of
tried o¤enders, conviction rates, prison rates and the rate of people sentenced
to a severe ne.54 Xit captures several aspects of political, structural and waste
market specic factors that are added subsequently. Examples are the share of
53In contrast to the anaylsis in part II, clearance rates seem not to exhibit a nonlinear rela-
tionship with respect to illegal waste disposals.
54As on state level, information about nes and prison sentences are not available in their true
magnitude but only in intervals. It is therefore not possible to construct plausible variables for
the severity of punishment.
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conservative politicians (CDU) and green politicians (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) in
the municipal councils (Kreistag and Stadtrat). In addition to using the share of
conservatives I also generated a dummy variable indicating whether the conserva-
tives hold the absolute majority in a county parliament. Furthermore, I generated
a dummy variable indicating whether the conservatives and their usual coalition
partner, the German liberals (FDP), have the absolute majority in local councils.
Variables reecting the structural composition are the share of civil servants and
the share of employees in the manufacturing industry in the population, popula-
tions density, the total revenue of the manufacturing industry, GDP per capita
and the share of county corporate taxes in total county income. Finally, ; ; ; 
and  stand for the parameter (vectors) to be estimated and the disturbance term,
respectively.
Table 12 presents the parameter estimates for the core model for di¤erent
estimation procedures with di¤erent characteristics. BB stands for the Blundell
and Bond (1998) one-step system GMM estimator with robust standard errors and
small sample corrections. BC reports the estimates obtained by following the bias
correction procedure as proposed by Bruno (2005a), applying BB in rst stage.
After pinpointing the key results of this analysis there will a section checking
the robustness with respect to endogeneity issues and time lags.
18 Estimation Results
The results for the core model are presented in table 12. Although many of the
mentioned shortcomings of GMM are not as demanding in this dataset as they
have been in part II, bias correction will serve as a benchmark to contrast esti-
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mation results. Very similar to my estimates on state level, illegal waste disposals
again show a signicant degree of persistency. However, parameter estimates are
signicantly lower and do not point towards I(1). The panel unit root test as
proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999)55 rejects the Null of nonstationarity for all
specications even at the 10% level.
There is some evidence that the 5 counties with outlying behavior follow a
distinct development as the estimates are signicant and positive for the GMM
specications. The behavior of the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions gives
again some reason for cautiousness. With a p-value of .044 for BB, the test ques-
tions whether levels and di¤erences of the lagged dependent variable serve as good
instruments to correct for the Nickell (1981) bias. However, the Arellano and Bond
(1991) tests for rst and second order autocorrelation do provide evidence against
the model t. There is evidence for ar(1) and for ar(2) at the 10% level and no evi-
dence for ar(3) (column1). I therefore only used lags 2-4 of the dependent variable
to serve as instruments in later GMM regressions. In doing so, there is evidence
that both the Sargan and the Hansen test are not able to reject the Null of validity
of the instruments at common signicance levels for the core equation in table 12.
Table 13 and 14 display results for additionally included structural e¤ects.
Although tests for ar(2) now behave as requested, the Sargan statistic again points
against the validity of the instruments. Altering the number of instruments or the
range of lags did not change results. It is therefore most practical to stick to bias
correction especially as there is no evidence that endogeneity plays a role in this
setting (see section 19.1).
55Again, the xtsher command in Stata by Scott Merryman has been used.
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Table 12: Estimation Results 1
Variable BB BB BC BB BC
1 2 3 4 5
waste, lag .46434 .7649 .4316 .4471 .4462
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0023) (0.0000)
clear -.3528 -.4156 -.2293 -.2246 -.2464
(0.0738) (0.0975) (0.2660) (0.2750) (0.2643)
tried -.5917 -.6482 -.4672 -.4988 -.4837
(0.0036) (0.0044) (0.0224) (0.0166) (0.0219)
convicted .0528 -.0638 -.1950 .0495 -.2105
(0.7844) (0.7933) (0.4166) (0.7922) (0.3971)
prison .5255 .2880 .2039 .4561 .2208
(0.1301) (0.4746) (0.6914) (0.1374) (0.6879)
ne -.4427 -.3464 -.2085 -.4387 -.2059
(0.1370) (0.2816) (0.5392) (0.1511) (0.5608)
outliertrend .0004 .0002 -.0056 .0003 -.0131
(0.0000) (0.0007) (0.8663) (0.0001) (0.6902)
pop.den -.0936 -.0662 5.5790 -.0887 5.3349
(0.1063) (0.1044) (0.2245) (0.1310) (0.2476)
greens .0172 .0230 .0315 -.0283 .0357
(0.8888) (0.7730) (0.9286) (0.8213) (0.9197)
cons .2870 .0479 -.2157
(0.3308) (0.8021) (0.7969)
dummy.cons .0442 -.0571
(0.6183) (0.7351)
N 407 407 407 407 407
instruments 57 53 53
Sargan 76.6833 25.5897 98.1410
(.0000) (.7814) (0.0000)
ar1 -4,63E+07 -4.168.601 -4,12E+07
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
ar2 1.7961 1.8135 1.6915
(.0724) (.0697) (.0907)
ar3 .3179 .4150 .4317
(.7505) (.6781) (.6659)
Note: Time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis. All GMM
specications have been applied using one-step system GMM with small sample corrections and robust standard
errors. In case of bias correction standard errors have been estimated using bootstrapping with 50 repetitions.
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Table 13: Estimation Results 2
Variable BB BC BB BC BB BC
1 2 3 4 5 6
waste, lag .6180 .4344 .4576 .3572 .7295 .3572
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
clear -.2243 -.3115 -.0683 -.0383 -.1013 -.0383
(0.2394) (0.1633) (0.7631) (0.8942) (0.7081) (0.8942)
tried -.6291 -.5079 -.6742 -.4406 -.7396 -.4406
(0.0075) (0.0310) (0.0068) (0.1311) (0.0159) (0.1311)
convicted -.0311 -.2520 .1092 -.1416 -.0436 -.1416
(0.8858) (0.3585) (0.6315) (0.6334) (0.8807) (0.6334)
prison .4258 .2188 .6908 .2638 .3789 .2638
(0.2693) (0.6378) (0.0909) (0.6372) (0.3853) (0.6372)
ne -.4217 -.2008 -.8873 -.1006 -.8903 -.1006
(0.3022) (0.6228) (0.1152) (0.8057) (0.1190) (0.8057)
outliertrend .0002 .0088 .0004 .0131 .0002 .0131
(0.0000) (0.8111) (0.0016) (0.7890) (0.0316) (0.7890)
greens .0335 .0182 .0079 .0400 -.0621 .0400
(0.7523) (0.9505) (0.9636) (0.9234) (0.5199) (0.9234)
rev.manu .0438 .6408 .0296 1.2438 .1138 1.2438
(0.5361) (0.1479) (0.8288) (0.0892) (0.4124) (0.0892)
gdp .6034 -.6748 1.2037 1.4656 1.0113 1.4656
(0.0175) (0.6174) (0.1427) (0.4760) (0.1456) (0.4760)
pop.den -.2050 2.8624 -.2399 .1231 -.2087 .1231
(0.0223) (0.5504) (0.3037) (0.9890) (0.2551) (0.9890)
dummy.cons.lib .0642 -.0833
(0.6073) (0.6519)
cons .3276 .6561 .1321 .6561
(0.4365) (0.5875) (0.7146) (0.5875)
civil.servants .3015 -.8222 .0564 -.8222
(0.3268) (0.1987) (0.8188) (0.1987)
Note: Time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis. All GMM
specications have been applied using one-step system GMM with small sample corrections and robust standard
errors. In case of bias correction standard errors have been estimated using bootstrapping with 50 repetitions.
Again, lags 2-4 of the dependent variable serve as instruments in GMM
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Table 14: Estimation Results 2, continued
Variable BB BC BB BC BB BC
1 2 3 4 5 6
corp.tax -.3684 -.2600 -.4314 -.2600
(0.0207) (0.2450) (0.0039) (0.2450)
emp.manu -.0885 -3.374 -.1589 -3.3744
(0.8130) (0.0737) (0.5141) (0.0737)
N 369 369 282 282 282 282
instruments 56 55 52
Sargan 37.0253 59.9053 58.4586
(.0000) (.0013) (.0006)
ar1 -4.4423 -4.3438 -3.9577
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
ar2 .7449 1.1125 1.2019
(.4563) (.2658) (.2293)
18.1 Deterrence
The result conrm most of the ndings of part II. The e¤ect for the rate of tried
o¤enders is again remarkable. The elasticities range from -.44 to -.67 and are highly
signicant in all specications. In contrast to part II, there is no evidence that
the prison rate provides signicant deterrence for the present data. Estimates are
positive throughout and in one case signicant (column 3 in table 13). However,
including prison rates with one lag reveals a negative and signicant e¤ect (see
section 19.3). The results for conviction rates and the rate of severe nes are in
line with the previous analysis. Both show negative parameter estimates for almost
all specications but are not signicant at the 10% level.
Result 1: There is evidence for a deterrence e¤ect of the rate of tried o¤end-
ers. Parameter estimates for conviction rates and the rate of severe nes are also
negative but not signicant. Prison rates do not seem to deter illegal waste dispos-
als as estimates are positive in all specications. However, including prison rates
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with one lag reveals a signicantly negative e¤ect on illegal disposals.
Hypothesis 2 focused on the e¤ect of police e¤ort in clearing illegal waste
disposals. Estimates for clearance rates do show the intended negative sign and
are signicant at the 10% level for some of the core specications (columns 1 and
2 in table 12) with values of around -.2 to -.4.
Result 2: Clearance rates do show up to have the intended negative e¤ect on
illegal waste disposals.
Another important issue within the deterrence framework stresses the relative
contribution of the di¤erent enforcement components. As di¤erent stages in the
enforcement process imply di¤erent costs it is interesting to compare their e¤ec-
tiveness. Similar to results of part II, there is again some support for hypothesis
3.
Result 3: For the relative contribution to the deterrence e¤ect it is possible to
partly conrm hypothesis 3. Within the signicant estimates, clearance rates do
show a smaller e¤ect than the rate of tried o¤ender. The remaining deterrence
variables, however, are not in line with the initial hypothesis.
To sum up, there is again evidence for a deterrence e¤ect especially for the rst
two enforcement stages.
18.2 Waste Market Variables
Although data quality for prices and quantities of waste disposal seems to be rather
low, I do provide estimates including specic variables in section 19.2. This is to
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test whether it is possible to conrm results obtained by Sta¤ord (2002). The
author showed that especially higher prices of legal disposal have the expected
e¤ect of increasing the amount of illegal disposal. However, and as it has been
expected, none of the included variables show up to be signicant. Since it is
unlikely the case that the market for waste disposal does not a¤ect the amount of
illegal disposals at all, the most obvious reason is that data quality is not su¢ cient
enough to enlighten the relevant information. Data for quantities and prices of
waste are collected only recently and there have been several adjustments such
that it is likely the case that the relevant information is blurred.
18.3 Political and Structural Factors
This part of the thesis summarizes the results for the political and structural
factors. As criminal enforcement is rather expensive, it may be interesting to
learn more about further determinants of illegal waste disposals. However, looking
at table 13, there is no conrmation for hypothesis 4. The estimates for the share
of civil servants do not reveal signicant e¤ects in any specication.
Result 4: Results do not support the hypothesis that the share of county popu-
lation working as civil servants a¤ects the amount of reporting and thus the amount
of reported illegal waste disposals.
However, I do nd some support for hypothesis 5 as estimates for population
density are relatively robust. Estimates are almost always negative and signicant
for one specication56 (column 1 of table 13) with an elasticity of around -.2.
56Estimates slightly fail signicance at the 10% level for many other specications (see table
13).
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Result 5: Results give cautious support for a higher population density leading
to a lower rate of reported illegal disposals.
Regarding the political suggestions subsumed in hypothesis 6, I do nd positive
parameter estimates for the share of conservatives in municipal councils and vary-
ing signs for both dummies. Results for the German green party show ambiguous
signs. It is therefore not possible to verify hypothesis 6.
Result 6: Contrasting results in part II, there is some evidence for a posi-
tive relationship between the conservatives and illegal waste disposals. However,
estimates are not signicant for any common signicance level and it is therefore
not possible to draw clear-cut conclusions. Estimates for the share of greens in
municipal councils is even more ambiguous.
The results for the structural factors are totally in line with the initial expecta-
tions. Revenue generated in the manufacturing industry shows positive parameter
estimates with elasticities ranging between .04 and 1.2 and estimates are signicant
for some BC specications. The results for GDP per capita are not as clear-cut.
Estimates are positive in most cases but only once signicant with elasticities
ranging from -.6 to 1.4.
Result 7: There is evidence that the revenue of the manufacturing sector has
a positive impact on illegal disposals. The results for GDP per capita point towards
the same direction but are less denite.
Hypothesis 8 focused on the dependency of a county on the manufacturing
industry. Both indicators for the degree of dependency show the expected negative
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sign and are signicant for some specications (table 14). Elasticities range from -
.26 to -.43 for the share of county corporate tax revenue in county total income and
from -.08 to -.3.37 for the share of county population working in the manufacturing
industry.
Result 8: Both the share of county populations working in the manufactur-
ing industry and the share of county corporate tax income in total county income
inuence the amount of reported illegal disposals negatively.
19 Robustness
As already discussed in part II, there are some technical issues connected to the
empirical estimation of the economic model of crime. First, simultaneity may lead
to biased estimates as discussed in section 11.1 of part II. It may always be the
case that both potential criminals reacting on changing enforcement e¤orts and
enforcement institutions reacting on the behavior of criminals. With observing an
increasing crime rate police, prosecutors and courts may tend to increase e¤orts
in order to keep the amount of crimes at an acceptable level. Further biases arise
when omitting important variables. Section 19.2 therefore focuses on this issue.
The last subsection is dedicated to a specic analysis of potential time lags in the
deterrence framework. Since the present part of the thesis analyzes illegal waste
disposals there is no danger of facing an aggregation bias as proposed by Cherry
and List (2002). Furthermore, panel unit root tests did reject the hypothesis of
nonstationarity in the series of illegal disposals (see section 18).
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Table 15: Di¤erence-in-Sargan Test
Deterrence Variable Test Statistic: Chi2(1) P-Value
Clearance Rate 0.96 0.328
Rate of Tried 0.06 0.809
Conviction Rate 0.14 0.71
Prison Rate 1.58 0.208
Rate of Severe Fines 1.94 0.163
Note: The di¤erence-in-Sargan tests follow a chi2 distribution with one degree of freedom (Roodman 2006). The
test was obtained using the estimation specication in column 2 of table 12 with non-robust standard errors.
19.1 Simultaneity
Simultaneity is of special interest for the included enforcement variables. It is
unlikely that the amount of illegal waste disposals a¤ects the political or structural
composition of a county. In testing for simultaneity I follow a similar strategy as
I did in part II. Testing for simultaneity implies using GMM as the bias-corrected
estimators are only valid for strictly exogenous variables.
The di¤erence in Sargan test57 is not able to reject the Null of exogeneity
for any of the deterrence variables. I present the p-values in table 15. As the
Sargan and Hansen test work well for the core specication58 results seem to be
trustworthy.
However, as one might question the reliability of the Sargan and Hansen test
(Baum et al. 2003, Roodman 2006) in general, I also estimated the core model
(column 2 in table 12) sequentially treating the di¤erent enforcement variables as
being endogenous in GMM.
Column 1 of table 16 presents estimates with endogenous treatment of clearance
57Automatically computed with xtabond2 in Stata.
58I used the specication displayed in column 2 of table 12 where the Sargan test was not able
to reject the validity of the instruments.
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Table 16: Estimation Results for Endogenous Treatment
Variable BB BB BB BB BB
Clearance Tried Convicted Imprisoned Sev. nes
waste, lag .6001 .6519 .6476 .7106 .7405
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
clear -.5091 -.2918 -.3405 -.33611 -.2689
(0.0804) (0.1534) (0.1314) (0.1267) (0.2008)
tried -.5869 -.6824 -.6314 -.5838 -.5392
(0.0015) (0.0121) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0056)
convicted -.0388 -.0108 -.0819 .0281 .0290
(0.8516) (0.9610) (0.7588) (0.8932) (0.8921)
prison .4208 .2727 .3515 .1799 .2780
(0.2606) (0.4312) (0.3392) (0.5679) (0.4821)
ne -.4548 -.2825 -.4062 -.3570 -.4402
(0.1252) (0.3341) (0.1751) (0.2203) (0.1672)
outliertrend .0003 .0003 .0003 .0002 .0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0009)
greens .0415 .0257 .0147 .0073 .0053
(0.6911) (0.7788) (0.8763) (0.9289) (0.9455)
pop.den -.0969 -.0715 -.0739 -.06117 -.0490
(0.0610) (0.0914) (0.1049) (0.1279) (0.2036)
cons .1735 .1560 .1174 .0794 .0521
(0.4864) (0.4815) (0.5930) (0.6894) (0.7980)
N 407 407 407 407 407
instruments 92 89 89 89 89
sargan 109.1096 81.4183 75.7144 65.3194 84.9833
(.0024) (.1273) (.2436) (.5696) (.0798)
ar1 -4.4129 -4.3852 -4.3529 -4.3477 -4.5117
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
ar2 1.8087 1.8154 1.8278 1.8195 1.8572
(.0704) (.0694) (.0675) (.0688) (.0632)
ar3 .3145 .4608 .4294 .4479 .4884
(.7531) (.6448) (.6676) (.6541) (.6252)
Note: All specications have been estimates via xtabond2 applying one-step system GMM with small sample
corrections and robust standard errors. P-values in parenthesis. Time dummies and a constant have been
included but omitted here.
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rates, column 2 with rate of tried, column 3 with conviction rates, column 4 with
prison rates and column 5 with the rate of severe nes, respectively. Similar to
my analysis in section 11.1, I do not nd evidence for simultaneity to play an
important role. None of the estimated parameter values changes signicantly in
comparison to the estimates in table 12. From a theoretical point of view it is
therefore appropriate to use both bias correction and GMM as valid estimators.
19.2 Omitted variables
The most obvious candidates for causing an omitted variable bias when excluded
from the estimation equation are informations regarding the potential gains of
illegal waste disposals. However, as stated in sections 15.2 and 18.2, data for
quantities and prices of local waste is not of particularly high quality. The reader
nds estimation results with several additional variables reecting waste market
factors in table 17.
None of the additional variables changes results for my initial estimates in
tables 12 and 13 except for the specications including waste fees. However, in
this case the sample size is reduced by almost 2/3. Estimating the core equation
in table 12 with the sample of columns 5 and 6 in table 17 leads to almost identical
results. That is, the di¤erent results are due to the sample reduction and not due
to the additional variables.
Furthermore, there may be selection bias when using subsamples as done in
tables 13 and 17. In this dataset there are di¤erent numbers of observations
available for di¤erent variables. I therefore rst of all estimated a core equation as
explained in section 18 to include as many observations as possible and then added
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Table 17: Estimation Results including Additional Variables
Variable BB BC BB BC BB BC
1 2 3 4 5 6
waste, lag .4550*** .3986*** .7428*** .3544*** -.0219 .1903
clear -.1223 -.2115 -.1091 -.0276 .3410 -.4654
tried -.5129** -.4605** -.7528** -.4406 .4457 .3355
convicted .0974 -.1100 -.0167 -.1453 .07468 -.3027
prison .5189 .1245 .3427 .2716 1.4850 1.2896
ne -.4044 -.0084 -.9293 -.1085 .00188 .7088
outliertrend .0004*** -.0126 .0002** .0073 .0005** -.0669
pop.den -.0949 6.330 -.2468 .1625 -.1228 3.0481**
greens .0297 .1502 -.0638 .0488 .0891 .0630
cons .2723 .3040 .0275 .7006 .3446 1.5177
household waste -.0496 -.1435 .1072 -.0017 -.2927 .9965
bulky waste -.0461 .0288 -.0612 .0165 .0896 .2592
industry waste -.0105 .0143 -.0055 .0523 .0623 .0574
hazardous waste .0694 -.0125 .0563 .0115 .1708 .0941
rev.manu .0903 1.2746**
gdp .8646 1.1515
civil.servants .0455 -.8698
corp.tax -.4794*** -.2605
emp.manu -.0419 -3.5274*
industry waste fees -.5732 .1382
household waste fees .2211 .0787
N 369 369 281 281 140 140
instruments 56 56 37
sargan 95.5370 57.8585 63.0967
(.0000) (.0007) (.0000)
ar1 -3.9438 -3.7643 -2.6820
(.0000) (.0001) (.0073)
ar2 1.9242 1.1860 1.8335
(.0543) (.2355) (.0667)
Note: All GMM specications have been estimates via xtabond2 applying one-step system GMM with small
sample corrections and robust standard errors. Bias correction has been implemented using xtlsdvc by Bruno
(2005) with BB as initial estimator and bootstrapping with 50 repetitions. Time dummies and a constant have
been included but omitted here. *, **, *** indicating signicance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
P-values in parenthesis.
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further variables resulting in a steadily decreasing sample size. Results might be
biased (Heckman 1979), if the availability of the information for a specic variable
would be correlated to the error term. In this context the sample size depends on
the decision of statistical o¢ ces when to start collecting specic data and should
therefore not depend on any of the other included variables. However, reducing
the sample size by introducing further variables provides a robustness check. The
result is that none of the estimates for the variables in the core equation change
signicantly (comparing estimates in tables 12, 13 and 17, except columns 5 and
6).
19.3 Time Lags
The last concern I want to stress is the possibility of time lags. Although empirical
work suggests that potential criminals update their beliefs within a few month
(see section 2.6.4), I will estimate the core equation including time lags of the
enforcement variables. I will include the variables with one year lag, as it is
unlikely the case that updating takes more than one year. Table 18 shows results
for the core equation.
There are two interesting ndings. First, the lag for clearance rates is positive
and highly signicant. This e¤ect may be due to a lagged e¤ect of police reaction
on the amount of crime that rst inuences clearing and then reporting behavior.
However, it is not easy to interpret. Remarkable are the results for the lagged
prison rate. Estimates are negative throughout all specications and in case of BC
also signicant with an elasticity of -.92. One might suggest that this is evidence
for delayed updating and therefore a conrmation for a deterrence e¤ect for prison
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sentences in case of illegal waste disposals. However, as the prison rate is 0 for
72% of the observations in the sample, the reliability of the estimates may be
questionable.
The lags for the remaining deterrence variables neither seem to have an impact
on illegal disposals nor on the remaining estimates.
20 Discussion
20.1 Interpreting the Results
The ndings in this part of the thesis support in a signicant way results of part
II. First, clearance rates and the rate of tried o¤enders seem to deter potential
environmental o¤enders from committing crimes. This ndings perfectly t to
both the analysis at the level of the German states (see section 10.1) and the
general crime literature (see section 2.3.1). A new insight is that there is cau-
tious evidence for the rate of severe nes additionally providing some deterrence
at least at the county level. Taken together, results of parts II and III explicitly
support the hypothesis that criminal law is a very e¤ective tool in enforcing en-
vironmental regulations. The thesis ndings contribute in a substantial way to a
better understanding of the e¤ectiveness of criminal enforcement in the context of
environmental law.
Secondly, it is not possible to conrm results of part II for the German con-
servatives. However, this has been expected as counties are far more conditioned
by the decisions of the state government than states are by the decisions of the
federal government. The federal system in Germany implies a huge degree of in-
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Table 18: Estimation Results Including Time Lags
Variable BB BC
1 2
waste, lag .4612 .4390
0.0008 0.0000
cleared -.2244 -.3342
0.3825 0.1363
cleared, lag .6935 .6413
0.0114 0.0041
tried -.5371 -.4200
0.0011 0.0523
tried, lag .0239 .1279
0.8965 0.5868
convicted .0747 -.1090
0.7105 0.5209
convicted, lag .1508 -.0749
0.5225 0.7191
prison .0982 -.2237
0.7135 0.6655
prison, lag -.7129 -.9213
0.1774 0.0421
ne -.5269 -.2279
0.1101 0.5694
ne, lag -.0965 .2926
0.8095 0.4595
Variable BB BC
1 2
outliertrend .0003 -.0253
0.0013 0.5089
greens -.0035 .1207
0.9782 0.7047
pop.den -.0542 6.7188
0.3932 0.1568
cons .3740 .4265
0.2460 0.6474
N 363 363
instruments 57
sargan 87.2260
.0000
ar1 -3.9387
.0000
ar2 2.0239
.0429
ar3 -.6059
.5445
Note: All GMM specications have been estimated via xtabond2 applying one-step system GMM with small
sample corrections and robust standard errors. Bias correction has been implemented using xtlsdvc with BB as
initial estimator and bootstrapping with 50 repetitions. P-values in parenthesis. Time dummies and a constant
have been included but omitted here.
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dependency for the single states. In contrast, counties are very much constrained
by the decisions of the state government. As the state government of Baden-
Württemberg is dominated by the German conservatives (CDU) for more than 50
years, it is implausible to expect a huge degree of political heterogeneity for the
single counties.
Third, there is evidence that counties that are highly dependent on a pros-
pering industry show a lower reporting behavior. Counties with a higher share
of people working in the manufacturing sector show a lower rate of reported il-
legal waste disposals. The results for the share of county corporate tax revenue
in total county income point in the same direction. This ndings are novel in
that the existing literature on illegal waste disposals only included more general
structural variables likes GDP per capita, income per capita, population density
or conventional political variables (Sigman 1998, Sta¤ord 2002).
In line with the existing literature (Eckert 2004), there is evidence for the
population density to negatively a¤ect the amount of reported illegal disposals.
Counties that are more dense populated seem to deter illegal disposals probably
because the probability of detection is higher there. Another structural factor
determining the amount of reported illegal disposals is the revenue generated in
the manufacturing sector. There is evidence that total revenue has a positive
impact on reported illegal waste disposals. Although not as denite, results for
GDP per capita support this ndings.
With respect to the econometric analysis, I focused on system GMM and bias
correction to estimate the economic model of illegal waste disposals. Similar to
the analysis in part II, I applied di¤erent robustness checks to test whether results
are reliable. First and foremost one has to control for potential endogeneity issues
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that are typically apparent in the economic model of crime (Ehrlich 1973, Cornwell
and Trumbull 1994, Baltagi 2006, etc.). In line with ndings of part II, there is no
evidence that endogeneity plays a crucial role in this setting. Environmental crime
in Germany is probably of minor importance in comparison to capital crimes and
may therefore imply a rather weak reaction of enforcement institutions to changing
criminal behavior.
20.2 Confronting Results with Part II and the Existing
Literature
It is the aim of this section to contrast the new insights to the ndings of part
II and the existing literature. This will be another proof for the reliability of the
ndings obtained so far.
20.2.1 Deterrence
Although elasticities for clearance rates and the rate of tried o¤ender are signi-
cantly lower in this part than in the previous one, they are still in a range that is
in line with the existing literature. Elasticities for clearance rates range between
-.2 and -.4 and therefore totally t into previous ndings ranging between 0 and
-3 (see section 2.3.1). As there is, at least to my knowledge, no other study using
the rate of tried o¤ender in the deterrence framework, I compare the ndings to
those of part II. With estimates ranging from -.48 to -.64 the results are lower
than those of part II (ca. -1) However, they are still highly signicant and t
into the estimates usually obtained for enforcement probabilities in the deterrence
literature (see section 2.3.1). Contrasting the results of part II and the major
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part of the general crime literature (see section 2.3.1), there is no evidence that
imprisonment deters people from disposing waste illegally in Baden-Württemberg.
Signicant e¤ects appear only when including lags of prison rates. Estimates for
conviction rates contradict the results of the general crime literature but are in line
with ndings of part II. A new insight is that severe nes show negative estimates
at the county level that only slightly fail signicance at the 10% level.
To compare both enforcement mechanisms it is important to also look at the
e¤ectiveness of administrative law. Although Sta¤ord (2002) nds no deterrence
e¤ect of past inspections on the compliance of plants with hazardous waste regu-
lations, Sigman (1998) does nd an e¤ect of state enforcement activities59 under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The author estimates an
elasticity of -.18 being signicant at the 10% level. This is in a similar range as
my ndings on clearance rates are and lower than the estimates for the rate of
tried o¤enders. In general, both administrative law and criminal law seem to be
e¤ective instruments to prevent violations of environmental laws.
20.2.2 Political and Structural Factors
Although there is no clear-cut evidence for GDP per capita a¤ecting the amount of
crime in existing literature (see section 2.5), there is a tendency pointing towards
a positive e¤ect di¤erent income measures have on crime (Ehrlich 1973, Andreoni
1995, Cherry 1999, Viren 2001, etc.). My own results conrm previous ndings in
that the e¤ects are not clear-cut but there is some support for GDP per capita and
manufacturing revenue to a¤ect illegal disposals. In line with the results of Eckert
59Total acitivities including administrative actions, civil referrals and criminal referrals
(Sta¤ord 2002).
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(2004) I do also nd a negative e¤ect of population density on illegal disposals.
I do also nd evidence for variables being at the intersection between the struc-
tural and political compositions of counties to inuence the amount of reporting.
One possible explanation for this is that the degree of dependency a county faces
with respect to the manufacturing sector inuences political decision-makers de-
ciding on the amount of e¤orts put into the enforcement of environmental laws.
This is in line with results obtained by Helland (1998) that both estimated prots
and number of manufacturing plants in a state have negative and signicant e¤ect
on inspections. It will be subject to further investigations to analyze this in more
detail.
21 Conclusion to Part III
The deterrence e¤ects estimated in the present part conrm to a huge extent
ndings of part III. There is again evidence that especially the rst stages of
enforcement - to be identied as a suspect and to be brought to court - deter
people from committing environmental crimes in general and illegal waste disposals
in particular. Combining the insights of both parts reveals important policy-
implications.
In line with the existing literature there is evidence that structural factors
a¤ect the amount of reported illegal disposals. Results suggest that the structural
composition of counties like population density, GDP per capita and revenue in the
manufacturing sector have an impact on illegal disposals. Moreover, new insights
suggest that informations being at the intersection between political and structural
factors inuence the amount of reported illegal disposals. Variables like the share
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of people working in the manufacturing sector and the relation between corporate
tax revenues and total county income seem to a¤ect the amount of reported crimes.
With this results at hand, policy-makers are able to base their decisions on
reasonable informations when deciding which enforcement mechanism to use and
how much resources to put into specic components.
The last part of the thesis provides information on the determinants of police,
prosecution and courts in enforcing environmental crimes. To get a complete
picture of the e¤ectiveness of criminal enforcement it is important to analyze both
the determinants of crime and the determinants of enforcement.
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Part IV
The Political Economy of
Criminal Enforcement in
Environmental Law
22 Introduction to Part IV
Every legislature interested in e¤ective, coherent, and consistent policy imple-
mentation has to confront the agency problem of how to organize its regulatory
activities. Key dimensions of the solution to the agency problem are the extent
of delegation from the legislature to the regulatory institutions and the degree of
independence of the institutions from the legislature (Horn 1995). One important
area in which the agency problem is particularly palpable is in the case of the
criminal justice system (Becker and Stigler 1974). The criminal justice system en-
sures compliance with key regulations and is therefore arguably as important for
determining policy outcomes as the regulations themselves (Polinsky and Shavell
2006).
Agency problems in the criminal justice system have attracted attention since
the system typically consists not of a single agency, but of several regulatory
institutions arranged sequentially. At the base, there is a police force that monitors
and investigates, followed by a prosecution service that decides on the basis of
police reports and own investigations on the merits of an o¤ence, and, nally, courts
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that decide on cases brought before their judges by prosecutors. The combined
activities of all of these institutions together jointly determine the e¤ectiveness of
the enforcement regime.
Despite their joint objective and their procedural inter-connectedness, the in-
stitutions of the criminal justice system vary considerably in terms of their inde-
pendence. Some, such as the police force, are - as part of the executive branch of
government - relatively dependent. Others, such as courts, are deliberately set up
to operate at arms length from other branches of government. This institutional
heterogeneity can be understood to mirror two countervailing arguments about
the merits of independence within the criminal justice system: One the one hand,
there are the well rehearsed arguments of constitutional checks-and-balances and of
interest group theory for granting some of the decision-makers in the system a rel-
atively high degree of independence (Landes and Posner 1975). On the other, the
independence of decision-makers in the criminal justice system from the legislature
should be limited in order to resolve the agency problem that has decision-makers
deviate systematically from the intentions of the legislature (Becker and Stigler
1974). This would suggest employing various incentive mechanisms in the form
of budgets or personal rewards in order to align the interests of police o¢ cers,
prosecutors, and judges with that of the public.
Conceptually, therefore, the trade-o¤ between the arguments of checks-and-
balances and agency problems seems clear. Empirically, however, there is a lack
of evidence on whether and how this trade-o¤ works in practice. Given the in-
stitutional structure, observed enforcement outcomes should reect the di¤erent
degrees of independence and therefore di¤erent incentives that agents face at dif-
ferent stages of the sequential enforcement process, taking into account the dif-
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ferent resource constraints at each level. The empirical question is whether this
conjecture is borne out by reality. This leads to three sub-questions. The rst is
what determines enforcement decisions by the police force, prosecutors, and judges
within the criminal justice system. The second is whether and if yes, to what de-
gree, decision-makers are responsive to the preferences of voters and politicians.
The third is how the inuence di¤ers between agents at di¤erent stages. Is the
conjecture correct that those institutions of enforcement that enjoy greater inde-
pendence by design are indeed less responsive to the political factors that drive
the legislature and executive?
The core of the present paper consists of an empirical approach to answering
these questions in a particular context. This context is the enforcement of envi-
ronmental criminal law. This highly specic area of criminal law lends itself for
an empirical investigation of this type for two reasons. One is that it is an area of
criminal law that - because of the complexity of its nature - requires non-trivial
amounts of resources to be spent at every level in order to push cases through
the enforcement process (Lutterer and Hoch 1997, Cohen 1999). This o¤ers an
opportunity to recover from empirical data the economic determinants of enforce-
ment decisions at the level of the police force, prosecution service, and courts
because pursuing environmental crimes imposes non-negligible opportunity costs.
The other reason is that the public and politicians have preferences regarding the
public good to be protected that are easily observable. Resource and political
economy factors should therefore be empirically salient.
How does this paper add to the literature? The political economy of regu-
latory enforcement has attracted a good deal of scholarly attention, resulting in
an impressive body of empirical evidence on what determines regulatory action.
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The typical case considered in the literature studies the behavior of one particular
regulator enforcing one regulation. Examples are studies on the enforcement by
a regulatory agency such as the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA, Shipan
2004), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS, Mete 2002) and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA, Nadeau 1997; Deily and Gray 1991) as well as monitoring
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA, Headrick et al. 2002).
Other studies examine the behavior of prosecutors (Ramseyer et al. 2008; Boylan
2005) or of judges (Salzberger and Fenn 1999, Ashenfelter et al. 1995). Across
the studies, there is evidence that the political economy factors are allocatively
relevant. My enforcement context also focuses on a single regulation, i.e. the
German Penal Code, but di¤ers in that it studies the behavior not of a single
regulator but several di¤erent institutions at once. This multitude of institutions
o¤ers the opportunity of comparing the determinants of enforcement decisions of
di¤erent institutions along a single enforcement chain with each other and against
widely held assumptions about how this system works. Methodologically, I add to
the literature by demonstrating the usefulness of approaches to dynamic produc-
tion function estimation (Blundell and Bond 2000) and to cross country studies
(Kiviet 1995, Bruno 2005a/b) to bear on the problem of the political economy of
regulatory enforcement.
My key results are threefold. The rst is that economic factors matter at all
stages of the enforcement process. This implies that - very much in line with the
economic theory of enforcement - institutions deliberately direct resources away
from the enforcement of environmental law as its opportunity cost increases. This
responsiveness with respect to costs is evident at all levels, including criminal
courts, which enjoy the greatest degree of independence. It also lends credibility
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to using a production function approach as a methodological starting point. The
second result is that political economy factors inuence enforcement decisions at
a statistically signicant level at all stages of the process. This demonstrates
that even in the ostensibly most independent parts of the criminal justice system,
there is evidence of political reach-through. The third result is that the relative
weight of political economy factors is not fully in line with the declared degree
of independence: Prosecutorsand judgesdecisions seem to be as responsive to
political economy variables as the police force.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, I summarize the main
features of environmental crime and its prosecution in Germany, emphasizing the
three institutions of police, prosecution service, and courts involved in criminal
enforcement. I then develop a set of testable hypotheses on the determinants of
enforcement decisions at each of the institutions in section 23. Section 24 explains
the data sources, followed by a presentation of the empirical strategy and key
results. Section 26 discusses the results and section 27 concludes.
23 Hypotheses on the Determinants of Enforce-
ment Decisions
In this section I develop the arguments that give rise to four testable hypotheses
regarding the extent to which political economy factors help explain enforcement
decisions of di¤erent institutions involved in the compliance assurance process.
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23.1 Police
As the rst of three institutions involved in enforcing the German Penal Code
against environmental o¤enders, decisions of police force determine the inux of
cases into the system by passing cleared cases, that is cases for which suspects
are identied, on to the prosecution o¢ ce. The productionof cleared cases is
determined by the number of cases on the one hand and the e¤ort dedicated
to linking individuals to an illegality on the other. I proceed in two steps, rst
focusing on the economic determinants of the production of cleared cases by the
police, then discussing the role of political economy factors.
From an economic point of view, the production of cleared cases depends on
inputs and opportunity costs of e¤ort dedicated to environmental crimes. Growth
in cleared cases of environmental crime will depend positively on the growth in
cases to be investigated. This scale e¤ect leads us to predict a positive coe¢ cient
(Ehrlich 1973). Higher opportunity costs of investigation, on the other hand, shift
resource away from investigating environmental crime. Such opportunity costs are
an increased number of overall cases to be investigated and - nally - a higher
number of cases of environmental crime proceeding to trial and therefore requiring
additional police resources dedicated to preparing evidence to a higher standard
of proof. The opposite e¤ect, driven by decreases in opportunity cost, is known
to be generated by changes in enforcement priorities towards environmental crime
as a result of a growing environmental crime rate. Benson et al. (1995) and
Cloninger and Sartorius (1979) identify increases in crime levels as a key driver of
inputs available for crime detection and reporting, leading us to predict a positive
coe¢ cient. In addition to the scale and opportunity cost e¤ects, the nal economic
155
consideration in the production of cleared cases is the question of economies of
scope in e¤orts dedicated to clearing up environmental crime. Two countervailing
e¤ects exist: A higher production of cleared cases in other areas will take resources
away from environmental crime, leading to a negative scope e¤ect. On the other
hand, o¤enders booked for environmental crime will - at the same time - have
typically committed other punishable o¤ences (Hoch 1994). The possibility of
both negative and positive spillovers is therefore present, with the net e¤ect an
empirical matter.
Turning to political economy considerations, political factors also impacts on
the opportunity costs of e¤ort. Pro-environmental parties in the administration
would be predicted to give higher priority to enforcement resources being shifted
towards environmental o¤ences while pro-industry parties would be predicted to
have a lower priority. Likewise, the executive administration may want to respond
to a higher greensentiment among the population by directing the police force to
prioritize environmental o¤ences relative to other areas of crime. Stronger green
preferences in the population would therefore be predicted to be associated with
a higher volume of cleared cases produced by the police.
The predictions on how the volume of cleared cases responds to exogenous
variables are summarized in the following hypothesis.
Conjecture 1 For reasons of economic constraints, the output of cleared cases of
environmental crime by police will (a) increase in the amount of cases to be inves-
tigated, (b) increase in the growth rate of environmental crime, and (c) decrease
in the number of environmental crime cases tried and in the number of general
crime case to be investigated. The e¤ects of (d) the total volume of cleared cases
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is ambiguous. For reasons of political economy, the e¤ect of (e) variables captur-
ing greenpreferences and the e¤ect of a pro-envionmental party in government
is predicted to be positive, that of (f) a pro-industry party in government to be
negative.
23.2 Prosecutors
There is a small, but rich literature on prosecutor behavior, starting with Forst
and Brosi (1977). Most of these studies focus on the case-specic determinants
of prosecutorial activity and productivity within the model of a self-interested
prosecutor (e.g. Myers and Hagan 1979, Albonetti 1986, Boylan 2005). The
empirical results bear out the concept of the prosecutor as a rational decision-
maker, balancing expected benets in the form of successful convictions against
opportunity costs of time and resources.
In terms of economic determinants, prosecutors are predicted to respond to
more prosecution opportunities in environmental crimes (that is cleared cases for-
warded by the police) with raising the volume of associated suspects accused on
account of higher expected benets and to an increase in the number of overall
identied suspects in the Penal Code by bringing fewer environmental o¤enders to
trial on account of higher opportunity cost of prosecuting environmental o¤ences.
Since prosecutors cannot be expected to care about deterrence to the same extent
as politicians (Miceli 1996), an increase in the growth rate of environmental crime
would be predicted to have a smaller e¤ect on the decision on whether to bring
case to trial at the margin.
Political economy considerations have only recently been studied in the con-
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text of prosecutor behavior. An approach close to ours in spirit is by Ramseyer
et al. (2008). There, two models of prosecutor behavior are developed, a func-
tionalist variety in which the prosecutor is an extended hand of the social planner
and a political variety in which the prosecutors payo¤ is modeled as dependent
on achieving a mix of objectives, in part set by the public and in part set by the
prosecutor themselves. The functionalist version is rejected by the empirical evi-
dence while the evidence support the political model. The empirical analysis by
Ramseyer et al. (2008) builds on the specics of the US context that do not carry
over easily to the German setting on account of important institutional di¤erences.
However, like Ramseyer et al., I include political economy factors as explanatory
variables in the empirical model, predicting that the dependence of prosecutors on
the Ministry in terms of resources will make their prosecution decisions responsive
to political circumstances such as the identity of the political party in power and
the strength of greenpreferences among the population.
Together, these factors give rise to the following predictions on how the number
of cases brought to trial will respond to di¤erent variables.
Conjecture 2 The number of o¤enders of environmental crime brought to trial by
public prosecutors will (a) increase in the amount of identied suspects, (b) weakly
increase in a growth in environmental crime, and (c) decrease in the number of
general suspects to be investigated on account of an opportunity cost e¤ect. The
e¤ects of (d) a higher number of overall tried suspects is ambiguous. The e¤ect
of (e) political economy variables capturing green preferences and the e¤ect of
a pro-envionmental party in government is predicted to be positive, that of (f) a
pro-industry party in government to be negative.
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23.3 Courts
The output of courts in context of environmental enforcement is the production of
convicts out of an input of defendants, with the balance constituting the released.
There is a strong expectation that the decisions of courts should - in the words of
Landes and Posner (1975) - be independent of the sorts of political factors [...]
that would inuence and in most cases control the decision were it to be made by
a legislative body. Empirical tests of the resulting prediction of judicial indepen-
dence demonstrate that the empirical record does not unequivocally support the
prediction of judicial independence. While some studies nd that variables captur-
ing the political environment of current court cases and the judges own political
background do not explain court decisions (Ashenfelter et al. 1995), the balance
of the literature tends to emphasize the importance of political economy variables
in explaining court behavior (Cohen 1987, Anderson et al. 1989, Salzberger and
Fenn 1999). In other words, the interests of voting public and politicians as well
as the ideological convictions of the judges themselves are - more often than not -
found to inuence judicial decisions at the margin.
The economic factors that are candidates for explaining the behavior of courts
in my sample center - again - on inputs and opportunity costs. I predict - on
account of a scale e¤ect - that a greater volume of suspects being brought to trial by
prosecutors will lead to an increase in the volume of convicts. However, an increase
in overall trials will raise the cost of time and e¤ort to argue environmental cases
to the required standard of proof. As a result, I predict a negative relationship
between the aggregate volume of trials and convictions for environmental crimes.
The impact of a growing rate of environmental crime on convictions should be
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weak, as argued before in the case of prosecutors (Miceli 1996), and if not zero,
then positive. As at the level of prosecution, the presence of economies of scope
between convictions for environmental and other crimes is an empirical question
with little prior evidence as guidance.
In the light of the preceding empirical literature on courts, I predict factors
of political economy to have the same e¤ect as at the previous two levels: A
greenerpopulation should - at the margin - lead to more convictions. So should
the presence of a green party in government. The presence of a pro-industry party
in government, on the other hand, should lead to a decrease in the conviction rate.
Hypothesis 3 summarizes these prediction regarding the decision of judges thus:
Conjecture 3 The number of o¤enders of environmental crimes ending in a con-
viction by a judge will (a) increase in the amount of tried suspects (b) be una¤ected
by a growth in environmental crime, and (c) decrease in the number of general
crime suspects to be tried on account of an opportunity cost e¤ect. The e¤ects
of (d) a higher number of convictions for other crimes is ambiguous. The e¤ect
of (e) political economy variables capturing green preferences and the e¤ect of
a pro-envionmental party in government is predicted to be positive, that of (f) a
pro-industry party in government to be negative.
23.4 Synopsis of Economic and Political Variable Predic-
tions
Before turning to my last testable hypothesis, table 19 summarizes the predictions
on the determinants of enforcement decisions. The left-hand column lists ex-
planatory variables for the enforcement outputs of the police force (cleared cases),
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prosecutors (tried o¤enders) and courts (convicted o¤enders). Di¤erent symbols
summarize the predicted e¤ects of a change in the explanatory variable on the en-
forcement output, with a plus sign signaling a predicted positive relationship and
a minus sign a predicted negative relationship. The sign ?implies a prediction of
no inuence of the variable and a question mark denoting an ambiguous inuence.
For police success in clearing environmental crimes, I predict a positive rela-
tionship vis-a-vis reported cases. In addition, theoretical considerations suggest
police to be negatively a¤ected by the amount of tried environmental o¤enders
and the amount of aggregate crime cases through a opportunity cost argument.
The inuence of an increase in the amount of aggregate cleared cases is unclear ex
ante.
The decision of prosecutors whether to bring an environmental suspect to court
is predicted to positively depend on the number of identied suspects. In contrast,
an increase in the amount of aggregate suspects is expected to raise opportunity
costs and thus reduce the number of environmental o¤enders brought to court.
There is again no clear-cut prediction for the scope e¤ect of the number of aggre-
gate tried suspects.
For the last stage of enforcement, theory suggests that an increase in the num-
ber of tried environmental o¤enders will increase, and an increase in the number
of overall o¤enders brought to court will decrease the number of convicted envi-
ronmental o¤enders. The e¤ect on overall convictions is ambiguous.
With respect to political factors the literature leads us to predict that the e¤ect
of a pro-industry party in state government is negative throughout. In contrast,
green preferences and the German greens in state government will have a negative
e¤ect on all stages of enforcement.
161
Table 19: Summary of Predictions
Police force Prosecution Courts
Explanatory variables Cleared cases Tried o¤enders Convicted o¤enders
No. of EC cases +
EC suspects +
EC o¤enders tried - +
Change in EC rate + ? ?
Aggr. crime vol. -
Aggr. cleared cases ?
Aggr. suspects -
Aggr. o¤enders tried ? -
Aggr. o¤enders convicted ?
Pro-industry party in gvmt. - - -
Greens in gvmt. + + +
Green preferences + + +
Taken together, theory and previous empirical evidence provide a basis for pre-
dicting the coe¢ cient sign of most of the variables. One exception are economic
variables whose e¤ect depends on the presence or absence of economies of scope
at each level: Dedicating e¤ort to cases in other areas of crime competes with
resources for environmental crime. On the other hand, environmental crime is fre-
quently connected with other o¤ences such that economies of scope are a plausible
outcome at every stage of the enforcement chain.
The nal testable hypothesis concerns the relative strengths of coe¢ cients for
variables capturing political economy factors. Di¤erent institutions ostensibly en-
joy di¤erent degrees of independence from the legislature, from the police force with
the lowest degree to the courts with the highest degree of autonomy in decision-
making. I would therefore expect that the relative responsiveness of these three
institutions vis-à-vis the identity of the governing party and the preferences of vot-
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ers should reect this. The police force would therefore be predicted to be most
responsive, courts the least, and prosecutors somewhere in between. This idea is
captured in hypothesis 4.
Conjecture 4 The absolute value of coe¢ cients for political economy variables
capturing greenpreferences and the identity of the party in government should be
highest at the level of the police, lowest at the level of courts, and between police
and courts at the level of the prosecution service.
With my set of three testable hypotheses complete, I now turn to the data used
in the econometric specications.
24 Data
Data on crime in Germany is collected at the level of 16 individual states to
which enforcement is devolved and at various stages in the state-level enforcement
process. Since one state has not released the relevant data, my sample comprises
15 of the 16 states and the years 1995 (1994 in case of reported cases) to 2005 with
a small subset of states having incomplete reporting,60 leading to an unbalanced
panel. Data on reported and cleared cases of environmental and aggregate crime
are taken from the o¢ cial police crime statistics (PKS) published by the German
Federal Criminal Police O¢ ce (BKA). Further necessary data of the sanctioning
regime applied to crime, such as the number of trials, convictions and imprison-
ment, is available from the o¢ cial prosecution statistics (StVSt) of the Research
60No data is available for the state of Saxony-Anhalt. Saarlands date cover 1996-2005, Bran-
denburg 1995-2005 with the exception of 2002, Hamburgs data 1997-2005. Thuringias data
cover 1998-2005 and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2001-2005.
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Data Centre (FDZ) provided by the Federal Statistical O¢ ce and its state level
counterparts. Data concerning juvenile o¤enders is included in cleared cases but
excluded from the remaining analysis due to the distinct sanctioning regime ap-
plicable to this subgroup. However, on average 93 percent of all identied suspects
for environmental crimes are adults. Data on structural variables that character-
ize individual states, such as population, size, political, and several socioeconomic
variables, are taken from publications of the Federal Statistical O¢ ce.
Voting shares and information on the support for the German Green Party at
the state level are available from the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research
(ZA). Specically, voting shares track the share of people surveyed who would vote
for the German green party if there had been elections at the time of the interview.
The supporters of the German Green Party indicate the share of respondents that
identify themselves as strong supporters for the German Greens (1 on a scale of
1-5).
As an indicator of having a pro-industry government in power, I use the pres-
ence of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) as a proxy. The CDU (CSU in Bavaria)
is the German party that is consistently most closely aligned with business and
industry interests and least aligned with environmental policy preferences among
the parties in German state parliaments (Budge et al. 2007). I also included a
dummy for the presence of the German greens in state governments to validate
their impact on prosecution.
Another important factor determining the success of institutions in enforcing
environmental criminal law is the endowment of police, prosecution, and courts
with manpower and equipment. I therefore included information for budgets and
number of employees in my analysis. However, I will explain in preceding sections
164
Table 20: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition
cleared env. crimes (cleared) number of cases for which suspects are identied
tried suspects (tried) number of identied suspects that are accused
convicted o¤enders (convicted) number of accused suspects that are convicted
environmental crime (cases) reported cases of environmental crime
identied suspects (suspects) number of identied environmental o¤enders
Environmental Crime Rate (CR) Number of reported cases divided by population
aggr. crime cases (agg.cases) total amount of reported crimes
aggr. cleared cases (agg.cleared) number of cases cleared overall
aggr. identied suspects (agg.suspects) number of identied overall o¤enders
aggr. tried o¤ender (agg.tried) total number of accused o¤ender
aggr. convicted o¤ender (agg.conv) total number of convicted o¤ender
dummy conservatives (cons) indicating whether CDU/CSU is in state government
dummy greens (greens) indicating whether green party is in state government
green voters (green.pref1) share of people intending to vote for greens
green supporters (green.pref2) share of people with strong support for greens
why I did not include information for this in my core estimations. Tables 20 and
21 provide variable denitions and summary statistics for all variables included in
the core econometric estimation.
25 Econometrics
In this section I analyze the 3 successive stages of the enforcement process in
Germany empirically. Thereby I assume that the enforcement production of police,
prosecution and courts depend on economic and political economy factors. As there
are di¤erent institutions responsible for di¤erent stages of the enforcement process
I split my analysis according to these responsibilities. Going with the natural
way rst of all a crime has to be detected and recorded to police. Police then
has to identify suspects. This is the rst step of the enforcement process and the
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Table 21: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
cleared 176 1.192.114 9.377.375 24 4258
tried 152 3.265.461 3.031.189 6 1497
convicted 152 2.493.487 2.366.307 4 1156
cases 176 1.986.028 1.452.868 58 5848
suspects 274 1261.825 939.9252 31 4211
CR 176 5.196.115 3.715.087 8.733.851 1.796.139
agg.cases 176 405652.2 317165 60651 1531647
agg.cleared 176 210833.5 163082.7 30861 741607
agg.suspects 274 137536.8 104779.7 21368 485859
agg.tried 154 76661.32 65145.82 10784 254178
agg.conv 155 62018.07 52157.22 8006 195050
cons 176 .5568182 .4981785 0 1
greens 176 .1818182 .386795 0 1
green.pref1 176 .0986038 .0520535 0 .3037975
green.pref2 176 .0440468 .026972 0 .1736111
only stage police is involved directly.61 After the police having identied a probable
o¤ender prosecution decides whether there is enough evidence to accuse the suspect
and thus bring the incidence to court. When brought to court the judge has to
decide whether a potential o¤ender is guilty and thus will be convicted to a ne
or even sent to prison. One important issue is whether these di¤erent punishment
rates are persistent - leading to a dynamic production function (Blundell and Bond
2000) - or not. As I will show in the next few paragraphs there is evidence for
persistency for most punishment rates but not for all. Another important task is
to deal with the small sample size in an appropriate manner. As the number of
observations is limited and the amount of potential explanatory factors is rather
large I followed two di¤erent strategies. I rst estimated a core equation and added
in a second step subsequently further variables guring out whether they have an
61However, the quality of evidence the police secures will be important for all following stages.
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inuence or whether they change results. The second approach was to include
all potential explanatory variables and then subsequently skip those which do not
seem to inuence the dependent variable. In this context I also included variables
indicating the number of employees and the expenditures for police, prosecution
and courts as obvious input to the enforcement process. However, none of these
variables turned out to be signicant (see table 26 provided in the appendix).
This is not very surprising considering the fact that overall employment or overall
budget probably does not reveal the resources dedicated to the prosecution of
environmental o¤ences. I therefore think that the opportunity costs faced by
everyone enforcing environmental o¤ences may be a far better indicator of the
available resources.
25.1 Police
The basis for all later enforcement activities for the major fraction of all reported
environmental crimes in Germany62 is the initial work of police.
The equation I am going to estimate for the production of cleared cases is the
following:
log clearedit = + 1 log clearedit 1 + 2 log casesit 1 + 3CRit + (12)
+4 log triedit + 5 log agg:casesit + 6 log agg:clearedit +
7consit + 8greensit + 9green:prefit
+fi + tt + it
62In 2004, 76% of all cases handled by prosecution were forwarded by police, 20% were initiated
by the prosecution itself and 3.2% were reported by environmental agencies.
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where ; 1 9 are the parameters to be estimated, fi and tt are state and time
dummies. Furthermore, i and t being the subscripts for states and time periods,
respectively, and  is the error term.
Table 22 displays the results. As suggested by Blundell and Bond (2000) for
dynamic production function estimation I used system GMM (BB) rather than
Arellano and Bond (1991) di¤erence GMM to estimate dynamic production func-
tions.63 However, simulations show (Bond 2002) that GMM is vulnerable in case
of very small samples and may perform badly in case of persistency for the depen-
dent variable. There is evidence (Bruno 2005a/b) that bias correction as proposed
by Bruno (2005a/b)64 or similarly by Kiviet (1995), Bun and Kiviet (2003) and
Bun and Carree (2005) outperforms GMM in terms of biases especially in case
of persistency of the dependent variable and small sample size. In addition, the
Sargan statistic of overidentifying restrictions points against the validity of the in-
struments. I would therefore in principle prefer the BC estimates. Unfortunately,
bias correction is only valid for strictly exogenous variables. One has therefore
to make sure that there exist no further endogeneity problem besides the Nickell
(1981) bias. The only suspected variables for potential endogeneity or simultane-
ity issues are the growth in environmental crime and number of tried o¤enders.
As the amount of identied o¤enders are the key input to the amount of tried
o¤ender there is obviously an e¤ect in this direction as well. However, I applied
di¤erent strategies65 to control for this and results remained fairly constant. On
63All GMM estimations have been carried out with the user written xtabond2 command in
Stata, see Roodman (2006). To keep the number of instruments for the lagged dependent variable
tractable we only used lags 1 to 4.
64All bias-corrected estimations have been carried out with the user written xtlsdvc command
in Stata, see Bruno (2006). Another feature of xtlsdvc is that it has been tailored for unbalanced
panels.
65A di¤erence-in-Sargan test was not able to reject the Null of exogeneity (p-value: 0.647).
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the other hand a rising amount of cleared cases increases expected punishment and
my therefore reduce that growth in environmental crime. Again, I applied various
tests66 and did not nd evidence for the growth of the environmental crime rate
to distort results.
Besides this the Arellano and Bond test for rst and second order autocorrela-
tion works as suggested. There is evidence for rst order autocorrelation (ar1) and
no evidence for second order autocorrelation (ar2). To capture the environmental
preferences of state populations I included the share of green voters (green.pref1)
or the share of strong supporters for the German green party (green.pref2).
Comparing the di¤erent specications does not reveal signicantly di¤erences
for most of my variables. There is huge evidence that the number of cleared cases
(cleared) occupy some time dependency as the lagged variable is highly signicant
in all specications with values between .57 and .75. My input variable for the
production process of cleared cases, the number of environmental crimes (cases),
has a positive and with elasticities of around .4 for BC signicant inuence on the
production of cleared cases by police. Overall crime cases (agg.cases) indicate the
opportunity costs and overall cases cleared (agg.cleared) point towards a general
scope e¤ect. In my case, parameter estimates for aggregate cases and aggregate
cleared cases show up to be highly signicant for BB and slightly fail signicance
at the 10% level for BC. Aggregate cases show with estimates of around -.3 for
BB a negative and signicant relationship to cleared environmental crimes. There
Furthermore, we treated the number of tried as being endogenous in BB and results remained
unchanged. Another strategy was to use the lag or to skip the variable from the estimation
equation. However, none of the applied methods revealed further problems.
66The di¤erence-in-Sargan test was again not able to reject the Null of exogeneity (p-value:
0.310). Furthermore, we treated the number of tried as being endogenous in BB and results
remained unchanged. However, none of the applied methods revealed further problems.
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Table 22: Estimation Results for Police Production of Cleared Cases
BB BC BB BC BB BC
Exp. variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
cleared, lag .7545 .5868 .7466 .5739 .7110 .5766
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
cases .1740 .3754 .1718 .3873 .2034 .3902
(0.2132 (0.0021 (0.1872 (0.0013 (0.1438 (0.0012
CR growth .8551 .6388 .8605 .6247 .8256 .6250
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
agg.cases -.3727 -.5312 -.3208 -.5403 -.3809 -.5324
(0.0321 (0.1331 (0.0517 (0.1248 (0.0294 (0.1330
agg.cleared .3735 .4777 .3265 .4903 .3840 .4822
(0.0318 (0.0550 (0.0471 (0.0477 (0.0268 (0.0517
tried .0378 .0458 .0439 .0503 .0498 .0453
(0.3263) (0.2095) (0.2579) (0.1620) (0.2634) (0.2118)
cons -.0447 -.1399 -.0438 -.1349 -.0438 -.1371
(0.3028) (0.0002) (0.3202) (0.0004) (0.3339) (0.0003)
greens .0315 -.0541 .0322 -.0494 .0302 -.0499
(0.3110) (0.2678) (0.2890) (0.3072) (0.3213) (0.3002)
green.pref1 -.2649 .1792
(0.3072) (0.5862)
green.pref2 -.2136 .1991
(0.6784) (0.7815)
N 152 152 152 152 152 152
instruments 69 70 70
F 1808.8973 2480.3867 4046.8116
Sargan 70.1179 69.6997 73.9341
(.0316) (.0341) (.0155)
ar1 -2.5958 -2.6591 -2.6566
(.0094) (.0078) (.0078)
ar2 .7591 .5501 .6391
(.4477) (.5822) (.5227)
Note: time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis. All GMM
specications have been estimated with robust standard errors and BC standard errors via bootstrapping with
50 repetitions.
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is thus strong support for the opportunity cost hypothesis. The estimates for the
aggregate cleared cases, however, are positive and give with a value of .53 support
for my scope e¤ect hypothesis.
The estimates for the growth rate for environmental crime (CR) are highly
signicant and positive and reveal elasticities ranging from .62 to .86. I therefore
nd clear evidence for the police reacting on criminal behavior. Another possible
determinant of cleared cases is the amount of suspects brought to court as this
may imply further investigations. However, my estimates for the number of tried
suspects (tried) do not seem to have a negative impact on the amount of cleared
cases.
The remaining explanatory variables represent my political hypothesis. The
share of green voters (green.pref1), the share of supporters of the greens (green.
pref2) and the greens dummy (greens) do not seem to inuence police behavior in
clearing environmental crimes. However, my dummy for the conservatives (cons)
reveals a negative and for BC signicant connection to cleared cases. The para-
meter estimate is throughout negative with a semi-elasticity of -.13 for BC.
The next section analyzes the behavior of prosecution as this is the next insti-
tution involved in the enforcement of environmental crimes.
25.2 Prosecution
It is probably not possible to underrate the role of prosecutors in the context of
enforcement of crimes. Prosecutors decide on behalf of society whether a suspect
will be brought to trial - or not. This decision being very important as if a prosecu-
tor decides not to accuse a potential o¤ender there will be no further opportunity
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for a criminal sanction.67
Having my theoretical predictions in mind I am going to estimate the following
equation:
log triedit = + 1 log triedit 1 + 2 log suspectsit + 3CRit 1 + (13)
4 log agg:suspectsit + 5 log agg:triedit + 6consit +
7greensit + 8green:prefit + fi + tt + it
where again the greek letters represent the parameters to be estimated, f and t
indicate state and time e¤ects and in case of  the error term. In contrast to the
specication for police production of cleared cases I included the growth rate for
environmental crime with one lag. The reason for this is that I belief prosecutors
and also judges not to have immediate information on the crime rate as it is
the case for police. I think that prosecution and judges may get the information
out of o¢ cial statistics published at the end of each year. Table 23 presents the
estimation results.
Similarly to cleared cases there is evidence that the amount of tried suspects
exhibits some degree of persistency. Problems arise when looking at the Sargan
test statistics. Whereas the Arellano and Bond tests for autocorrelation behave
as requested the Sargan test needs some further attention. The Sargan test is for
both AB and BB signicant rejecting the Null of validity of the instruments even
at the 1% level for BB. I therefore again prefer bias correction as the most reliable
estimator.
The results reveal a throughout positive and highly signicant relationship for
67There will be exceptions only if the prosecutor made a serious mistake.
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Table 23: Estimation Results for Production of Suspects Prosecuted
BB BC BB BC BB BC
Exp. variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
tried, lag .6879 .5651 .7338 .5760 .6606 .5619
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
o¤ender .3273 .2688 .2647 .2652 .3640 .2612
(0.0110) (0.0690) (0.0286) (0.0706) (0.0013) (0.0748)
CR growth, lag .4395 .3857 .4564 .3439 .4338 .3865
(0.0095) (0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0250) (0.0126) (0.0101)
agg.o¤ender -.3589 -.1883 -.2809 -.0631 -.4083 -.1817
(0.2479) (0.7470) (0.3036) (0.9123) (0.1638) (0.7561)
agg.tried .3435 .3210 .2763 .2369 .3806 .3900
(0.1842) (0.5594) (0.2176) (0.6613) (0.1230) (0.4822)
cons -.0520 -.1614 -.0455 -.1913 -.0656 -.1664
(0.3041) (0.1496) (0.3755) (0.0887) (0.1818) (0.1284)
greens -.0334 -.0643 -.0246 -.0941 -.0522 -.0512
(0.4016) (0.6515) (0.6289) (0.5056) (0.2645) (0.7128)
green.pref1 -.4710 -3.553
(0.7347) (0.0006)
green.pref2 2.6105 2.4377
(0.0323) (0.2010)
N 136 136 136 136 136 136
instruments 55 56 56
F 91.5133 42.2263 1126.0095
Sargan 63.863.609 62.572.573 64.039.004
(.0053) (.0072) (.0051)
ar1 -2.4597 -2.4052 -2.4304
(.0139) (.0161) (.0150)
ar2 .4177 .7968 .2855
(.6761) (.4255) (.7752)
Note: time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P-values in parenthesis. All GMM
specications have been estimated with robust standard errors and BC standard errors via bootstrapping with
50 repetitions.
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the lagged number of tried suspects. The magnitude of the e¤ect is with estimates
of .56 to .73 in the same range as for the number of cleared cases. Again, the
production input in form of the amount of identied suspects reveals with elastic-
ities ranging from .26 to .36 a highly signicant inuence on the amount of tried
o¤ender. Contrary to my initial suggestions the growth of environmental crime
shows up to be a signicant and positive driver of the amount of tried suspects (.34
to .45). My variables indicating the aggregate amount of identied and tried sus-
pects have the expected signs but seem to have no inuence on the amount of tried
environmental o¤enders. A bit curious are the ndings for public environmental
preferences. The share of green voters (green.pref1) seem to have a negative and
in case of BC signicant e¤ect on the amount of tried environmental o¤enders.
On the other hand, the parameter estimate for share of strong supporters for the
German green party (green.pref2) has in case of BB a positive and signicant in-
uence on the amount of tried o¤enders. It is therefore not quite clear if one can
rely on one of these outcomes. The dummy for the greens in state parliament is
not signicant in any specication. My dummy for the conservatives, however,
reveals a throughout negative parameter estimate which is signicant once68 and
gives thus cautious support for the pro-industry assumption.
In the next subsection I now analyze the behavior of courts. After a prosecutor
deciding whether to accuse a potential o¤ender the lawsuit comes to court and
judges have to decide whether to convict the o¤ender.
68cons slightly fails signicance at the 10% level for the other BC estimates.
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25.3 Courts
As already stated in my theoretical part I assume that the political inuence is
reduced signicantly for this last stage of enforcement. However, as this is just a
hypothesis in a rst stage I estimated the following estimation equation:
log convictedit = + 1 log convictedit 1 + 2 log triedit + 3CRit 1 +(14)
4 log agg:triedit + 5 log agg:convictedit +
6consit + 7greensit + 8green:prefit + fi + tt + it
In line with the production function for prosecutors I assume that judges take their
information about the environmental crime rate out of o¢ cial statistics published
at the end of the previous year. The growth rate of environmental crime appears
therefore with one lag. Table 24 reveals that the series of convicted environmental
o¤enders does not exhibit persistency as found in earlier stages of the enforcement
process. I therefore stick to static Fixed E¤ects (FE) as the most appropriate es-
timator. Moreover, further investigations revealed that there is serial correlation69
in the errors such that I estimated the model with AR(1) disturbances.70
It is interesting to see that the persistency of judges behavior is relatively small
in comparison to previous results.
Besides this, the input measure for the production of convicted environmental
o¤enders, the amount of tried suspects has the intended e¤ect. The amount of
tried suspects (tried) shows up to be highly signicant with an elasticity of around
1. The estimates for the growth in environmental crimes do provide some evidence
69We applied a test suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and implemented in Stata through the
user written command xtserial by Drukker (2003).
70Implemented with xtregar in Stata.
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Table 24: Estimation Results for Judges Production of Convicts
BB BC FE FE FE
Exp. variables 1 2 3 4 5
convicted, lag -.0155 -.0071
(0.7500) (0.8504)
tried 1.0173 .9757 .9710 1.0276 .9702
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CR growth, lag -.1325 -.1443 -.1090 -.1153 -.1082
(0.3168) (0.0328) (0.0656) (0.0402) (0.0687)
agg.tried -1.3584 -1.8491 -2.4771 -2.2343 -2.4698
(0.0400) (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0070) (0.0052)
agg.conv 1.3396 1.7964 2.3021 2.0703 2.3078
(0.0474) (0.0144) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0020)
cons -.0255 .0329 .0365 .0656 .0341
(0.4938) (0.4711) (0.4996) (0.2025) (0.5329)
greens -.0354 .0389 .0511 .0581 .0506
(0.4758) (0.5631) (0.4601) (0.3726) (0.4668)
green.pref1 1.6152
(0.0004)
green.pref2 .2697
(0.7372)
N 136 136 135 135 135
j 55
F 3890.9901 59.4512 64.0705 55.4288
Sargan 112.9140
(0.0000)
ar1 -1.5625
(.1181)
ar2 1.0813
(.2795)
Note: time dummies and a constant have been included but omitted here. P-values in
parenthesis. All GMM specications have been estimated with robust standard errors and BC
standard errors via bootstrapping with 50 repetitions.
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for inuencing the amount of convicted o¤ender negatively with an elasticity of
roughly -.1 for static FE. This is not in line with my initial expectations and
di¢ cult to interpret.
The variables reecting the amount of overall tried and convicted o¤ender fol-
low my previous suggestions. The number of tried (agg.tried) have negative elas-
ticities ranging from -1.3 to -2.4 and the number of convicted (agg.conv) a positive
one with values of 1.3 to 2.6. Both elasticities are highly signicant throughout all
specications.
The political variables included in my regressions show in most cases no e¤ects
on the amount of convicted environmental o¤enders. The share of green voters
(green.pref1) being the only exception indicating a signicant and positive inu-
ence with an elasticity of around 1.6. The estimates for strong green support are
positive but not signicant. The dummy for the greens is negative but insignicant
in case of static FE and the dummy for the conservatives has also no denite e¤ect
on convicted o¤enders.
26 Discussion
In this section I contrast previously stated conjectures with my empirical ndings.
The rst conjecture stressed the possible determinants of police clearing behavior
regarding environmental crime.
Result 1 I nd evidence for (a) the amount of reported cases of environmental
crime to increase with the amount of cleared cases. Moreover, there is also evi-
dence that (b) the growth rate of environmental crime has the intended shift e¤ects
as parameter estimates are positive, signicant and robust. There is no support
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for the hypothesis that the amount of tried environmental o¤enders decreases the
amount of cleared cases (c) through a opportunity cost e¤ect. The e¤ects of my
aggregate crime variables (d), however, are very denite. The amount of aggregate
crime points towards a signicantly negative e¤ect on the clearing of environmen-
tal o¤ences through a opportunity cost e¤ect. In contrast, the aggregate amount of
cleared cases is a positive driver of the amount of cleared environmental crimes.
For my political variables there is only evidence for the conservative dummy to
negatively a¤ect police success in clearing environmental crimes. The remaining
variables do not show up to have a signicant inuence on police behavior.
My results for the opportunity cost arguments conrm the ndings of Helland
(1998) in the context of EPA enforcement of pollution control laws. The author
nds that increasing the number of targeted companies by one standard deviation
signicantly reduces the probability of being inspected by the EPA by around -
.5. Moreover, I do also nd evidence for the argument that police may react to
changing crime rates as proposed by Miceli (1996). With respect to the political
factors, estimates support ndings in the existing literature that politicians may
have a signicant impact on enforcement decisions (Mete 2002, Shipan 2004, etc.).
The behavior of prosecution is the next key institution when stepping up the
enforcement process. Their key input in the production of tried suspects is iden-
tied suspects resulting trough the clearing of a crime cases. I summarize my
empirical ndings in the following paragraph.
Result 2 There is clear-cut evidence that the amount of suspects brought to
court increases with the number of identied suspects (a). Surprisingly, the growth
in environmental crime (b) again has a highly signicant and positive e¤ect on the
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amount of prosecuted suspects. I also nd support for my next hypothesis (c) that
a higher amount of aggregate suspects decreases the amount of tried environmental
o¤enders through a opportunity cost e¤ect. There is also evidence for the scope
e¤ect. The amount of aggregate suspects tried increases the amount of tried en-
vironmental o¤enders. A bit surprising and counterintuitive are the negative and
in some cases signicant estimates for the share of green votes. In contrast, the
share of green supporters point towards a positive and signicant e¤ect on tried
o¤ender. It is therefore not possible to draw clear-cut conclusions with respect to
environmental preferences. Being in line with this, the dummy variable for the
greens does not show up to have any e¤ect. However, there is again some evidence
that the conservatives have a negative inuence on enforcement of environmental
crimes.
In contrast to the theoretical considerations by Miceli (1996), I do nd evidence
that prosecutors react to changing criminal threat in the context of environmental
crimes. A higher growth in environmental crimes leads to a signicantly higher
amount of tried environmental o¤enders. In contrast to Ramseyer et al. (2008),
I do nd evidence for both political and production-based factors to inuence the
behavior of prosecutors.
The nal institution involved in the enforcement of crimes are courts repre-
sented by judges. Judges nally decide whether to convict a suspect and which
kind of sanction to impose.
Result 3 The input of tried o¤enders has the suggested e¤ect (a) of increasing
the number of convicted suspects. Contrary to initial suggestions and results for
previous enforcement stages there is evidence that the growth in environmental
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crime a¤ects the amount of convicted o¤ender in a negative fashion (b). Similar to
previous stages, however, the overall amount of tried suspects has a negative and the
overall amount of convicted criminals a positive e¤ect on convicted environmental
o¤ender (c) and thus supporting my opportunity cost and scope e¤ect hypothesis.
Contrary to my initial expectations I nd cautious support for public environmental
preferences to positively inuence judges decisions to convict o¤ender (d). Both
the share of green supporters and the share of green voters show positive estimates
which are in case of the share of green voters also signicant. The dummies do
not show up to be signicant in any specication.
Surprisingly, the growth in environmental crimes seem to negatively a¤ect the
amount of convicted o¤enders. As the results for previous stages were positive
it is not quite clear how to interpret this. However, there is again evidence for
political considerations to inuence judges decisions as the variables indicating
public environmental preferences seem to have a positive inuence. Although my
approach is rather novel, there is support in the literature that political factors
have an inuence on courts (Cohen 1987, Anderson et al. 1989, Salzberger and
Fenn 1999) or bureaucrats enforcement decisions (Headrick et al. 2002).
My last hypothesis focuses on the degree of political inuence at di¤erent stages
of the enforcement process. Although my empirical ndings do show evidence for
political economy factors being important determinants of agency behavior, the
degree of political inuence contradicts initial predictions.
Result 4 Except for the dummy for the German Green Party being in state
government, all political economy variables seem to inuence enforcement of envi-
ronmental crimes. Especially the dummy for the conservatives meant to reect a
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pro-industry policy has a negative and signicant impact on police and prosecution
in enforcing the German Environmental Penal Code. Moreover, there seems to be
at least slight evidence for the share of green voters to positively inuencing the
amount of convicted environmental o¤enders. However, as the degree of control
does not decrease but remains fairly constant while stepping up the enforcement
process, I do not nd support for my fourth hypothesis.
27 Conclusion to Part IV
The starting point of this paper was that the criminal justice system combines at
least three distinct institutions, police, prosecution service, and courts, in order
to enforce key regulations. This proliferation of agencies for a single public task
- while grounded in sound constitutional arguments - raises questions about the
scale of agency problems in criminal enforcement. These questions have not been
adequately examined from an empirical perspective and I believe that this paper
is one rst step in this direction.
The ndings of this paper add in a signicant way to existing literature. Firstly,
I rea¢ rm the usefulness of the production function approach as a powerful tool
for analyzing behavior of law enforcement institutions as pioneered by (Becker
and Stigler 1974). On its basis, the paper provides new evidence on the role of
economic and political factors for explaining the behavior of the criminal justice
system. Secondly, it is the rst paper to my knowledge to provide this evidence
not only at the level of one institution involved in criminal enforcement, but at all
three key stages of police, prosecution, and courts. This allows us to compare the
empirical record with institutional design choices. These choices would suggest
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that while the police and - to a lesser extent - the prosecution service can be
expected to be responsive to public preferences, the decisions of courts should
be independent of political factors. The empirical analysis, on the other hand,
nds evidence that both economic and political factors are present at all levels.
This means that - faced with scarce resources - police, prosecutors and judges
are forced to consider opportunity cost arguments when deciding how much e¤ort
to put into enforcement and that political factors inuence this decision at the
margin. It also means that political economy factors inuence agency decision
making in signicant ways. In line with previous results (Ramseyer et al. 2008),
there is evidence that pro-industry parties tend to decrease the enforcement of
environmental crimes while public environmental preferences have a positive e¤ect.
In addition, there is evidence that police and prosecutors respond to a growth of
environmental crime with increased e¤ort in order to provide further deterrence,
an empirical nding that contrasts with Miceli (1996).
Finally, on a geographical note, this is to my knowledge the rst paper to do so
for the context of Germany, thus demonstrating the applicability of the methods
in new legal contexts.
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28 Final Conclusions
The present thesis extends both the economic literature on the enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations and the general economic of crime literature by empirically
analyzing the e¤ectiveness of environmental criminal law. In addition, it provides
evidence for the determinants of police, prosecution, and courts in enforcing en-
vironmental laws. In line with the initial predictions, the empirical results show
that economic theory is a very powerful tool in explaining the behavior of both
environmental o¤enders and enforcement institutions.
28.1 The Contributions
The contributions of the thesis are manyfold. At rst, the thesis makes a rst step
to ll an important gap in the existing literature. It has been a shortcoming of
the discussion on the merits of criminal sanctions for environmental o¤ences that
the empirical evidence on their e¤ectiveness had so far not been systematically
examined. This contrasts with the case of administrative sanctions for which a
rich literature is available. Furthermore, and despite the obvious parallels with
the types of criminal behavior studied using the so-called economic model of
crime, the theoretical and empirical economic literature on crime had also largely
by-passed the area of environmental crime. Little was therefore known regarding
the extent to which the calculus of deterrencepostulated by Becker (1968) is
operational in the context of environmental sanctions. The present thesis provides
important new insights in the peculiarities of criminal enforcement in the context
of environmental crime. It adds a sound empirical analysis to the literature that
is able to uncover important new aspects in this context.
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The second contribution is that the new insights obtained in the present thesis
have important implications for the ongoing policy debates in the US (HoC 2003),
the EU (EC 2007) and several other countries. Findings support the beliefs of many
policy-makers that criminal enforcement is e¤ective in the context of environmental
law.
Third, the thesis provides clarication for the German case. Germany ex-
tended its Penal Code in 1980 to include important environmental laws and there
has been no verication of this decision until now. While a substantial part of the
German legal literature characterizes the German environmental criminal code as
ine¤ective and therefore redundant, the results obtained in part II and III indi-
cate otherwise. While rarely used, enforcement instruments restricted to criminal
sanctioning such as being identied as a suspect and being brought to a public
court have a substantial statistical e¤ect on reported environmental crime rates.
Fourth, the thesis adds a new geographical focus to the literature as most of
the surrounding literature relies heavily on data from the U.S. or UK.
Lastly, the results of the present thesis emphasize that criminal law is a pow-
erful tool for reducing the damages to society caused by environmental crime.
The results on the e¤ectiveness of criminal sanctioning suggest that enforcement
signicantly reduces the amount of crimes and therefore the amount of damages.
28.2 The Results
On the basis of the present thesis one can derive ve results that are of huge
importance for the general discussion.
First, with a view to validating the economic theory of crime, there is clear
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evidence that the calculus of deterrenceis indeed operational in the domain of
environmental crime. Especially the fact of being identied as a suspect and being
tried in a public court deters people from committing environmental crimes in
Germany. For the level of the German states there is also evidence that prison
sentences are e¤ective in the enforcement of environmental law. With respect to
their relative contribution to the deterrence e¤ect one can conclude that estimates
are mostly in line with economic theory. Clearance rates have the smallest e¤ect
followed by the rate of tried o¤enders and prison rates. However, conviction rates
and the rate of severe nes do not t into this frame as the estimates do not show
up to be signicant.
The second insight is the importance of the detection and reporting e¤ort
for understanding the variation in reported environmental crime. The positive
and negative contribution of citizensenvironmental awareness and pro-industry
parties, respectively, to the explanation of reported crime has in my view not
been empirically established so far. In contrast to felonies like murder, rape, etc.
the dark gure for environmental crimes is assumed to be rather high at least
for Germany. Although it is not possible to pinpoint the causal channels, the
thesis ndings in part II point towards environmental preferences of society and
the political orientation of parties in power to a¤ect the amount of reporting and
detection e¤orts in each state. This is a very important nding as enforcement in
either way rst of all requires that a crime is reported to police and thus nds its
way into o¢ cial statistics.
Third, the results for the analysis of the counties of Baden-Württemberg addi-
tionally suggest that structural factors and community characteristics do have an
impact on the amount of reported environmental crime. Especially the manufac-
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turing sector being one important source of waste seems to inuence the amount
of reported illegal waste disposals through various channels. I assume that these
factors do have an impact on reporting rather than on the actual amount of ille-
gal disposals. However, it will be subject to further investigations to identify this
relationship in more detail.
Fourth, according to the results obtained in part IV, an important nding is
that the behavior of institutions involved in the enforcement process can be de-
scribed by a production function approach. For example, the success of police in
clearing environmental crimes depends on the amount of reported cases and on
opportunity costs like the amount of overall crimes reported to police. Further-
more, institutional behavior also reveals scope e¤ects as police behavior in clearing
environmental crime depends on the amount of overall cleared crimes. The same
arguments hold for the behavior of prosecutors and judges. In line with the exist-
ing literature, there is also evidence for the growth rate of environmental crime to
a¤ect the behavior of involved institutions.
The nal result of the present thesis is that the outcomes of di¤erent enforce-
ment stages not only depend on input factors and opportunity costs as suggested
by production theory but also on political factors similar to the analysis in previous
parts. Although the degree of independence increases with enforcement stages, it
seems like the inuence of political factors remains fairly constant.
Taken together, the thesis contributes in a signicant way to a better un-
derstanding of the functioning of criminal law in the context of environmental
regulation. For this reason the thesis builds an important basis for several ongoing
debates discussing whether to strengthen or weaken criminal enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws. Although the analysis concentrates on German data, the thesis
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provides consistent results that allow decision makers to base their arguments on
reliable information.
28.3 Future Research
In order to provide additional verications for the results of the present thesis,
it would be of interest to compare the ndings to other empirical studies with a
similar research focus. Moreover, as the policy debates are not limited to Ger-
many or the EU, it will be of importance to have further evidence for di¤erent
legal environments and di¤erent geographical focuses. Especially the importance
of reporting and political determinants should attract more attention in future
research on the determinants of crimes in general and environmental o¤ences in
particular.
Another important area of further research is to examine whether criminal or
administrative enforcement is more e¢ cient in this context. It will therefore be
important to provide additional evidence for the e¤ectiveness of administrative
sanctions in enforcing environmental regulations in Germany. Finally, one would
have to analyze the e¢ ciency of both enforcement mechanisms. This would al-
low decision makers to compare both enforcement mechanisms for the same legal
environment.
Although the present thesis concentrated on empirical strategies, there is of
course need for theoretical analysis. Theoretical considerations in the context of
environmental crimes received an as low attention as the empirical counterpart.
Similar to the empirical ndings, further research questions include e.g. e¢ ciency
aspects of criminal enforcement or the importance of reporting. As shown in
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the present thesis, reporting may play a key role in the context of environmental
crimes. However, detecting and reporting environmental crimes is costly as it
requires a signicant amount of informations. Without having detailed knowledge
of a specic law or the relevant technical tools, it is in many cases impossible to
decide wether a specic emission or waste disposal is illegal or not.
It would be also interesting to analyze wether the more or less static setting
of criminal enforcement applied in most countries including Germany exhibits
disadvantages in contrast to dynamic aspects like bargaining, warnings or other
types of reciprocal interactions commonly used for administrative enforcement.
In order to establish the optimal amount of deterrence it may be e¢ cient to use
customized enforcement strategies preceding the criminal enforcement as this is
very costly.
Moreover, some peculiarities of the German environmental law like the admin-
istrative accessoriness should be analyzed in more detail. It is not clear ex ante
what the e¤ects are on o¤enders and on enforcement institutions. The fact that
bureaucrats decide on both what is legal and what has to be punished may have
distorting e¤ects on the enforcement of environmental laws.
188
References
[1] Albonetti, Celesta (1986): Criminality, Prosecutional Screening, and Uncer-
tainty: Toward a Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case
Processings, Criminology, 24, 4, 623-644
[2] Alvarez, Javier/Arellano, Manuel (2003): The Time Series and Cross-Section
Asymptotics of Dynamic Panel Data Estimators, Econometrica, 71, 4, 1121-
1159
[3] Anderson, Gary/Shughart, William/Tollison, Robert (1989); On the Incen-
tives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers, Journal of Law and
Economics, 32, 1, 215-228
[4] Andreoni, James (1995): Criminal Deterrence in the Reduced Form: A New
Perspective on Ehrlichs Seminal Study, Economic Inquiry, XXXIII, 476-483
[5] Arellano, Manuel/Bond, Stephen (1991): Some Tests of Specication for
Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to to Employment
Equations, The Review of Economics Studies, 58, 2, 277-297
[6] Ashenfelter, Orley/Eisenberg, Theodore/Schwab, Stewart (1995): Politics
and the Judiciary: The Inuence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes,
Journal of Legal Studies, 24, 257
[7] Baltagi, Badi (2006): Estimating an Economic Model of Crime Using Panel
Data from North Carolina, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21, 543-547
[8] Bar-Ilan, Avner/Sacerdote, Bruce (2004): The Response of Criminals and
NonCriminals to Crime, Journal of Law and Economics, XLVII, 1-17
189
[9] Baum, Christopher/Scha¤er, Mark/Stillman, Steven (2003): Instrumental
variables and GMM; Estimation and testing, Stata Journal, 3, 1-31
[10] Becker, Gary (1968): Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 76, 2, 169-217
[11] Becker, Gary/Stigler, George (1974): Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies, 3, 1, 1-18
[12] Benson, Bruce/Rasmussen, David/Sollars, David (1995): Police bureaucra-
cies, their incentives, and the war on drugs, Public Choice, 83, 21-45
[13] Binder, Michael/Hsiao, Cheng/Pesaran, Hashem (2005): Estimation and
Inference in Short Panel Vector Autoregressions with Unit Roots and Coin-
tegration, Econometric Theory, 21, 795-837
[14] Blumstein, A./Cohen, J./Nagin, D. (1978): Deterrence and Incapacitation:
Estimating the E¤ects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, U.S. Dept. of
Justice
[15] Blundell, Richard/Bond, Stephen (1998): Initial conditions and moment
restrictions in dynamic panel data models, Journal of Econometrics, 87,
115-143
[16] Blundell, Richard/Bond, Stephen (2000): GMM Estimation with persistent
panel data: an application to production functions, Econometric Reviews,
19, 3, 321 - 340
[17] Bond, Stephen (2002): Dynamic panel data models: a guide to micro data
methods and practice, Portuguese Economic Journal, 1, 2, 141-162
190
[18] Bourguignon, Francois/Sanchez, Fabio/Nunez, Jairo (2003): A structural
model of crime and inequality in Columbia, Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, 1(2-3), 440-449
[19] Boylan, (2005): What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers
of US Attorneys, American Law and Economics Review 2005, 7, 2, 379-402
[20] Bruno, Giovanni. (2005a): Approximating the bias of the LSDV estimator
for dynamic unbalanced panel data models. Economics Letters, 87, 361-366
[21] Bruno, Giovanni. (2005b): Estimation and inference in dynamic unbalanced
panel data models with a small number of individuals. CESPRI WP n.165.
Università Bocconi-CESPRI, Milan
[22] Budge, Ian/Klingemann, Hans-Dieter/Volkens, Andrea/Bara, Ju-
dith/Tanenbaum, Eric (2001): Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates
for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998, Oxford University Press
[23] Budge, Ian/Klingemann, Hans-Dieter/Volkens, Andrea/Bara, Ju-
dith/Tanenbaum, Eric (2007): Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates
for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe,
European Union and OECD, Oxford University Press
[24] Bun, Maurice/Carree, Martin (2005): Bias-Corrected Estimation in Dy-
namic Panel Data Models, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 23,
2, 200-210
[25] Bun, Maurice/Kiviet, Jan (2003): On the diminishing returns of higher order
terms in asymptotic expansions of bias. Economics Letters, 79, 145-152
191
[26] Bundesministerium der Justiz (2001): 1. Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht,
available at: http://www.bmj.bund.de/
[27] Bundesministerium des Inneren (2006): 2. Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht,
available at: http://www.bmi.bund.de
[28] Cameron, Samuel (1988): The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of
Theory and Evidence, Kyklos, 41, 2, 3001-323
[29] Cantor, David/Land, Kenneth (1985): Unemployment and Crime Rates in
the Post-Worl War II United States. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
American Sociological Review, 50, 3, 317-332
[30] Cherry, Todd (1999): Unobserved heterogeneity bias when estimating the
economic model of crime, Applied Economics Letters, 6, 753-757
[31] Cherry, Todd/List, John (2002): Aggregation bias in the economic model of
crime, Economics Letters, 75, 1, 81-86
[32] Cloninger, Dale/Lester, Sartorius (1979): Crime Rates, Clearance Rates and
Enforcement E¤ort, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 38, 4,
389-400
[33] Cohen, Mark (1987): Optimal enforcement strategy to prevent oil spills: an
application of a principalagent model with moral hazard, Journal of Law
and Economics 30, 2351
[34] Cohen, Mark (1999): Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Pol-
icy, in: International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics,
192
edited by Tom Tietenberg and Henk Folmer; Edward Elgar publishers, 44-
106
[35] Cohen, Mark (2001): Criminal Law as an Instrument of Environmental Pol-
icy in: Heyes, Anthony (2001): The law and economics of the environment,
Cheltenham, UK
[36] Corman, Hope/Mocan, Naci (2000): A time series analysis of crime de-
terrence and drug abuse in NYC, The American Economic Review, 90, 3,
584-604
[37] Cornwell, Christopher/Trumbull, William (1994): Estimating the Economic
Model of Crime with Panel Data, The Review of Economics and Statistics,
76, 2, 360-366
[38] Decker, Christopher S. (2003): Corporate Environmentalism and Environ-
mental Statutory Permitting, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 46, No.
1: pp. 103-129
[39] Deily, Mary E./Gray, Wayne B. (1991): Enforcement of Pollution Regu-
lations in a Declining INdustry, Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 21, 260-274
[40] Dezhbakhsh, Hashem/Rubin, Paul (1998): Lives Saved or Lives Lost: The
E¤ect of Concealed-Handgun Laws on Crime, The American Economic Re-
view, 88, 2, 468-477
193
[41] Di Tella, Rafael/Schargrodsky, Ernesto (2004): Do Police Reduce Crime?
Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack,
The American Economic Review, 94, 1, 115-133
[42] Drukker, David (2003): Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data
models. Stata Journal, 3, 2, 168-177.
[43] Earnhart, Dietrich (2004): The E¤ects of Community Characteristics on Pol-
luter Compliance Levels, Land Economics, 80, 3, 408-432
[44] EC (2007): Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of the environment through criminal law, European Commission
Sta¤Working Document, SEC(2007) 161
[45] Eckert, Heather (2004): Inspections, warnings and compliance: the case
of petroleum storage regulation, Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 47, 232-259
[46] Ehrlich, Isaac (1973): Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical
and Empirical Investigation, The Journal of Political Economy, 81, 3, 521-
565
[47] Ehrlich, Isaac (1996): Crime, Punishment, and the Market for O¤enses,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 1, 43-67
[48] Ehrlich, Isaac/Liu, Zhiqiang (1999): Sensivity Analysis of the Deterrence
Hypothesis: Lets keep the Econ in Econometrics, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 42, 1-2, 455-487
194
[49] Eide, Erling (2000): Economics of Criminal Behaviour, in: Encyclopedia
of Law & Economics, ed: Boudewijn Bouckaert, Gerrit De Geest, Edward
Elgar Publishing
[50] EPA (1999/2002/2006): Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accom-
plishments Report, O¢ ce of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Wash-
ington D.C.
[51] Epple, Dennis/Visscher, Michael (1984): Environmental Pollution: Modeling
Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence, The Journal of Law and Economics,
27, 1, 29-60
[52] Evans, William/Owens, Emily (2006): COPS and crime, Journal of Public
Economics, 91, 1-2, 181-201
[53] Fajnzylber, Pablo/Lederman, Daniel/Loayza, Norman (2002a): Inequality
and Violent Crime, The Journal of Law and Economics, 45, 1-40
[54] Fajnzylber, Pablo/Lederman, Daniel/Loayza, Norman (2002b): What
causes violent crime?, European Economic Review, 46, 1323-1357
[55] Faure, M. (2004): European Environmental Criminal Law: Do we really
need it?, European Environmental Law Review, 18
[56] Faure, Michael/Heine, Gunter (2006): Criminal Enforcement of Environ-
mental Law in the European Union, Springer Netherlands
[57] Forst, Brian/Brosi, Kathleen (1977): A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
of the Prosecutor, Journal of Legal Studies, 1977, 6, 1, 177-192
195
[58] Fullerton, Don/Kinnaman, Thomas (1995): Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit
Burning or Dumping, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
29, 1, 78-91
[59] Funk, Patricia (2004): On the E¤ective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent,
European Economic Review 48, 715-728.
[60] Garoupa, Nuno/Gomez-Pomar, Fernando (2004): Punish once or Punish
Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory
Penalties, American Law and Economics Review, 6, 2, 410-433
[61] Gould, Eric/Weinberg, Bruce/Mustard, David (2002): Crime Rates and Lo-
cal Labor Market Opportunities in the United States: 1979-1997, The Re-
view of Economics and Statistics, 84, 1, 45-61
[62] Granger, Clive (1969): Testing for causality and feedback, Econometrica, 37,
424-438
[63] Gray, Wayne/Deily, Mary (1996): Compliance and enforcement: air pollu-
tion regulation in the U.S. steel industry, Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management 31, 96-111
[64] Greenberg, David (2001): Time Series Analysis of Crime Rates, Journal of
Quantitative Criminology, 17, 4, 291-327
[65] Greene, William (2003): Econometric Analysis, 5th edition, Prentice Hall
[66] Hamilton, J. T. (1996): Going by the (Informal) Book: The EPAs Use
of Informal Rules in Enforcing Hazardous Waste Laws, in: G.D. Libecap
196
(ed.), Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic
Growth, 7, 109-155.
[67] Headrick, Barbara/ Serra, George/Twombly, Jim (2002): Enforcement and
Oversight: Using Congressional Oversight to Shape OSHA Bureaucratic Be-
havior, American Politics Research; 30; 608-628
[68] Heckman, James (1979): Sample selection as a specication error, Econo-
metrica, 47, 1, 153-162
[69] Heinz, Wolfgang; Spiess, Gerhard (1995): Viktimisierung, Anzeigeerstat-
tung und Einschätzung der Arbeit der Polizei durch die Bürger - Analy-
sen anhand der Bevölkerungsbefragung in den Projektstädten, in: Feltes,
Thomas (Hrsg.): Kommunale Kriminalprävention in Baden-Württemberg.
Erste Ergebnisse der wissenschaftlichen Begleitung von drei Pilotprojekten.
Holzkirchen/Obb. 1995, 93-122.
[70] Helland, Eric (1998): The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs: Stringency,
Enforcement, and Subsitution, Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 35, 242-261
[71] Helland, Eric (2001): Prosecutorial Discretion at the EPA: Some Evidence
on Litigation Strategy, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 19, 3, 271-294
[72] Heyes, Anthony (1998): Making things stick: enforcement and compliance,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14, 4, 50-63
[73] Heyes, Anthony (2000): Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforce-
ment and Compliance, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 2, 107-129
197
[74] Hoch, Hans (1994): Die Rechtswirklichkeit des Umweltstrafrechts aus
der Sicht von Umweltverwaltung und Strafverfolgung, Empirische Unter-
suchungen zur Implementation strafbewehrter Vorschriften im Bereich des
Umweltschutzes, Freiburg i.B.
[75] Horn, Murray (1995): The Political Economy of Public Administration: In-
stitutional Choice in the Public Sector, Cambridge University Press
[76] House of Commons (2005): Government Response to the Committees Sec-
ond Report of Session 2004-05 on Corporate Environmental Crime, available
at: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-o¢ ce.com
[77] Hsieh, Ching-Chi/Pugh, M. D. (1993): Poverty, Income Inequality, and Vi-
olent Crime: A Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies, Criminal
Justice Review, 18, 2, 182-202
[78] Innes, Robert/Sam, Abdoul G. (2008): Voluntary Pollution Reductions and
the Enforcement of Environmental Law: An Empirical Study of the 33/50
Program, The Journal of Law and Economics, 51:2, 271-296
[79] Interagency Working Group [IWG] (2000): International Crime Threat As-
sessment. Available at: http://clinton4.nara.gov
[80] Kahan, Dan M./Eric A. Posner (1999): Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A
Proposal for Reform Fo the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Journal of Law
and Economics 42, no. 1 , 365-391.
198
[81] Karpo¤, Jonathan/Lott, John (1993): The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear
from Committing Criminal Fraud, The Journal of Law and Economics, 36,
757-802
[82] Karpo¤, Jonathan/Lott, John/Wehlry, Eric (2005): The Reputational
Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, Journal of Law
& Economics, 48, 2, 653-676
[83] Kelly, Morgan (2000): Inequality and Crime, The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 82, 4, 530-539
[84] Kessler, Daniel/Levitt, Steven (1999): Using Sentence Enhancements to Dis-
tinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, XLII, 343-363
[85] Kiviet, Jan (1995): On bias, inconsistency, and e¢ ciency of various estima-
tors in dynamic panel data models, Journal of Econometrics, 68, 53-78
[86] Klick, Jonathan/Tabarrok, Alexander (2005): Using Terror Alert Levels to
Estimate the E¤ect of Police on Crime, Journal of Law and Economics,
XLVIII, 267-279
[87] Landes, William/Posner, Richard (1975): The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, The Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 3, 875-
902
[88] Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen (2006): Trends der Kriminal-
ität in NRW. Eine Zeitreihenanalyse unter Berücksichtigung demographis-
199
cher und ökonomischer Entwicklungen, Kriminalistisch-Kriminologische
Forschungsstelle Forschungsberichte Nr. 3/2006
[89] Langpap, Christian (2007): Pollution abatement with limited enforcement
power and citizen suits, Journal of Regulatory Economics 31, 57-81
[90] Laplante, Benoit/Rilstone, Paul (1996): Environmental Inspections and
Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec, Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management, 31, 1, 19-36
[91] LPB (2008): Eine kleine politische Landeskunde, Landeszentrale für
politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, available at: http://www.lpb-
bw.de/publikationen/politischelandeskunde/kpl_08.pdf
[92] Levitt, Steven (1996): The E¤ect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates:
Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 111, 2, 319-351
[93] Levitt, Steven (1997): Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate
the E¤ect of Police on Crime, The American Economic Review, 87, 3, 270-
290
[94] Levitt, Steven (1998a): The relationship between crime reporting and police:
Implications for the use of uniform crime reports, Journal of Quantitative
Criminology, 14, 1, 61-81
[95] Levitt, Steven (1998b): Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce
Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error, Economic In-
quiry, XXXVI, 353-372
200
[96] Levitt, Steven (1998c): Juvenile Crime and Punishment, The Journal of
Political Economy, 106, 6, 1156-1185
[97] Levitt, Steven (2002a): Deterrence, in: Wilson, James/Petersilia, Joan
(2002): Crime: Public Policies for Crime Control, ICS Press
[98] Levitt, Steven (2002b): Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate
the E¤ect of Police on Crime: Reply, The American Economic Review, 92,
4, 1244-1250
[99] Levitt, Steven/Miles, Thomas (2006): Empirical Study of criminal punish-
ment, in: The Handbook of Law and Economics, ed: Mitchell Polinsky and
Steven Shavell, North Holland
[100] Lohr, S. L. (1996): Interpreting Crime Statistics, Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 1996
[101] Lutterer, Wolfgang/Hoch, Hans (1997): Rechtliche Steuerung im Umwelt-
bereich, Kriminologische Forschungsberichte, MPI, Freiburg
[102] Machin, Stephen/Meghir, Costas (2004): Crime and economics incentives,
Journal of Human Resources, 39, 958-79
[103] Maddala, G/Wu, Shaowen (1999): A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests
with Panel Data and a New Simple Test, Oxford Bulletin of Economics &
Statistics, 61, 631-52
[104] Magat, Wesley/Viscusi, Kip (1990): E¤ectiveness of the EPAs regulatory
enforcement: the case of industrial e­ uent standards, Journal of Law and
Economics, 33, 331-361
201
[105] Marvell, Thomas/Moody, Carlisle (1994): Prison population growth and
crime reduction, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 10, 2, 109-140
[106] Marvell, Thomas/Moody, Carlisle (1996): Specication Problems, Police
Levels, and Crime Rates, Criminology, 34, 4, 609-646
[107] McCormick, Robert/Shughart, William/Tollison, Robert (1984): The Disin-
terest in Deregulation, The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 5, pp.
1075-1079
[108] Mc-Crary, J. (2002): Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the
E¤ect of Police on Crime: Comment, The American Economic Review, 92,
4, 1236-1243
[109] McDonald, Ziggy (2001): Revisiting the dark gure: A microeconometric
analysis of the under-reporting of property crime and its implications, British
Journal of Criminology, 41, 127-149
[110] McDonald, Ziggy (2002): O¢ cial Crime Statistics: Their Use and Interpre-
tation, The Economic Journal, 112, 85-106
[111] Mete, Mihriye (2002): Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments:
Politicians, Taxpayers, and the IRS, The Journal of Politics, 64, 2, 384-407
[112] Miceli (1996): Criminal Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion, Con-
temporary Economic Policy, 26, 2, 207-215
[113] Mustard, David (2003): Reexamining Criminal Behavior: The Importance
of Omitted Variable Bias, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82, 1,
205-211
202
[114] Myers, Martha/Hagan, John (1979): Private and Public Trouble: Prosecu-
tors and the Allocation of Court Resources, Social Problems, 26, 4, 439451
[115] Myers, Samuel (1983): Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employ-
ment Versus Punishment E¤ects, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98,
1, 157-166
[116] Nadeau, Louis W. (1997): EPA E¤ectiveness at reducing the duration of
rm non-compliance Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
34, 54-78.
[117] Naysnerski, Wendy/Tietenberg, Thomas (1992): Private enforcement of fed-
eral environmental law, Land Economics 68(1), 28-48
[118] Nicholas, Sian/Povey, David/Walker, Alison/Kershaw, Chris (2005): Crime
in England and Whales 2004/2005, Home O¢ ce Statistical Bulletin,
[119] Nickell, Stephen (1981): Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed E¤ects,
Econometrica, 49, 6, 1417-1426
[120] Obergfell-Fuchs, Joachim/Kury, Helmut/Robert, Philippe/Zaubermann,
Renee/Pottier, Marie-Lys (2003). Opferbefragungen in Deutschland und
Frankreich. Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform, 86, 1, 59
73.
[121] Ogus, Anthony/Abbot, Carolyn (2002): Sanctions for Pollution: Do We
Have The Right Regime? Journal of Environmental Law, 14, 3, 283-298
203
[122] Pesaran, Hashem/Shin, Yongcheol/Smith, Ron (1999): Pooled Mean Group
Estimation of Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels, Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association, 94
[123] Pesaran, Hashem/Smith, Ron (1995): Estimating long-run relationships
from dynamic heterogeneous panels, Journal of Econometrics, 68, 1, 79-113
[124] Polinsky and Shavell (1984): The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment,
Journal of Public Economics, 24, 89-99
[125] Polinsky and Shavell (2000): The economic theory of public enforcement of
law, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 45-76
[126] Polinsky, Mitchell/Shavell, Steven (2006): The Theory of Public Enforce-
ment of Law, in: Handbook of Law & Economics, eds., Vol. 1
[127] Pudney, Stephen/Deadman, Derek/Pyle, David (2000); The Relationship
Between Crime, Punishment And Economic Conditions: Is Reliable Infer-
ence Possible When Crimes Are Under-Recorded? Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, 163, 1, 81-97
[128] Raine, Adrian (2002): The Biological Basis of Crime, in: Wilson,
James/Petersilia, Joan (2002): Crime: Public Policies for Crime Control,
ICS Press
[129] Ramseyer, Marc/ Rasmusen, Eric/ Raghav, Manu (2008): Convictions ver-
sus Conviction Rates, The Prosecutorss Choice, Working Paper, Harvard
University
204
[130] Rickman, Neil/Witt, Robert (2007): The Determinants of Employee Crime
in the UK, Economica, 74, 161-175
[131] Roodman, David (2006): How to do Xtabond2: An Introduction to Dif-
ference and System GMM in Stata, Institute for International Economics -
Center for Global Development Working Paper
[132] Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1995): Controlling Environmental Policy: The lim-
its of Public Law in Germany and the United States, Yale University Press
[133] Salzberger, Eli/Fenn, Paul (1999): Judicial Independence: Some Evidence
from the English Court of Appeal, Journal of Law & Economics October, 42
, 2 , 831-47
[134] Saridakis, George (2004): Violent Crime in the United States of America:
A Time-Series Analysis Between 1960-2000, European Journal of Law and
Economics, 18, 2, 203-221
[135] Schall, Hero (2006): Neue Erkenntnisse zur Realität und Verfolgung der
Umweltkriminalität, in: Feltes/Pfei¤er/Setinhilper, Festschrift für Professor
Dr. Hans-Dieter Schwind zum 70. Geburtstag, 395-412
[136] Shimshack, Jay/Ward, Michael (2005): Regulator reputation, enforcement,
and environmental compliance, Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 50, 519-540
[137] Shimshack, Jay/Ward, Michael (2008): Enforcement and over-compliance,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55, 1, 90-105
205
[138] Shipan, Charles (2004): Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Con-
ditional Nature of Congressional Inuence, American Political Science Re-
view, 98, 3, 467-480
[139] Sigman, Hilary A. (1998): Midnight Dumping: Public Policies and Illegal
Disposal of Used Oil, Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 1
[140] Situ, Yingyi/Emmons, David(2000): Environmental Crime: The Criminal
Justice Systems Role in Protecting the Environment, Sage Publication, CA
[141] Sta¤ord, Sarah (2002): The E¤ect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with
Hazardous Waste Regulations, Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 44, 2, 290-308
[142] Statistisches Bundesamt (2003): Staatsanwaltschaftsstatistik, available at:
www.destatis.de
[143] Stigler, George (1970): The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 78, 3, 526-536
[144] U.S. Department of Justice, USDOJ (2005): Criminal Victimization in the
United States, 2004, Statistical Tables, NCJ 207811
[145] U.S. Senate (2003): Criminal and Civil Enforcement of Environmental Laws:
Do We Have all the Tools We Need? Hearing, U.S. Governmental Printing
O¢ ce, J10797
[146] Viladrich Grau, Montserrat/Groves, Theodore (1997): The Oil Spill Process:
The E¤ect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills, Environmental and
Resource Economics, 10, 4, 315-339
206
[147] Viren, Matti (2001): Modelling Crime and Punishment, Applied Economics,
33, 1869-1879
[148] Weil, David (1996): If OSHA is so bad, why is compliance so good? Rand
Journal of Eeconomics, 27, 3, 618-640
[149] Winter, Soren/May, Peter (2001): Motivation for compliance with environ-
mental regulations, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 20, 4, 675-
698
[150] Witte, Ann (1980): Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individ-
ual Data, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 1, 57-84
[151] Wittebrood, Karin/Junger, Marianne (2002): Trends in violent crime: a
comparison between police statistics and victimization surveys, Social Indi-
cators Research, 59, 2, 153-173
[152] Witzke, H. Peter/Urfei, Guido (2001): Willingness To Pay for Environmental
Protection in Germany: Coping With the Regional Dimension, Regional
Studies, 35, 3, 207-214
[153] Wooldridge, Je¤rey (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press
[154] Zhang, Junsen (1997): The E¤ect of Welfare Programs on Criminal Be-
havior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, Economic Inquiry, XXXV,
120-137
207
Part V
Appendix
A Appendix to section 1.3
Figure 6: The Development of Environmental Crimes in German States (1987/1993
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B Appendix to Part II
B.1 The Development of Strong Green Support
Figure 7: Share of Strong Supporters for the German Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die
Grünen, 1995 - 2005)
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Source: Politbarometer (ZA Cologne)
Note: Data from the Politbarometer survey provided by the ZA of the University of Cologne
was used to generate this variable consisting of two survey questions. The rst questions is:
"Do you tend to sympathize with a special party? When, which one is it?". The second one is:
"How strong is your sympathy for this party on a scale from 1 to 5?". I generated a variable
indicating the portion of people who denounced the green German party to the rst question
and one (very strong) to the second. This variable is denoted as the portion of people who are
"Strong Supporter of Greens". The present graph displays averages over all states.
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B.2 Estimates for Di¤erent Covariates
Table 25: BC Estimates for Di¤erent Covariates (Part II)
Regressors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Env. Crime Rate (Ln/Lag1) .7561*** .7624*** .8488*** .8462*** .8354*** .8422*** .8548***
Clearance Rate -3.711*** -3.719*** -3.329*** -3.469*** -3.389** -3.451*** -3.484***
Clearance Rate Squared 3.671*** 3.680*** 3.216*** 3.325*** 3.250*** 3.330*** 3.329***
Rate of Tried O¤enders -.7618*** -.7879*** -1.045*** -1.052*** -1.042*** -1.038*** -1.054***
Conviction Rate -.2087 -.2276 -.3009 -.2763 -.2918 -.3092 -.2849
Prison Rate -1.507** -1.500** -1.528*** -1.549*** -1.544*** -1.570*** -1.525***
Rate of Severe Fines .1896 .1157 .0420 .0910 .0682 .0592 .0762
Strong Green Support 1.993* 1.974* 2.317** 2.260** 2.288** 2.268** 2.295**
Dummy Cons -.1249** -.1238** -.0993** -.0928** -.0901 -.1021 -.1023
Real Police Exp (Ln) .1426
Real Exp Pro./Courts (Ln) -.0674
Real GDP per Capita (Ln) -.2298
Unemployment Rate .0060
Dummy Greens .0178
Dummy SD -.0091
Agg. Crime Rate (Ln/Lag1) -.1898
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Note: All estimates are produced with Bias-correction and standard errors through bootstrapping with 50 repeti-
tions. ***, ** and * indicating signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Time dummies have been
included but omitted here. Real Police Exp (Ln)and Real Exp Pro./Courts (Ln)indicate the natural logarithm
of real expenditures for police and for prosecution and courts, respectively. The dummies for conservatives, greens
and social democrats indicate whether the specic party was in the state government. The last variable indicates
the Ln of the overall crime rate with lag 1.
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C Appendix to Part IV
C.1 The Development of Enforcement for Environmental
Crimes in Germany
Figure 8: Proceedings of Environmental Crimes in Germany (1995 - 2005)
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Source: Federal Criminal Police Office/Research Data Centre (FDZ)
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C.2 Estimates for Di¤erent Covariates
Table 26: BC Estimates for Di¤erent Covariates (Part IV)
Exp. variables BC(cleared) Exp. variables BC(tried) Exp. variables FE(convicted)
cleared, lag .5527 tried, lag .5416
(0.0000) (0.0000)
cases .4279 o¤enders .3809 tried 1.0354
(0.0000) (0.0160) (0.0000)
CR growth .6257 CR growth .3029 CR growth -.1325
(0.0000) (0.0404) (0.0256)
agg.cases -.7469 agg.o¤enders -.5793 agg.tried -2.7638
(0.1379) (0.3998) (0.0066)
agg.cleared .5845 agg.tried -.0091 agg.conv 2.8395
(0.0732) (0.9887) (0.0017)
tried .0489
(0.2972)
cons -.1110 cons -.1520 cons .0172
(0.0181) (0.2125) (0.7728)
greens -.0240 greens -.0240 greens .0054
(0.6569) (0.8689) (0.9398)
green.pref1 .0581 green.pref1 -3.4383 green.pref1 1.7102
(0.8933) (0.0068) (0.0006)
exp.police .1221 exp.enf -1.0494 exp.enf .1454
(0.7571) (0.1410) (0.7056)
GDP -.6967 GDP -.6254 GDP .8631
(0.3050) (0.6319) (0.2182)
unemp -.0031 unemp -.0377 unemp -.0122
(0.8830) (0.2899) (0.5133)
N 137 N 121 N 120
Note: P-values in parenthesis. Time dummies have been included but omitted here. exp.police and exp.enf
indicate the log of real expenditures for police, and for prosecution and courts, respectively. GDPand unemp
stand for real GDP per capita and the unemployment rate in either state and year.
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